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Institutions are widely regarded as important, even ultimate drivers of economic 
growth and performance. A recent mainstream of institutional economics has 
concentrated on the effect of persisting, often imprecisely measured institutions and 
on cataclysmic events as agents of noteworthy institutional change. As a 
consequence, institutional change without large-scale shocks has received little 
attention. In this dissertation I apply a complementary, quantitative-descriptive 
approach that relies on measures of actually enforced institutions to study institutional 
persistence and change over a long time period that is undisturbed by the typically 
studied cataclysmic events. By placing institutional change into the center of attention 
one can recognize different speeds of institutional innovation and the continuous 
coexistence of institutional persistence and change. Specifically, I combine text 
  
mining procedures, network analysis techniques and statistical approaches to study 
persistence and change in England’s common law over the Industrial Revolution 
(1700-1865). Based on the doctrine of precedent - a peculiarity of common law 
systems - I construct and analyze the apparently first citation network that reflects 
lawmaking in England. Most strikingly, I find large-scale change in the making of 
English common law around the turn of the 19th century - a period free from the 
typically studied cataclysmic events.  Within a few decades a legal innovation process 
with low depreciation rates (1 to 2 percent) and strong past-persistence transitioned to 
a present-focused innovation process with significantly higher depreciation rates (4 to 
6 percent) and weak past-persistence. Comparison with U.S. Supreme Court data 
reveals a similar U.S. transition towards the end of the 19th century. The English and 
U.S. transitions appear to have unfolded in a very specific manner: a new body of law 
arose during the transitions and developed in a self-referential manner while the 
existing body of law lost influence, but remained prominent. Additional findings 
suggest that Parliament doubled its influence on the making of case law within the 
first decades after the Glorious Revolution and that England’s legal rules manifested a 
high degree of long-term persistence. The latter allows for the possibility that the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mankind’s ability to collaborate in large groups of genetically unrelated individuals and 
quickly adapt its behavior to changing environments is unique in the animal kingdom. No 
other animal species ever colonized and transformed so many different habitats, became a 
lethal threat to so many other animals, or appropriated such a vast amount of the 
biosphere for its own purpose. Through the increasing use of knowledge, symbolic 
representations and material artifacts humans were able to construct ecological niches in 
all kinds of habitats, modify selection pressures and pave the way to their unparalleled 
evolutionary success (Laland and O’Brien, 2011). The biological predisposition for 
cumulative culture appears in the eyes of many to be the main ingredient underlying 
flexible large-scale collaboration among humans (Boyd et al., 2011; Tomasello, 2014; 
Gintis and Helbing, 2015; Harari, 2015). It not only enables the transmission of 
advantageous information from individual to individual and from generation to 
generation, but also the effective construction of new advantageous information. Socially 
constructed values, norms, and institutions – sometimes called imagined realities – are 
manifestations of cumulative culture and play an essential part in the ability of human 
groups to collaborate and adapt. 
 Over the last decades values, social norms and institutions have gained1 
prominence in the field of economics, particularly through work that studies the causes of  
modern economic growth2. The modern, previously unknown phenomenon of intense and 
sustained economic growth3 – brought by the Industrial Revolution - is central to 
                                                 




economists and thought after by politicians because it results in drastic increases of 
material well-being and state power4. Last two centuries’ unequal occurrence of sustained 
economic growth resulted in large discrepancies in the wealth of nations and state 
power5, allowed Western states to dominate the globe for two centuries, and produced 
historically unprecedented levels of global wealth and income inequality (Milanovic, 
2012). Most individuals in today’s industrialized countries, live longer, are healthier, and 
consume more goods and services than most individuals in humankind’s history. How to 
ignite, maintain or accelerate economic growth is one of the main preoccupations of 
economists and policy makers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Values, social norms, and institutions also figure prominently in other subfields of 
economics. For example, in works that study deviations from purely self-regarding  
behavior (Henrich et al., 2001; Ostrom, 2005), differences in transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1998), questions of political economy (Tabellini, 2008a), or determinants of 
female behavior (Fernández, 2010). 
 
3 As demonstrated by rough estimates of historical income (e.g. Maddison 2007), and the 
Kuznets argument of absurdly low incomes if one would extrapolate modern growth rates 
to earlier times. For a qualification of this statement see Fouquet and Broadberry (2015). 
 
4 There are other benefits that are attributed to this type of growth. For example, 
Friedman  (Friedman, 2005, p. 4) argues that “economic growth - meaning a rising 
standard of living for a clear majority of citizens - more often than not fosters greater 
opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness and 
dedication to democracy.” . 
 
5 Economic differences in the wealth of nations and its impact on state power became the 
subject of systematic reflection before the appearance of modern economic growth. The 
increasing prominence of manufacturing and trade in 16th century Europe affected trade 
balances, and spurned a discussion on the benefits of manufacturing and the most 
advantageous composition of a state’s economic activities (in an era of frequent 
mercenary warfare, advantageous often meant the ability to pay for a large number of 
mercenaries). Serra’s 1613: “A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations” is 
one of the first treatises, while Adam Smith’s 1776: “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations” is the most famous one. 
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 While economists agree that intensive and sustained economic growth is the only 
road to general material well-being, they have debated for many decades how to achieve 
it. By drawing on Solow’s growth model and its later variants, one can distinguish post-
WWII explanations of modern economic growth according to the different aggregate 
production function factors they emphasize (roughly in historical order): physical capital, 
human capital and demographics, natural capital, and various determinants of total factor 
productivity: technological knowledge; values, social norms and institutions; or social 
capital and trust 6.  
 From a cultural perspective the apparently clear distinctions between the different 
production factors appear blurry. Cumulative culture permeates all of them. For example, 
trust and social capital - i.e. social networks resulting from repeated mutually beneficial 
social interactions - are indispensable for cumulative social learning. Imagined realities, 
knowledge, and technology derive their force from the inter-generational transmission of 
existing culture, the possibility to create the new from the existing and the spread of 
innovations within groups. Humankind’s ability for cumulative culture allowed it to 
                                                 
6 Each approach tends to see the emphasized aspect as the ultimate cause of economic 
growth, and the emphasis of previous approaches as proximate causes. The different 
emphasized aspects result in different policy prescriptions. When the focus is on capital 
accumulation one aims at rapid accumulation of physical capital, possibly by increasing 
savings rates and undertaking a government-led “big push”. If demography and human 
capital are at the center of attention, policies concentrate on fertility factors, education 
reform and health care programs. A preoccupation with natural capital results in policies 
that try to limit overuse of natural resources and establish ecological sustainability. To 
increase total factor productivity through knowledge, policies encourage transfer of 
know-how or create incentives for research & development activity. An institutional lens 
magnifies institutional setups, and tries to promote favorable institutional setups by 
improving regulations, governance mechanisms, the business environment and related 
institutional features. Finally, a social capital focus will try to avoid damage to existing 
social ties, and support beneficial social interactions (often non-market). 
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transform nearly the whole ecosystem of the earth into natural capital7. The transmission 
of cognitive and non-cognitive8 skills (particularly the latter often promoted by imagined 
realities) determines human capital and influences demographics. Tools, machines and 
vehicles are material artifacts that are useful only when embedded in knowledge 
structures and cooperation networks. Last, but not least, money - the grease of all 
commercial transactions - is an invention that draws on the symbolic skills of humans9. 
 The blurriness, of course, does not imply the futility of the distinctions between 
the different factors of the production function. The distinctions have guided analysis 
over many decades and proved to be useful. Generally speaking, distinctions allow the 
mind to focus on one dimension and follow it over time, to compare different dimensions 
at a given point of time, to study interactions between the different dimensions, or to 
realize the need for different distinctions. While I believe it worthwhile to point out the 
cultural connections between different factors of the aggregate production function, I will 
stick with the standard distinctions and – while maintaining a cultural perspective - 
concentrate on the institutional part and related research of economists. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, the proclamation of the “Anthropocene” (Zalasiewicz et al., 2008) 
and the subsequent debate. 
 
8 Non-cognitive skills - largely due to recent work of Heckman (see e.g. Heckman, 2013) 
- are a recent extension of economists’ notion of human capital. 
 
9 To avoid the appearance that I see culture as dominating everything, and intend to fire 
the conflict between idealist and materialist approaches, I would like to point out that I do 
not find it fruitful to accept the dichotomy between ideas and matter or between culture 
and nature. Culture is a biological adaptation that is common in many different species. 
Natural selection continues to operate on the genetic level and coevolves with culture. 
The ability for cumulative culture, however, seems to be a distinct feature of humans (see 
for example Richerson and Boyd, 2005). 
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The post-WWII economics literature on institutions and economic development is 
vast and spawns many sub-disciplines - among them economic history, comparative 
institutional economics, transaction cost economics, and political economy. This study is 
best understood as a reflection on a mainstream of the recent literature. That literature has 
a focus on institutional persistence. Empirically it manifests as searches for persistent 
institutional influences while its associated theoretical literature lays out formal models 
that are meant to represent mechanisms of institutional persistence. Institutional change is 
sidelined. 
The empirical literature first demonstrated a statistical cross-country association 
between different measures of values, social norms, institutions and various measures of 
economic performance (Hall and Jones, 1999; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Barro and 
McCleary, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). Subsequent studies used more sophisticated causal 
identification techniques to argue that these types of statistical associations reflect causal 
relationships (a few examples out of a long list are Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and 
Iyer, 2005; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Partly as a consequence of these studies and 
their causal identification strategies, institutional persistence - i.e. the unchanging 
influence of specific values, norms or institutions over long time periods - became the 
focus of a mainstream empirical literature. As of now numerous studies proclaim some 
kind of institutional persistence or assume institutional persistence in their identification 
strategies (for a good, fairly recent overview and an extensive discussion of seminal 
studies in this kind of literature see Nunn, 2009; for a very recent review with a focus on 
the interaction between values and formal institutions see Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).  
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A good part of theoretical work in institutional economics aims to outline 
mechanisms that produce institutional persistence (see e.g. Young, 1996; Coate and 
Morris, 1999; Tabellini, 2008b; Guiso et al., 2008). Most researchers seem to believe that 
values, norms, and institutions can have an effect only if they persist over long time 
periods10. Consequently, In the words of Acemoglu and Robinson: “Much of the 
empirical work and the conceptual discussion of the impact of institutions on economic 
development either implicitly or explicitly assumes that institutions persist.” (2006). In 
the same paper they immediately admitted that “…many aspects of institutions change 
frequently” before redirecting their research to the persistence of institutional outcomes 
or as they called it: “persistence of a cluster of economic institutions”. Examples of the 
clusters of economic institutions they suggested were constraints on the executive or the 
extent of property rights enforcement. 
 In my view the mainstream literature has at least three problematic features. First, 
because the literature is undecided between measuring institutional persistence or 
persistence of institutional outcomes the measures as such and the underlying concepts 
are often vague. Because values, norms, and institutions are difficult to quantify in 
present times and even more so in former times, researchers very rarely try to record 
actually existing social rules. The most common measures rely on surveys, expert 
opinions, or weighted outcome measures. Consequently, claims of institutional 
persistence based on these measures will tend to confound constant institutional 
characteristics with constant subjective perceptions, constant outcome measures, or 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, this is in opposition to the legal professions’ mainstream view that legal 
development neither stalls nor leaps. In Hutchinson’s (2005, p. 10) words: “Eschewing 
notions of revolution or stasis, most judges and jurists insist that law evolves 
incrementally rather than leaps convulsively or stagnates idly.”. 
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present day’s projections on the past (see e.g. Glaeser et al., 2004 for problems with 
measures of political institutions; or Voigt, 2013 for a more general discussion). Even if 
measures of institutional outcomes could be made unambiguous their benefits are 
unclear. Focusing on constant institutional outcomes in the presence of ongoing 
institutional change does not reveal much about the processes of institutional change. Or 
as  Wallis (2014) puts it: “If we do not follow the time pattern of specific institutions 
unfolding over time we will never understand the process of institutional change. By 
focusing on outcomes we take our eye off the ball.” 
 Second, emphasizing institutional persistence leaves the impression that most 
institutional change is superficial and that noteworthy institutional changes necessitate 
the occurrence of cataclysmic events, i.e. of drastic one-time events that produce large 
institutional changes in a short period of time. Examples of cataclysmic events are 
political revolutions, foreign invasions or some other massive outside interference (e.g. 
North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2008; Acemoglu et al., 
2011)11. Consequently, it is not surprising that quantitative empirical studies and 
theoretical models of institutional change are rare. While it is undeniable that cataclysmic 
events can result in large institutional changes, searching for large institutional changes 
only when such events have occurred unnecessarily restricts the study of major 
institutional change. It is at least conceivable that large institutional changes occur 
without preceding cataclysmic events.  
                                                 
11 I am aware that the sophistication of the mentioned authors allows them to see the 
possibility of major institutional change without cataclysmic events. My point is that the 
sheer number of studies on institutional change in the aftermath of cataclysmic events 
obscures the possibility. 
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 Third, an exclusive focus on institutional persistence limits the understanding of 
the nature of institutions. If one regards values, norms, and institutions as a form of 
cumulative culture it becomes clear that institutional change and institutional persistence 
always go together. While institutional change always occurs, a large part of values, 
norms, and institutions simultaneously persist for at least some time period. New values, 
norms, and institutions always build on existing ones. Humans cannot create new values, 
norms, and institutions out of thin air, and their symbolic minds depend on some degree 
of coherence. Sources of institutional change are various and often unexpected. For 
example, institutional innovation can result from individuals learning social rules in a 
different manner (Sperber and Claidière, 2006), from dissatisfied sub-groups using their 
imagination to modify institutions through recombination of the old, or from the need to 
adapt to changes in material artifacts, knowledge or ecology. Even sudden change during 
political revolutions, though very real, appears abrupt only because one sub-group of 
individuals was able to spread or enforce another set of slowly accumulated values, 
norms, and institutions. 
 In this study I try to address some of these shortcomings. In a nutshell, I will use 
quantitative measures of actually enforced social rules to study institutional persistence 
and change over a long time period that is free of cataclysmic events. Ideally one would 
be able to determine at any given point of time and for any group under consideration, 
which social rules exist (and are complied with), persist or change. Additionally one 
would be able to deconstruct the formation of new social rules. That way one could 
precisely answer questions regarding the length of institutional persistence, the speed of 
institutional change, and their coexistence. Processes that result in the formation of new 
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social rules could be illuminated. Moreover, one could classify social rules according to 
different criteria, study change and persistence of institutional categories, and possibly 
replace persistence of social rules with persistence of specific institutional categories. 
Finally, one could search for major institutional change in the absence of cataclysmic 
events. 
Living in a non-ideal world, I will not be able to address all of the above-
mentioned problematic features, and unavoidably need to embark on a more modest 
endeavor. Subsequently, I will restrict myself to institutional innovation in law in a 
specific location and time period. I will combine text mining procedures, network 
analysis techniques and statistical approaches to study persistence and change in 
England’s common law over the Industrial Revolution. I am not aiming to identify 
drivers of England’s legal change or causes of the Industrial Revolution, but hope to 
characterize main features of legal innovation in 18th and 19th century England. My 
analysis exploits a citation network that I construct based on the most comprehensive 
collection of English 16th to 19th century case reports. 
Various reasons speak for the choice of England as location, the Industrial 
Revolution as time period, and law as cultural dimension. England’s common law is, as 
of today, one of the world’s most influential law systems. It features prominently in the 
“legal origins” literature (for an overview see La Porta et al., 2008), provided the legal 
basis of the British empire, and constitutes the legal basis of the world’s only remaining 
superpower. The Industrial Revolution marks the beginning of the period of modern 
economic growth, the factors leading to the Industrial Revolution are still hotly debated 
(see e.g. Clark, 2007; Allen, 2008; Mokyr, 2009; Clark, 2012; McCloskey, 2010), and 
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developing countries are arguably trying to undertake a transition not too dissimilar from 
the one England undertook in the 18th and 19th century. Law, according to many scholars 
(for example, Scheiber, 1998; Lieberman, 2002), played a central role in 18th/19th century 
England12. Given its cultural centrality one can expect developments in the legal domain 
to have counterparts in other coevolving cultural dimensions, and, thereby, hope to gain a 
clue about general cultural developments13. Last but not least, law in 18th and 19th century 
England, unlike social norms or other social rules, has the benefit of an unbroken written 
record that is accessible to quantitative techniques. 
                                                 
12 Two quotes from eminent legal scholars may serve as illustration. Scheiber (1998) 
states: “David Hume, observing organized society's paramount task to provide for the 
administration of justice, conjectured that “the vast apparatus of our government [could 
be thought to have] ultimately no other object or purpose [but] the support of the twelve 
judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, 
ambassadors, ministers, and privy counselors, are all subordinate in their end to this part 
of administration.””. And Lieberman (2002) claims: “The eighteenth century, according 
to the judgment of its current historians, was England's century of law. As E. P. 
Thompson has put it, ‘'The Law' [was] elevated during this century to a role more 
prominent than at any period’ of English history. The culture of law, it is increasingly 
observed, extended throughout the social fabric, conditioning popular protest as much as 
formal public debate. ‘From the hue-and-cry to the macabre carnival of the public 
hanging,’ notes Roy Porter, ‘the law and its execution were not just Government fiats or 
ruling-class weapons but an intimate part of community life.’ Law and legal process were 
equally fundamental to the political dynamic of this community. ‘Most Englishmen 
experienced government and understood politics through their dealings with the law,’ 
John Brewer has argued. In this society, ‘all parties - government, radical and spectators 
... recognized the potency of [the law's] symbols and rituals, knew how significant a 
platform its institutions provided and what a powerful legitimizing force its endorsement 
could be.’”. 
 
13 A quote from Lord Kames (1696-1782) to substantiate this hope: “The law of a country 
is in perfection when it corresponds to the manners of the people, their circumstances, 
their government. And as these are seldom stationary, the law ought to accompany them 
in their changes. An institute of law accordingly, however perfect originally, cannot long 
continue so ... The knowledge, therefore, of the progress of law and of its innovations is 
essential.” (cited in Lieberman, 2002); Another quote along similar lines by Brooks 
(1998, p. 189) on England’s law courts: “Until it is proved otherwise it is a mistake to 
assume that judicial thought diverged significantly from other contemporary values.”. 
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The method of analyzing citation networks to advance the understanding of law is 
well established and has generated a large literature in American common law. Legal 
scholars began using the method not long after WWII. One of the first studies was carried 
out by Merryman (1954). He found that citation frequency of precedents decays with 
their age. In a landmark paper Landes and Posner (1976) advocated the use of a precedent 
capital model with depreciation and the systematic application of citation studies. About 
two decades later Posner (2000) further urged the legal community to make extensive use 
of citation analysis in scholarly inquiries and evaluations of the legal profession. Cross et 
al. (2011) gave a good overview over the literature including existing criticism. 
Unfortunately, there seems to exist no study that applies the approach to English law. 
That holds true even if one includes the burgeoning field of network science (for an 
excellent introduction see Newman, 2010). Though hundreds of publications investigate 
all kinds of citation networks (patents, scientific publications, cases), there seems to exist 
no publication about English law. 
 My citation-network-based study of persistence and change in England’s legal 
innovation process falls into two main parts. Chapters 3 to 5 form the first part and 
describe the construction and validation of a citation network that embodies English law. 
The second part, i.e. chapters 6 to 8, contains the core of the inquiry into legal persistence 
and change. Here I exploit citation counts to measure characteristics of the legal 
innovation process, analyze the emerging patterns and compare the findings.  
The study resulted in a few main findings. First, it produced a citation network of 
high quality that reflects English courtroom practice between 1580 and 1865. To the best 
of my knowledge this is the first time that a citation network on English law becomes 
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available. I went at great length to test the reliability of the data and the meaningfulness 
of its content. Second, I used information in the citation network to estimate a lower 
boundary for the long-term persistence of actually enforceable legal rules. Surprisingly, 
the degree of long-term persistence of 16th and early 18th century legal rules is very high. 
About 40% of preceding cases and statutes seemingly remained authoritative more than 
100 years after they were decided or enacted. This opens up the possibility that 
persistence of institutional outcomes derives from the actual persistence of institutions. 
Third, I found a major change in the influence that Parliament had on the making of case 
law. Within the first decades after the Glorious Revolution Parliament not only convened 
every year and enacted a steadily increasing number of statues, but also doubled the 
relative frequency with which its statutes were cited in court to about 30%. Fourth, 
possibly the most striking finding is a drastic change in making of common law during a 
period that was free from cataclysmic events. Within a few decades a legal innovation 
process with low depreciation rates and strong past-persistence transitioned to a present-
focused innovation process with significantly higher depreciation rates and weak past-
persistence. The transition accompanies the Industrial Revolution. A sharp transition in 
the legal innovation process is not peculiar to England: a similar, though apparently less 
drastic transition occurred in the United States towards the end of the 19th century. Fifth, 
relying on findings from a specific technique in network science it seems that the 
observed English and U.S. transitions unfolded in a very specific manner: apparently a 
new body of law arose during the transitions and developed in a self-referential manner. 
At the same time the existing body of law remained prominent even though the new body 
of law became prevalent. Sixth, while year-specific depreciation rates apparently have 
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not yet been systematically studied by legal scholars, they change drastically from about 
1-2% before the transition to about 4-6% after the transition. This suggests an 
acceleration of social life that is often associated with modernity.  
 The following chapters are structured as follows. In chapter 2 I will present a 
basic outline of the history of England’s common law that led to the vast collection of 
case reports called the English Reports. In chapter 3 I will explain how the electronic text 
of the English Reports was transformed into a citation network. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
the validation of the extracted data and the interpretation of the English Reports citation 
network. Chapter 5 confirms the meaningfulness of general patterns in the dataset and 
discusses the role of potentially confounding heterogeneities. Chapter 6 presents specific 
findings regarding the use of precedents in English courtrooms. Chapter 7 compares the 
findings of chapter 6 with analogous features of precedent use in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Chapter 8 presents findings regarding the use of statutes in English courtrooms. Chapter 9 
summarizes previous findings, draws conclusions, presents a few conjectures and outlines 
avenues of future research. 
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Chapter 2: The long way to the English Reports 
In this chapter I give an overview of England’s legal development within its political, 
religious, and European context. The history and context are helpful to understand the 
subsequent analysis and the meaning of citations in the English Reports. It should 
become clear that law is an important example of cumulative culture that builds the new 
from the past and possibly does so at different speeds. Law in England was administered 
in a peculiar set of courts that came to be dominated by the king’s superior common law 
courts. The common law courts introduced peculiar doctrines of precedent as criteria for 
good law. These doctrines conferred a central role to written case reports and their 
citation during court sessions. Thereby, citations of preceding cases open a window into  
the workings of common law. Until 1865 private case reporters recorded case reports. 
Most of the pre-1865 case reports were published together in a 20th century project 
named The English Reports. 
In the following sections I will introduce the writings of Harold Berman, which 
provide the framework for the chapter, and contrast them with general features of the 
related literature and, in particular, with the legal origins literature of institutional 
economists. Second, following Berman I will outline the emergence of a Western legal 
tradition in the aftermath of a papal revolution, before, third focusing on the emergence 
of English royal law, and, fourth, its embodiment in the superior common law courts. 
Fifth, I introduce the coexisting equity and prerogative courts and, sixth, sketch the 
Glorious Revolution with its ensuing predominance of common law. Seventh, I elaborate 
on the rise of two different doctrines of precedent and the importance of written case 
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reports. Eighth, I outline the history of case reports, before, ninth, concluding with the 
publication of the English Reports. 
Literature on the history of Western European law 
The overview draws to a large extent on two important books by Harold Berman (1983, 
2003). I find his interpretation congenial in its breadth, emphasis on legal influences of 
other cultural dimensions, long time horizon and comparative pan-European perspective. 
Moreover, Berman’s claim that the European legal development of the last 1000 years is 
best described as organic growth where the new consciously builds on the old 
exemplifies the constructivist, cultural evolution perspective used here. Although it is 
clear that Berman’s interpretation – like any interpretation - will filter legal history in a 
specific way and lose sight of otherwise notable features, Berman’s critics – even the 
fiercest ones - acknowledge the general correctness of his presented facts and figures 
(Landau, 1984; Peters, 1985; Ewald, 2005). Interestingly, one of Berman’s main biases - 
his belief that legal change proceeds slowly and incrementally unless it is interrupted by 
drastic legal change in revolutions - is very close to the current persistence bias in 
institutional economics. The notion that change occurs at different speeds is interesting 
and central to the study of history. However, the notion and the claim that accelerated 
change is linked exclusively to revolutions, appear to be quantitatively not well founded 
and warrant further investigation14. 
                                                 
14 For example, Thier (2013), in a recent contribution, states: “Berman’s contribution is 
of lasting importance for legal history research: It presents a reference model, which is 
perfectly suited to stimulate further research – be it as confirmation, be it as refutation of 
Berman’s ideas. Moreover, in highlighting and elaborating the importance of 
revolutionary change for legal evolution, Berman points to a phenomenon which may be 
called »temporal structure of law and legal change«: His description of Western law »as 
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Legal histories as broad and comparative as Berman’s are rare15. His differs from 
standard legal histories, which tend to focus on an isolated legal domain in a specific, 
modern country. Legal historians tend to focus on one country, while comparative 
lawyers tend to compare without much attention to history. Both breeds rarely try to 
integrate non-legal domains into their studies. For example, even in Zweigert and Köch 
(1998) - one of the best known comparative law textbooks - historical considerations 
serve more as highway to the present legal systens and their suggested comparative law 
framework than as serious inquiries into legal history. Baker (1990) is an example of a 
very learned legal history that is limited to one country and to interactions within the 
legal domain. In spite of a vast amount of detail, it is difficult to perceive an overall shape 
or situate England’s legal history within the English and European landscape. The 
famous English histories of Holdsworth (1922) and Milsom (1969) belong to the same 
kind.  
                                                                                                                                                 
moving forward in time« with a »time dimension« as defining mark, and his attraction to 
the dialectics and mechanisms of revolutionary change as opposed to evolutionary legal 
change points to an essential topic of history in general and legal history in particular: It 
is the notion that legal evolution does not happen as steady process with always the same 
speed. Instead, there are different evolutionary layers and, presumably, patterns with 
different speeds of historical time. Berman might be mistaken in his belief that only 
revolutions represent this kind of accelerated legal change, because there might be – 
depending from the changing cultural, social and economic contexts of legal normativity 
– other phenomena of such acceleration. But his argument for a deeper research on the 
evolutionary mechanisms of the Western legal orders in comparison to other legal 
traditions is certainly right.” 
 
15 Grossi (2010) and Lesaffer (2009), while focusing exclusively on civil law in the 
Continental European West, are some of the rare authors who take a broad perspective 
(here combining a long-term, comparative legal perspective with political and cultural 
context). Lesaffer makes the interesting point that European integration and legal 
harmonization encourage these kinds of projects.  
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Within institutional economics the characterization of English common law is 
closely associated with the so-called legal origin literature. In a series of influential 
studies (see e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; and for an overview La Porta et al., 2008) on 
the relationship between legal origin – a grouping of different countries into a handful of 
legal families16 – and various economic indicators, La Porta et al. essentially plot the 
more market-centered common law countries against the more state-centered (French) 
civil law countries. La Porta et al. argue that in the 18th and 19th century European 
colonizers (mainly England and France) transplanted their legal systems and 
corresponding legal styles17 to most of today’s countries and that the style of these 
transplants persisted. They connect the differences between the two European legal 
traditions with two accounts of English and French legal history: In one account the 
legacy of successful anti-royal resistance from landed gentry, wealthy merchants, and 
legal profession characterizes modern English law. The Glorious Revolution granted 
strong protection of property rights, robust enforcement of contracts, and judicial 
independence (Merryman, 1969; Zweigert and Kötz, 1998)18. In the other account the 
distinct character of English law was branded in medieval times and only deepened by 
the Glorious Revolution. The Magna Carta limited royal power (e.g. by guaranteeing a 
                                                 
16 Based on Zweigert and Kötz (1998). 
 
17 To La Porta et al. legal style means a legal system’s tradeoff between market 
failure/disorder and dictatorship/state abuse, i.e. a variation on the current market vs. 
government theme (e.g., stated in Djankov et al., 2003). 
 
18 In France – according to this account - the association of judges with the Ancien 
Regime and the revolutionaries’ attempt to rework the material basis of society ended in 
codification of all rules and docility of state-dependent judges. 
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due process of law, or the use of juries (Dawson, 1960) and laid the foundations of 
England’s legal system19. 
 Both accounts including the stark dichotomy between common law and civil law 
do contrast with Berman’s account. While Berman supports the medieval origins of 
differences between the legal systems and recognizes distinctive English and French 
features at the end of the 15th century20, he emphasizes that to a non-European the 
differences would appear minor and that both legal systems simultaneously incorporated 
features of the other. In general, European lawyers enjoyed a standardized education at 
the medieval universities. Even the English Inns of Court - established in the 14th century 
as an alternative to Oxbridge university education - were profoundly influenced by legal 
science as it was practiced at the European universities (see e.g. Berman, 1983, p. 162). 
At the end of the 15th century a European legal professional did not have large difficulties 
to adjust to the legal order of a different European state and often enough migrated from 
one to another. Moreover, the two modern legal families arose from royal jurisdictions, 
which more or less simultaneously expanded into feudal jurisdictions, became partly 
professionalized, opened space for the superiority of law over rulers, and aimed at 
consistency across cases21. Berman traces the ahistorical urge to overemphasize legal 
differences between England and France to the need to justify England’s anti-royal 
                                                 
19 By this account, the king in France copied the bureaucratic inquisitorial system of the 
church to reduce a lack of central control. This was the beginning of a century-long 
struggle between center and regions. Napoleon achieved victory for the center. 
20 E.g. oral versus written procedure, mainly lay versus professional jurors, adversarial 
versus inquisitorial trials, more particularistic versus more systematic, more Germanic 
versus more Roman, limited forms of actions versus comprehensive law (Berman, 1983, 
p. 477). 
 
21 Berman (1983), pp. 478-480. 
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resistance in the 17th century and, more importantly, to the nationalism of the 19th and 
20th century22. Finally, Berman depicts the different Western European legal systems as 
participants in an ongoing dialogue, i.e. as connected subsystems in an overarching 
European system23. When major change occurred in one legal system it reached sooner or 
later the other legal systems. For example, the French Revolution’s adoption of 
rationality, individualism, and utilitarianism resulted in codification and legal reform 
movements across all of Europe24. The Russian Revolution marked a general European 
tendency towards legal positivism and increased government interference. 
Origins of Western European law 
The Western European distinction between government, law, norms, and values is a 
fairly recent one. According to Berman (1983) until the 11th century laws and judgments - 
usually not recorded in writing - came from popular assemblies and only in rare cases 
directly from kings. Laws and judgments back then were largely reactive, based on 
custom, and often drastically different from one nearby place to another. A professional 
body of lawyers, judges and legal scholars did not exist. The pope’s 11th century attempt 
                                                 
22 This is the context in which the notion of  “democratic, individualist, empirical, Anglo-
Saxon or Germanic theory of law and government versus an autocratic, collectivist, 
dogmatic Romanist one” emerges (Berman, 2003, pp. 460–461). 
 
23 The exclusive focus on Europe, the lack of clear European borders and the neglect of 
Europe’s interconnections with the rest of the World have become the center of an 
interesting debate about the limitations of European legal history (see e.g. Duve, 2013). 
However, because the apparent limitations are not immediately relevant to the questions I 
am investigating here, the usefulness of Berman’s account remains untouched. 
 
24 In that context the American Revolution appears as a hybrid of the English and French 
systems. A written constitution, the separation of powers (driven to the extreme by an 
English political system inspired Montesquieu), a government accountable to the voters, 
and individual freedoms exhibit the influence of the French Revolution (Berman, 1983, p. 
51). 
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to centralize authority over the whole Western church and gain independence from 
worldly powers resulted in a fundamental change - the Papal Revolution. The papacy set 
up a separate chancery, treasury, and professional judiciary to govern the reformed body. 
It fostered a legal system called canon law, which embodied the spirit of the supreme rule 
maker, symbolized the distinctiveness of the Church, and standardized interactions with 
secular authorities. Law was systematized with the help of a new so-called scholastic 
method, uniformly applied across far away places, and increasingly perceived as an 
autonomous, continuously evolving body. The legal corpus grew in stature, and 
transformed itself from a servant of rulers to an authority, in principle, entitled to rein in 
rulers25. Berman realizes that refererence to the rule of law in front of a ruler was at times 
a bold and dangerous. 
From the late 11th century onwards, secular treasuries, chanceries, law-making 
bodies, dedicated courts, cohorts of legal professionals, legal writings, and a whole 
cultural dimension of law emerged all over Western Europe (Berman, 1983). Multiple 
secular jurisdictions (Berman names feudal, manorial, mercantile, urban, and royal ones) 
                                                 
25 For example, the “Sachsenspiegel, written in the early thirteenth century about the 
time of Bracton, stated that "a man must resist his king and his judge if he does wrong, 
and must hinder him in every wrong, even if he be his relative or feudal lord. And he 
does not thereby break his fealty." Likewise a famous legal formula of Aragon stated that 
subjects will obey a king only so long as he performs his duties, "and if not, not." 
(Berman, 1983, p. 192). One can see here the origin of the modern idea of the Rule of 
Law or Rechtsstaat. Rule of Law here means “what Lord Dicey, who invented the phrase 
in 1885, meant by it: that statutes, regulations, rules, and other laws that are adopted by 
lawmaking authorities within a polity must conform to fundamental principles of justice, 
fundamental principles of right, fundamental principles of Law with a capital "L"—or 
else they have no legal validity. The rule of law, Dicey said, is the supremacy of law over 
the lawmaking authorities, over the state itself.” (Berman, 2007). The specific rules found 
in the English Magna Carta of 1215, in the Hungarian Golden Bull of 1222, or in towns’ 
charters of liberties are expressions of these principles. 
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began to coexist and compete with each other and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Strongly 
influenced by the pan-European ecclesiastic canon law, location-specific secular law 
systems began to grow out of local customs.26 Among the secular law systems royal law 
generally increased its authority. At the same time royal governance became increasingly 
concentrated on a small professional body named the “king’s council”. The body 
included a chancery, a treasury, and the soon to be spun-off royal courts. Even though 
some important legislative acts were enacted, royal legislation consisted mainly in the 
definition of wrongs, remedies, and procedures applicable within the royal courts. Within 
the various European territories royal law was applied more and more uniformly, earning 
it the name common law (ius commune - a term previously associated with the 
universally applicable parts of canon law or the rediscovered Roman law).  
Berman (e.g. 1983) attributes major shifts in Western Europe’s legal development 
exclusively to drastic events like the Papal Revolution or the French Revolution (his 
stance is similar to current inclinations in the mainstreams of institutional economics; 
there cataclysmic events like the Big Bang of the Glorious Revolution (North and 
Weingast, 1989), the arrival of Napoleon’s armies (Acemoglu et al., 2011), or the arrival 
of Western colonialists (Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2008) fullfill the 
function). According to Berman these events went hand in hand with new ideas about 
what the purposes and sources of law should be, or more generally about what constitutes 
                                                 
26 For example, Glanvill’s and Bracton’s writings in England, Beaumanoir’s work in 
France, von Repgaus’s work in Germany, or the Liber Augustalis in Sicily are region-
specific examples (Berman, 1983). 
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good law27. The new ideas - even though initially hostile to the traditional legal corpus – 
ultimately incorporated the old body of law, and simply redirected its growth. Even when 
drastic events and related legal ideas were region-specific, the ideas spread and their legal 
repercussions were felt across all of Western Europe. 
For example, the Lutheran Reformation movement shifted the course of legal 
development in regions that fell under its spell. Lutherans promoted a so-called “two 
kingdoms” theory, which confined the Church to the heavenly kingdom while it 
expanded secular authority – exercised by a Christian, justice-loving prince - to the whole 
earthly kingdom of sin and death. Law – derived from the Bible and the prince’s 
ordinances - was meant to point sinners to their sinfulness and facilitate repentance, to 
deter sinners from actions hurtful to their community, and encourage the righteous to live 
just lives. Consequently, Lutherans erected state churches subordinate to the prince, 
based law on a new fundament, aimed at unification of all law using a new so-called 
topical method, and gave law professors an exalted role in the adjudication of difficult 
cases. These developments partly spilled over to non-Lutheran regions. For example, the 
powers of secular rulers increased across most of Western Europe. 
Origins of English law 
The development of English law reflects the pattern outlined above (Berman, 1983). 
During the reign of Henry II (1133-1189), and through the martyrdom of Thomas Becket, 
the pope was able to consolidate his influence over English churches, and achieve more 
freedom from royal and ducal domination than in most other parts of Europe. Multiple 
                                                 
27 To determine what makes good law one needs to answer questions like: What is law?, 
What are the purposes of law? What are the sources of law (e.g. politics, morality, 
history/culture)? What makes people obey or disobey law? (Berman, 1998). 
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competing secular bodies of law arose from pre-existing customs. In response to the 
pope’s large influence, the English king expanded his jurisdiction further than in most 
other European kingdoms. However, it took another five centuries until the common law 
jurisdiction eclipsed all other jurisdictions. To compete with the sophistication of 
ecclesiastical governance and canon law, Henry II instituted governmental and legal 
innovations similar to the ones by the church. A treasury (named Exchequer and running 
a court, which investigated treasury related wrongs), a chancery (overseeing all 
government functions), a permanent court (later known as Court of Common Pleas), and 
a court traveling with the king (soon to become the Court of King’s Bench) arose as 
powerful, distinguishable and centralized arms of governance. The professionalized 
departments allowed the king to govern his kingdom without being continually on the 
move or even without being in England. All the departments belonged to the permanent 
council and household of the king (curia regis). Following Norman tradition a temporary, 
large council (magnum concilium) – the highest authority in the kingdom - was 
occasionally summoned to legislate, adjudicate28, and authorize taxes. The large council 
came to be called Parliament in the 13th century and split into the House of Commons and 
House of Lords in the 14th century. 
Henry II reformed royal law and became the father of English common law by 
defining a limited number of wrongs, establishing standardized procedures to judge 
particular wrongs, and providing specific remedies that would become available once the 
wrong was confirmed (Berman, 1983). The initial wrongs comprised felonies and 
                                                 
28 The legislative and judicative functions were initially not separated. Even as late as the 
17th century the legal profession did not make a clear-cut distinction between legislation 
and adjudication (Baker, 1990, p. 238). 
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landhold issues - two main sources of violent unrest in medieval England. To obtain 
justice for one of the available wrongs a plaintiff had to obtain a so-called writ from the 
chancery (a brief royal order in written form). Imitating procedures in canon law, the writ 
ordered plaintiff and defendant to appear in front of a jury, but made no other 
prescriptions. The jury gathered information before the trial, and communicated their 
verdict on the day of trial to one of the king’s itinerant judges. The remedy was then 
ordered without further investigation. Like cases were decided alike (a feature that was 
common in the developing law systems all over Western Europe). The introduction of a 
standardized writ-jury procedure allowed Henry II to gain legitimacy and expand into 
other jurisdictions. At the same time, the procedure limited his direct interference and 
royal power.  
The English king’s jurisdiction continued to expand until the second half of 
the13th century. The standardized writ-jury system remained unchanged, but the chancery 
created hundreds of new types of writs and addressable wrongs (important new writs 
covered trespass, money debts, or chattel returns). These writs and the corresponding 
procedures (also called forms of actions) constituted the core of the first legal treatises on 
English common law (e.g. Glanvill in 1189, and Bracton in the 1230’s). The explosive 
growth of writs ended in the second half of the 13th century when it threatened to become 
unmanageable. The chancellor was forbidden to issue new typers of writs without the 
approval of the king’s council, and consequently the chancery writs remained essentially 
fixed until the 19th century. To adapt the fixed forms of action to a changing world, 
fictions, i.e. court-sanctioned construction of fictitious facts, were used to apply existing 
writs to situations that would otherwise not fit the writ (Baker, 1990).  
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Common law courts 
Until a single High Court was formed in 1875 three courts had the role of superior 
common law courts (Baker, 1990): the Court of Common Pleas (initially presiding over 
cases in which the king had no direct interest – i.e. common pleas, and the first court to 
take a permanent seat in Westminster Hall), the Court of King’s Bench (initially a 
traveling court presiding over important cases in the presence of the king, and later - in 
the 14th century – joining the Court of Common Pleas in Westminster Hall without the 
king), and the Court of The Exchequer (initially handling cases related to the Crowns 
revenue streams). In case of error the Exchequer Chamber (established in 1585), the 
King’s Bench, or the House of Lords could revisit a closed case. 
The jurisdictions of the three common law courts overlapped and changed over 
time. Each court financed itself by fees, and litigants tried to exploit minor differences 
between the courts. Therefore, courts often tried to expand their jurisdiction, while 
litigants tended to prefer one court to another. Moreover, the number of litigated cases 
fluctuated strongly over time (Brooks, 1998, chap. 4, 5; for example, litigation dropped at 
the end of the 17th century before it began to rise again in the second half of the 18th 
century). Consequently, the temporal distribution of business between the courts was 
unstable and showed a complicated dynamics (Baker, 1990, chap. 3). For the purpose of 
this study, it suffices to say that by the end of the 17th century all 3 courts had comparable 
jurisdiction over common pleas. They differed in that the King’s Bench had a judicial 
review function in case of error and the right to hear criminal cases, the Common Pleas 
(also called Common Bench) had exclusive jurisdiction over a subclass of common pleas, 
and the Exchequer had exclusive jurisdiction over revenue cases. From the 18th century 
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onwards the judges of the superior common law courts had equal status, authority, and 
function, and were commonly referred to as the “twelve judges”29. Each court consisted 
of 4 judges who heard cases in Westminster Hall 4 terms a year over a period of 3-4 
weeks. The setup in Westminster Hall was peculiar: the courts operated in the vicinity of 
each other, next to shopkeepers and amid a chatting public (see Figure 1). When judges 
did not preside in Westminster Hall they frequently went on circuit to trials outside 
London or participated in other judicial functions. 
Equity courts and prerogative courts 
The inflexibility of the writ system created situations where the English sense of 
fairness/equity was violated (Baker, 1990, chap. 6). That might have been because a writ 
for a wrong did not exist, because a standardized writ resulted in remedies that did not 
remedy the wrong suffered, or because the due process guaranteed by common law was 
corrupted. Consequently, the king and his council (including the Parliament) received 
many petitions that appealed to the king’s grace and prerogative of justice. To remedy 
individual cases where justice was not within reach of the common law, the king’s 
chancellor or councilors investigated the cases and made arrangements. Over time the 
recurring petitions established the Court of Chancery and various conciliar courts. 
Among the best-known conciliar courts were the Privy Council (the modern version of 
the king’s council and the mother of the modern Cabinet), the Star Chamber (consisting 
of privy councilors and common law judges), and the Court of Admiralty (having 
jurisdiction over the high seas). The chancery and conciliar courts relied heavily on canon 
                                                 
29 See footnote 12 for an example. 
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law and the Roman law (rediscovered in 1070 and taught in Oxford and Cambridge) 
thereby fueling the suspicions of the common law courts. 
The Court of Chancery stands out in that it developed a legal system clearly 
distinct from the common law. A peculiar blend of the Aristotelian concept of equity 
(necessary when strict application of universal rules fails in a specific case), Christian 
ideas of conscience, legal systematizing, and the chancery’s freedom from the writ 
system generated a new body of law called equity. While complementing each other, 
common law courts and chancery competed for larger jurisdictions, legal superiority, and 
business. The number of cases that could be heard in the chancery was limited, because 
the Lord Chancellor’s presence was mandatory during the whole process. Only in the 19th 
century were high-level proxies of the chancellor, i.e. the Vice-Chancellor or the Master 
of Rolls, allowed to hear cases autonomously. 
The 16th and 17th century legal developments in England were strongly influenced 
by the Protestant Reformations (Berman, 2003). A pan-European movement towards 
absolutist reign justified by a divine right of kings exhibited itself in England as Henry 
VIII’s (1491-1547) drive to expand royal powers over church, nobility, and urban 
centers. When Henry VIII’s urge to secure the Tudor’s reign through a male heir met the 
pope’s refusal to divorce the king, Henry seized the opportunity provided by the 
Reformation, and separated the English churches from the Roman-Catholic church. He 
then - like the Lutheran princes - erected a state church subordinate to the king and 
expropriated the assets and income streams of monasteries. Similar to the Lutheran 
princes he reformed the king’s council - renamed Privy Council – by reducing its size, by 
professionalizing civil service, by creating ministries detached from the royal household, 
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and by independently selecting the Privy Council members. Henry VIII summoned and 
presided over Parliaments more frequently than previous kings even though he kept 
proclaiming many more laws without the involvement of Parliament. He strengthened the 
conciliar courts, and greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. These 
governmental arrangements remained largely unchanged over more than 100 years until 
the second half of the 17th century. 
The Glorious Revolution and the predominance of common law 
The second half of the 16th and 17th centuries saw in Europe an often violent antagonism 
between Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic churches (e.g. in France, the Netherlands, and 
the German Empire). In England, Catholics loyal to the pope experienced persecutions, 
while Lutherans, Calvinists and Puritans were the target of mockery and repression 
(Berman, 2003, chap. 7). Before the background of religious tensions a European 
backlash against the rise of absolutist rulers occurred in the 17th century (e.g. in France, 
the Netherlands, and Spain). In England the House of Commons did not want to comply 
with the king’s requests for increasingly arbitrary taxation, and the common law judges - 
under the leadership of Edmund Coke - attempted to curtail the jurisdiction of the 
conciliar and chancery courts. The king responded with imprisonments, dismissals, and 
charges from the conciliar courts. The religious and political confrontations expressed 
themselves in revolts and civil wars, before culminating in the Thirty Years’ War and 
England’s Glorious Revolution. 
 The Glorious Revolution represents Berman’s (2003) next major legal shift in 
Western European legal development. The replacement of the Stuart king, the Bill of 
Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Hanoverian succession, and failed attempts to reverse 
 29
newly won rights over the kings or reinstitute the Catholic Stuart monarchy, cemented the 
constitutional monarchy and constraints on the king. As a consequence, Parliament’s, i.e. 
landed gentry’s and wealthy merchants’, supremacy over the king crystallized30, and non-
Anglican Protestant denominations, including Calvinism, were respected. Within 
England’s legal domain the common law courts gained weight, while courts closer to the 
king (i.e. the Chancery and conciliar courts) lost it. For example, the common law courts 
gained exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases and thereby ended inquisitorial trials 
from the conciliar courts. Furthermore, Anglo-Calvinist belief - for example, the idea that 
England’s status as God’s elect nation reveals itself in history -, a Parliament with two 
adversarial parties, and the already existing influential legal guilds nourished an 
idiosyncratic legal system. Good law now unanimously meant continuity with the past 
and ceaseless debate about which principles to derive from previous cases. A lot of effort 
was spent to find continuity with laws of ancient times, precedents gained an authority 
they did not have before, and by interpreting precedents judges acquired new law-making 
powers. 
Doctrines of precedent 
Earlier, the effect of preceding judicial decisions was confined to the parties in trial and 
to the illustration of existing legal principles (Berman, 2003). Single decisions had no 
normative force beyond the single case and did not function as a source of law. 
According to Bracton, one judged by reasons and not by examples. While judges 
intended to judge like case alike – a principle built into the writ system -, they withheld 
                                                 
30 From 1689 onwards Parliament met every year and regularly enacted new statutes, 
whereas it was convened only sporadically before the Glorious Revolution (Hoppit, 
1996). 
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judgments when they could not agree on how to apply general legal principles to a 
specific case. All this changed over the course of the 17th century when a doctrine of 
precedent emerged.  
The doctrine of precedent turned preceding judicial decisions, i.e. the past, into an 
essential source of law31 and bound later courts in analogous cases (Berman, 2003). The 
doctrine relied on a distinction between necessary (“holding”) and unnecessary 
(“dictum”) parts of a judgment. The holding, i.e. the judges’ statements that were 
necessary to a decision, was (and still is) the part that later became binding on analogous 
cases. The dictum was (and still is) essentially a residual category and contained judges’ 
non-necessary deliberations. A precedent holding - if applied by different judges to 
different cases - could become a local principle. In the 17th and 18th century it became a 
sign of good law/good judging not to deviate from an established principle except for 
very weighty reasons32. Precedents and principles within the same court had (and have) 
                                                 
31 Because statutes came to have higher authority than precedents, and because judges 
were allowed - in the absence of applicable statutes - to draw on other sources of legal 
norms (incl. customs, common sense, etc.) the doctrine of precedent does not single out 
the past as the sole source of law. 
 
32 According to the great 18th century judge Lord Mansfield :”It is the reason and spirit of 
cases that make law, not the letter of particular precedents.” Here, it is interesting to note 
a parallel in the approach to scientific knowledge that emerged around the same time in 
the Royal Society (formally founded in 1660 out of regular gatherings of natural 
philosophers, and only subsequently chartered by the king in 1662; in the context of the 
legal origin literature it is remarkable that the French counterpart, the Academy des 
Sciences, was founded by royal decree as a government organ in 1666). Gentlemen - no 
farmers, no workers, and no women - and thereby presumably trustworthy beings 
(Shapin, 1994) - met to discuss science in a latitudinarian manner (Shapiro, 1968) and 
carry out experiments. If small circles of gentleman agreed on an experimental finding a 
fact was established. A large number of related facts lead to the extraction of a credible 
law. The statutes of the Royal Society explicitly ruled out discussions about religious or 
political matters (analogously to the Academy des Sciences). This approach was one 
attempt to overcome ad hominem attacks as well as the political and religious divisions of 
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higher weight than precedents from outside the court. However, analogous precedents 
could lose their status as principle if judges stopped seeing similarities between later 
cases and the precedents that constituted the principle. Clearly, the litigants’ lawyers 
would (and will) try to nudge the judge’s interpretation in a direction favorable to their 
clients.  
In the wake of Enlightenment rationalism and 19th century positivism, the 
doctrine of precedent became narrower and known as “stare decisis”. Precedent came to 
be seen not as a binding local principle derived from several cases, but as a binding literal 
holding of an individual case. Judges’ room for interpretation was narrowed. This was 
meant to avoid judicial prejudice and improve predictability of judgments analogous to 
the codifications of law on the European continent. However, because cases never exactly 
repeated themselves and judges needed to determine which precedent cases were 
analogous to the case they were investigating, judicial lawmaking power survived (see 
e.g. Baker, 1990, pp. 227–230; Berman, 1990, pp. 32–33). The 20th century European 
trend towards expansion of state power manifested itself in increased Parliamentary 
legislation, legal positivism, and further confinement of judicial law-making power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the time. Over the validity of the approach Robert Boyle – council member of the Royal 
Society – entered into a fierce debate with Thomas Hobbes who advocated logical 
reasoning and discovery of natural law (Shapin et al., 1985). The combination of 
gentlemanly deliberation, fact discovery, and extraction of laws is analogous to how 
judges in the 17th and 18th century decided cases and generalized precedents to principles 
(Berman, 2003). In that context it is not surprising that the official hero of the Royal 
Society was Francis Bacon – alleged father of empiricism, practicing lawyer, Attorney 
General, and Chancellor. 
 
 32
However, to this day only statutes of Parliament surpass the authority of England’s 
judicial precedents (a written, codified constitution does not exist)33.  
Case reports 
The doctrine of precedent crucially depended (and depends) on reliable transmission of 
what was decided in court (i.e. issues at stake; facts of the case34; judge’s holding, 
dictum, and explanation; argumentative context)35. Over the course of the 17th century 
hand-written reports by eminent legal professionals (e.g. judges, sergeants-at-law, etc.) of 
what had been argued in court became much thought after. These manuscripts contained 
the reporter’s notes and reflected the reporter’s understanding of the case. They could be 
shared and copied by others in the legal profession. Or, to reach wide circulation and 
ensure low errors of reproduction they could be printed, published and sold.  
Initially the reporters produced manuscripts for their own use and, if requested, let 
others borrow them36. In the 17th century various reporters took notes with the intent to 
publish them. Publication was not immediate, and editors often enough added numerous 
notes to the original manuscripts. The 17th century reporters built on a tradition of 
                                                 
33 This does not hold true for areas where England has transferred authority to the 
European courts. 
 
34 The vast majority of reported cases does concern itself with issues of law and not 
issues of fact. 
 
35 The so-called plea rolls – official court records dating back to the 11th century – were 
insufficient. They simply recorded names, forms of action, and the final judgment. 
 




previous case reports - the so-called yearbooks and nominate case reports37 - that were 
used in legal training with a different focus (namely to record pleadings and debate in 
court). In the course of the 17th and 18th centuries the case reports became standardized, 
timely and focused on court’s decisions. The 19th century case reports were similar in 
style and content to the official post-1865 so-called Law Reports.  Until 1865 - when the 
Law Reports began to be published by the newly created Council for Law Reporting - 
official, standardized, and timely reporting of cases in the superior courts did not exist 
and law reporting remained in the hands of private reporters.  
Many originally unpublished manuscripts appeared in print in the mid 17th 
century when the legal profession abandoned its preference for the secretive38 and 
publishing restrictions were eased (thereby also lowering standards of publication 
quality). After the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 a large body of published case 
reports became available, new case reports were published in English, and the practice of 
citing other cases as authority in court became well established39. The most respected 
                                                 
37 The last yearbook was printed in 1535 and then non-anonymous case reports - called 
nominate or nominative reports - became common. However, style and content of these 
case reports remained the same. 
38 See e.g. Ross (1998) for a discussion of the debate about secrecy and publication; 
interestingly, an inclination towards the secretive was not exclusive to the legal 
profession - it existed much more broadly in all kinds of hermetic traditions and was 
abandoned at about the same time in natural philosophy (see e.g. (2001)). 
 
39 A quote from Coke’s reports describes well the transition from law based on general 
principles over law based on general citing to law based on citing of particular authorities 
(and the problems of the transition): "The ancient order of arguments by our serjeants and 
apprentices of law at the bar is altogether altered. 1. They never cited any book, case, or 
authority in particular ..., which order yet remains in moots at the bar in the Inner Temple 
to this day. 2. Then was the citing general, but always true in the particular; and now the 
citing is particular, and the matter many times mistaken in general. 3. In those days few 
cases in law were cited, but very pithily ... and now ... such a farrago of authorities, it 
cannot be but there is much refuse." (as cited in Holdsworth, 1922, vol. v p. 372) 
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case reports before the mid 17th century came from Plowden – a lawyer and member of 
Parliament, Coke – chief justice at the King’s Bench and Common Bench courts and 
member of Parliament, and Bulstrode – a lawyer, member of Parliament and high 
government official. Bulstrode’s case report, written completely in English, marks the 
beginning of the 17th century transformation from Law French or Latin case reports to 
exclusively English case reports. In the middle of the 18th century Burrow’s case reports 
mark the beginning of high quality case reports published timely and regularly by 
authorized reporters attached to particular courts.  
As a consequence of the uncoordinated private reporting, pre-1865 case reports 
did not cover all cases (however, there is a strong bias towards reporting the more 
difficult cases40), did summarize the same case multiple times (different reporters at times 
even giving inconsistent summaries), did experience publication years after the case was 
recorded (sometimes without the involvement of the person who created the manuscript), 
did contain editors’ comments whose length could exceed the original case report (and 
the editor making his own sense of a manuscript), did use differing styles (ranging from 
the very abridged summary to the very extended elaboration of a side remark or a 
reporter’s opinion), and did show variation in reliability (the occasional reporter was said 
                                                 
40 E.g. Burrow says in his 4th volume on page 2583: “I only report what I think may be of 
use, as a determination or illustration of some matter of law. I take no notice of the 
numerous questions of fact which are heard upon affidavits ; (the most tedious and 
irksome part of the whole business). I take no notice of a variety of contestations, which, 
after having been fully discussed, are decided without difficulty or doubt. I take no notice 
of many cases which turn upon a construction so peculiar and particular as not to be 
likely to form a precedent for any other case.” 
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to fall asleep during trials and make up the proceedings after trial)41. Unsurprisingly, the 
heterogeneity of case reports complicated application of the doctrine of precedent and 
knowledge of the trustworthiness of individual case reports was an important skill in 
legal practice. Nevertheless and in spite of all their shortcomings the “Reports [meaning 
the pre-1865 nominate reports], together with the Abridgments of and the indices to 
them, are in bulk, and, to a large extent, in substance, the most important part of the 
literature of the common law.” (Holdsworth, 1922, vol. v p. 378). Drawing on the 
authority of a precedent essentially meant citing one of the published case reports. If a 
previously reported case was cited the names of the opposing parties were usually 
followed by a so-called nominate citation, which identified the reported case by volume 
number, name of the case reporter, and page number. An example would be Finlay versus 
Seaton, 1 Taunton 210. 
The English Reports 
To gather in one place as many of the pre-1865 nominate reports as possible, a major 
publishing project called “The English Reports” (The English Reports, 1900) was begun 
in the year 1900. The project took about 30 years to complete and brought together the 
vast majority of all available pre-1865 nominate reports. Some reports do not appear in 
the publishing project, but nearly all cases ever reported are covered by at least one case 
report from the English Report (ER). The formatting of the different nominate reports 
was unified, their original page numbers and footnotes were maintained. Finally, various 
comments, meant to enhance the understanding of relationships between cases, were 
                                                 
41 Good histories of case reports and assessments of their quality exist (see e.g. 
Holdsworth, 1922, vol. v pp. 355-378, 1922, vol. vi pp. 551-574; Veeder, 1901a, 1901b; 
Wallace, 1882). 
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added. By 1932 the whole project - containing 265 distinct series of nominate reports 
with 130’000 case reports on over 250’000 pages, was completed and the last of the 179 
volumes were published (the last 3 volumes contain the index and an index chart). The 
English Reports contain nominate case reports from the three superior common law 
courts, Nisi Prius trials (transport-cost-reducing, locally-held common law trials whose 
jury verdicts formed the basis for judgments from Westminster Hall), the Chancery 
courts, the House of Lords, the Privy Council, the Admiralty court, and the supreme 
ecclesiastical court (including the renamed Probate and Divorce court). The English 





Chapter 3: Data preparation 
In this chapter I describe the two-step process that turned the English Reports into a 
citation network. In the first step, I isolated individual case reports and recorded 
information about the reported case and the references - ER case citations and statute 
citations - contained therein. In a second step I cleaned and combined the extracted 
information. I undertook the first step in Python with the help of 3 modules (see appendix 
A). The first module (ER search.py) splits ER text files into individual case reports before 
using a technique called regular expression matching42 to extract case name, case parties, 
trial date, and number of words in the report. It then called two other modules to extract  - 
again using regular expression matching - from any given case report ER case citations 
(search cases.py) and statute citations (search statutes.py). The extracted information was 
translated into a standardized format and saved to an SQL database. 
 The second step used Stata code (see appendix B) and the information stored in 
the SQL database to add missing information about ER volume attributes (1_prepare case 
information & volume attributes.do). It then combined information about case and statute 
citations with information about the individual case reports (2_merge cases data.do and 
3_merge statutes data.do). 
 The following sections follow the two-step structure to lay out the steps in a more 
detailed manner. For each step they describe the specific problems encountered and the 
solutions I chose to address them. Because I preferred a smaller sample size to an 
erroneous sample I generally adhered to the principle of minimizing false positives (e.g. 
recording incorrect case citations) at the expense of increasing the number of false 
                                                 
42 A regular expression is essentially a sequence of characters that defines a search 
pattern. 
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negatives (e.g. omitting actually present case citations). This also implies that I corrected 
erroneous case information and citations only when the errors were unambiguous (e.g. 
missing dates or incorrect page numbers). 
Data extraction 
Starting from the physical existence of 176 volumes with ER reports I identified the 
publisher of an electronic ER database whose characteristics allowed reliable extraction 
of case information and citations. After having exported the database into text files, I 
applied the three Python modules to the individual text files and obtained a preliminary 
version of the citation network. I then corrected obvious errors, added information to fill 
in obvious omissions, and reran the Python modules until no further obvious errors or 
curable omissions remained. 
I will illustrate the process that extracts information from the original English 
Reports with the help of a specific ER case report. Taunton reported the case of Finlay 
versus Seaton that went to trial in the Court of Common Pleas in the year 1808 on page 
210 of his first reporter volume. The corresponding nominate citation is 1 Taunton 210. 
In the English Reports the case was republished on page 813 of volume 127 - often 
abbreviated as 127 ER 813. Figure 2 shows how the short report appeared in the original 
English Reports. 
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Choosing a database 
I opted for an electronic ER database published by Juta Law (2010)43. The reasons for the 
choice were a comparatively low error rate of Juta Law’s open text recognition 
procedures, clear separation of distinct cases, consistent naming and reliable dating of 
cases. All other published databases had considerably higher OCR error rates or made it 
very difficult to separate cases and extract case and date information. 
Creating text files 
To transform the Juta Law database into a format that is open to automated text 
processing I installed the Juta Law software and exported the individual case reports into 
combined text files. Each of the resulting 176 text files corresponded to one of the 
volume of the English Reports. Figure 3 shows the text file excerpt that corresponds to 
the case report 1 Taunton 210 from the 813th page of the 127th ER volume. Close 
comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals a number of OCR errors. A rough 
investigation suggests an OCR error rate of about 2 in 100044.    
Extracting case information 
To extract information from the individual case reports I used regular expression 
matching to split the 176 text files into strings that pertained to only one case report. 
Splitting the text files into individual case reports was straightforward because the text 
                                                 
43 The Economics Department of the University of Maryland, College Park kindly 
supported the acquisition of the database. I gratefully acknowledge the departmental 
support. 
 
44 To derive the admittedly very rough estimate I tried to identify all character 
mismatches between the original print and the OCR-ed version. I counted 7 mismatches 
in 3045 characters. 
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files from the Juta Law database have a consistent structure: the first line of a case report 
begins with the names of the two opposing parties; the names are separated by the letter v 
(an abbreviation of the word versus) and immediately followed by the name of the 
nominate report and the corresponding ER reference. In the concrete case of Figure 2 this 
corresponds to Finlay v Seaton 1 Taunton 210, 127 ER 813. Apart from a small number 
of inconsistencies Juta Law consistenly uses the same format to delineate case reports. In 
particular, the reporter names are used consistently within and across reporter volumes. 
 The Juta Law header that delineates case reports contains valuable information 
per se. It is easy to extract from it the case name (Finlay v Seaton), the name of the 
plaintiff (Finlay), the name of the defendant (Seaton), the nominate report reference (1 
Taunton 210), the nominate report volume (1), the reporter name (Taunton) and the 
nominate page number (210), the ER reference (127 ER 813), the ER volume (127) and 
the ER page number (813). A second line added by Juta Law immediately follows the 
header and contains the report date. Reasonably, the second line always starts with the 
words “Report Date:” and then provides the year in which the reported case took place. 
For example, the case from Figure 2 goes back to the year 1808. Recording the date of 
the case (1808) and determining to which decade the case belongs (1800) is 
straightforward.  A unique identifier is generated and saved together with the recorded 
information in a table of the SQL database as variables uid, casename, 
casenamefirstparty, casenamesecondparty, nomcite, nomcitevol, nomciterep, 
nomcitepage, ercite, ercitevol, ercitepage, date, decade.  
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Extracting case citations 
Finding within an ER case report references to other ER case reports posed some 
difficulties. The vast majority of references to other ER case reports appear as nominate 
citations, i.e. as a combination of volume number, reporter name and page number (e.g. 1 
Doug. 308 in Figure 3). The main difficulty is that reporter names are often abbreviated 
and that the abbreviations occur in many different forms. For example, in Figure 3, 1 
Doug. 308 refers to 1 Douglas 308. However, other common abbreviations are 1 Doug. 
K.B. 308, 1 Dougl. KB 308 or 1 Dougl. KB, 308. Therefore, the reliability of the 
extracted ER case citations depends on the comprehensiveness of the list of ER reporter 
abbreviations. To compile the list I relied on the widely popular Cardiff Index to Legal 
Abbreviations (n.d., list compiled in 2012). The Cardiff Index brings together a large 
number of different high-quality sources. I augmented the index with Williams’ (1941) 
insights into particularly idiosyncratic abbreviations and erased all abbreviations that did 
not uniquely identify reporter volumes (e.g. the abbreviation Black can refer to William 
Blackstone's King's Bench Reports or to Henry Blackstone's Common Pleas Reports).To 
avoid otherwise frequently occurring false positives I further erased all reporter 
abbreviations that consisted of less than three letters and no volume number. 
 To actually extract case citations from an ER report I then combined all the 
previously assembled abbreviations into a regular expression, i.e. a search pattern, that 
extracted text strings whenever they matched one of the abbreviations and were followed 
by a page number. With regard to search pattern interpunctuation I permitted periods, 
empty spaces, and combinations of periods and empty spaces. However, I ruled out all 
other interpunctuation marks like commas or semicolons because they significantly 
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increased the rate of false positives. This implies that an abbreviation like 1 Dougl. KB, 
308 was not recognized by the search pattern. 
 When the search pattern matched a string within an ER case report, the string was 
extracted and translated into the naming convention used by Juta Law to identify cases in 
their database (for example, 1 Doug. K.B. 308 would be recorded as 1 Douglas 308). 
Without translation to the naming convention it would otherwise be impossible to 
determine that 1 Doug. K.B. 308 and 1 Dougl. KB 308 actually refer to the same case 
report. After the translation the standardized citation of the cited case and the string 
context surrounding the citation were recorded together with the unique identifier 
were in a table of the SQL database. The names of the recorded variables are uid, 
casecite, and casecontext. 
Extracting statute citations 
Finding within an ER case report references to enacted statutes posed other challenges. 
References to statutes appear in two different forms. The most common form consists of  
the regnal year of the ruler under which it was enacted and a chapter (chapter number n 
signifies that the statute was the nth statute enacted in a specific regnal year). For 
example, citation of the statute 11 G. 2, c. 19 (i.e. the 19th Act of Parliament in the 11th 
regnal year of George II or calendar year 1737) can also be found as 11 G. II ch. 19 or 11 
Geo. 2, chap 19 or 11 Geo. II, chapter 19, and so on. Moreover, punctuation marks are 
used inconsistently (e.g. 11 G. 2, c. 19 can appear as 11 G 2, c 19, 11 G 2 c. 19, etc.). 
In the majority of cases the chapter number is provided, but often enough it is not. Then it 
is easy to confuse a statute citation with the designation of a court session (e.g. Easter 11 
Geo. 2) or a simple non-statute related date reference (e.g. 11 Geo. 2). The second form is 
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specific to popular statutes. These statutes were frequently cited by name and not by 
regnal year (e.g. Statute of Uses instead of 27 Hen. 8, chap. 10). 
 To extract the first form of statute citations I proceeded analogously to the 
extraction of case citations. I manually constructed a list with possible regnal year 
abbreviations for thirty of England’s rulers (beginning with Edward I) and calendar year 
correspondences. I then combined all the previously assembled abbreviations, augmented 
them with a search pattern that detected potentially existing chapter information, and 
created a regular expression. Interpunctuation constraints were less stringent than for case 
citations. 
 When the regular expression matched a string within an ER case report, the string 
was extracted, and the regnal year translated into a standardized format (generally the 
ruler abbreviation that is longest, e.g. 11 Geo. 2 and not 11 G. 2). If no chapter 
information existed in the matched string the regnal year it was accepted as statute 
citation only if the words Act or Statute appeared in close vicinity. After the translation 
the standardized regnal year of the cited statute, its chapter information and the string 
context surrounding the citation were recorded together with the unique identifier of the 
citing case.  
 To extract the second form of statute citations I compiled a list of statute names 
based on a table of popular statute names from the officially authorized Chronological 
Table of and Index to the Statutes (1873). As before the list was compiled into a regular 
expression and the matched string recorded. The name of the cited statute and the strings 
surrounding the citation were recorded together with the unique identifier of the citing 
case. Information about the two forms of cited statutes were combined and recorded in a 
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table of the SQL database as variables uid, statciteregnalyear, statcitechapter, 
statcitename and statcitecontext. 
Correcting OCR errors (case names and case dates) 
I checked case report names and report dates for inconsistencies that arose due to OCR 
errors in the Juta Law database. If reporter volumes changed unexpectedly, if page 
numbers did not increase from one case report to the subsequent one, if page numbers or 
report dates fell outside the reporter volume-specific range, I investigated the 
inconsistency. If the inconsistency arose from an OCR error, I corrected them. After 
applying the corrections I repeated the procedures from the previous step and kept 
iterating steps until no inconsistencies remained. All in all I made 644 corrections to 
report names and report dates. 
 After OCR corrections the Python algorithm separated 129,042 case reports, and 
extracted corresponding case report names, report dates, opposing parties names, and 
word counts. It further extracted 468,872 case citations and 157,021 statute citations (the 
latter together with the years of enactment).  
Cleaning and combining data 
The raw data extracted with Python required further processing to add missing 
information and merge case information with the extracted information about case and 
statute citations. This required the following tasks:  
• merging case information of cases with the duplicate nominate citation 
• adding trial dates to case information when they were missing in the Juta Law 
database, but clearly identifiable in the original ER reports 
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• adding missing reporter volume information to case information  
• matching the nominate citation of cited cases with the available case information 
• removing duplicate case and statute citations from the same citing case 
• deleting case and statute citations with clearly erroneous page numbers, chapter 
numbers, or regnal years 
Merging duplicate nominate citations 
When case reports were short enough it could occur that two distinct case reports were 
printed on the same page of a reporter volume and, consequently, were identified by the 
same nominate citation. Figure 4 shows an example. The two cases Ball versus Adrian 
and Scholey and Another versus Mansell Powell were printed together on page 64 of 
reporter volume 1 Taunton. Therefore, both of them would be cited by the nominate 
citation 1 Taunton 64. To distinguish between them the name of plaintiff and defendant 
was usually added to the nominate citation. Because it is impossible to distinguish by the 
nominate citation only and because it proved technically too difficult to identify case by 
the names of the opposing parties, I decided to merge the case information of all cases 
with the same nominate citation. This reduced the number of distinguishable cases to 
100,618. To date a merged case report I used the most frequently occurring or the first 
non-missing date of the merged case reports. 
Adding missing dates 
About 7 percent of (combined) cases in the Juta Law database lacked information 
regarding the trial date. Inspection of the original English Reports showed that the trial 
date of many of these cases could be unambiguously determined. Therefore, I manually 
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inspected all ER volumes where Juta Law dates were missing, and whenever possible 
used regularities in the dates of individual reporter volumes to generate the missing Juta 
Law dates (for example, in many ER volumes subsequent case reports belong to the same 
year and increments of the report year occur only once on specific pages). I then added 
the missing dates to the case information. Thereby, it was possible to fill in 4,436 of the 
6,854 missing dates. 
Adding reporter volume information 
Some reporter volume-specific information needed to be added. In particular, I used an 
overview table in the English Reports to add information regarding the volume’s 
earliest/latest date of reported cases, the volume’s lowest/highest page number, and the 
court where cases went to trial (generally one court per volume). 
Matching cited cases 
Nominate citations within a case report were often insufficient to identify a specific case 
report. On the one hand, incorrect citations (due to OCR errors in the Juta Law database 
or due to mistakes in the original English Reports) obviously made it impossible to match 
the nominate citation with the case information of the intended reference. On the other 
hand, the cited page number often did point to a relevant page in a multi-page case report 
and not to the beginning page.  
 Therefore, I used three different methods to match the nominate citation of a cited 
case with case information from the Juta Law database (most importantly the trial date). 
The first method attempted direct matching of standardized reporter volume and page 
number (e.g. if the matching based on Grindley v. Holloway would have been 
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unsuccessful, the method would have tried to match the citation 1 Doug. 308 to the case 
report 1 douglas 308; however, only case report 1 douglas 307 and 1 douglas 309 exist 
and so the matching would have been unsuccessful). Whenever the first method failed, I 
applied the second method, which used the names of opposing parties that appeared close 
to the cited case (e.g. Grindley v. Holloway in front of 1 Doug. 308 was matched to 
Grindley v. Holloway 1 Douglas 307) and relied on fuzzy matching to match these to 
opposing parties’ names within the cited reporter volume (e.g. 1 Douglas). Fuzzy 
matching was necessary because spelling of names is inconsistent across the various 
reporter volumes. If fuzzy matching failed, the third method matched the citation to the 
nearest (lower) page number in the cited reporter volume (e.g. 1 Doug. 308 would have 
been matched to 1 douglas 307). Direct citation matching was applied to 276,574 case 
citations, fuzzy matching was applied to 29,427 case citations and nearest (lower) page 
matching was applied to 85,377 case citations. 270 case citations could not be matched to 
any case report. To validate the reliability of the matching of case citations and case 
reports I picked a random sample of 100 case citations and identified mismatches. I found 
that the sequence of the three matching methods outlined above correctly identified 97 
out of the 100 sampled citations. The 3 incorrect matches result from incorrect nominate 
citations within the English Reports. 
Removing duplicate case and statute citations 
In several case reports the same nominate citation or the same statute citation appeared 
multiple times. Because the meaning of multiple citations within case reports of varying 
quality and length is unclear, and because the focus of this study is on the existence and 
not the frequency of connections between cases and statutes, I decided to remove 
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duplicate citations. Whenever a nominate citation occurred more than once in a combined 
case report I dropped the duplicate citations. Whenever, a combined case report cited a 
statute by the same regnal year and chapter or when it cited a statute by the same regnal 
year without chapter information, I removed the excess statute citations. After dropping 
duplicates 399,924 citations of combined case reports and 78,878 statute citations 
remained (60,697 with chapter information, 7,075 without chapter information, and 
11,106 with explicit statute names). 
Deleting erroneous case and statute citations 
To minimize errors in the data I identified obviously incorrect case and statute citations 
and eliminated them without trying to infer the correct citation (the majority of errors are 
due to OCR errors in the Juta Law database). Consequently, I deleted 8,471 case citations 
where page numbers fell outside the page range of the cited reporter volume, 216 case 
citations that could not be matched to a case report, and 9,910 erroneous case citations 
that derived from three specific ambiguous abbreviations (most importantly, 6,718 
references to Coke on Littleton - a canonical 17th century text on English property rights - 
that were misidentified as references to Littleton’s case reports, and 2,839 references to 
post-1865 Queen’s Bench case reports that were misidentified as early 19th century case 
reports). After the deletion of erroneous case citations 381,310 case citations remained. 
I further erased 332 statute citations with erroneous regnal years (for example, 0 
Victoria or 48 Elizabeth - Elizabeth reigned only for 44 years), 1,683 statute citations 
with chapter numbers superseding the total number of statutes enacted in a regnal year, 
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and 1,760 statute citations to years where no statutes were enacted. After the deletion of 
erroneous statute citations 75,103 statute citations remained45. 
Final dataset 
Table 1 and Table 2 describe and summarize the final comprehensive data set, which 
includes 360,385 case citations and 75,103 statute citations. Information on 27,369 case 
reports that do not cite cases or statutes were incorporated for completeness. The dataset 
comprises various variables that were derived during or after data generation (for 
example, information on the case citation matching method, or number of case reports in 
the year of the citing/cited case report).  
Citation network 
One can regard the statutes and case reports as constituent nodes of a citation network. 
Citations of statutes and case reports then form the links that connect the distinct nodes. If 
one leaves aside editors’ references to later statutes and case reports, then all citations are 
past-oriented and directional. Because published case reports exist indefinitely, the 
                                                 
45 To facilitate understanding of the second step in the construction of the dataset 
(cleaning and combing data) I summarize its sub-steps’ effects on number of cases, 
available dates, number of case citations and number statute citations. The consequences 
of restricting the dataset to the date range of 1580 to 1865 and strict precedents are added 
for later use. 
 case reports dates case cites statute cites 
raw data 129,042 112,980 468,872 157,021 
merging duplicate nominate citations 100,618 93,764 468,872 157,021 
adding missing dates 100,618 98,200 468,872 157,021 
dropping duplicate citations 100,618 98,200 399,924 78,878 
cleaning erroneous citations 100,618 98,200 381,310 75,103 
1580-1865 date range 96,896 96,896 360,385 56,685 




resulting citation network is directed, static (new nodes and links can be added, but old 
ones do not disappear), and acyclic46 (it is impossible to find a path that returns to the 
citing node). Figure 5 depicts the part of the citation network that is derived from the case 
report in 1 Taunton 210 (1 ER 813). 
  
  
                                                 
46 That is strictly untrue for the derived citation network because of editors’ references to 
later case reports  
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Chapter 4: Data interpretation and reliability 
To gain insights into institutional persistence and change based on the constructed 
citation network, it is necessary to give case reports and the citations they contain a 
consistent meaning. To do so I begin with the general features of legal process and their 
concrete expression in English royal law. After pointing to the importance of publicly 
available precedents for the doctrine of precedent I describe the need for analogies and 
interpretation if one wants to apply the doctrine. I then turn to the meaning of precedent 
and statute citations and the possibility of measuring influence through citations. Because 
the meaning of ER citations is unclear I conduct a random sample study whose results 
suggest that about 80% of targeted citations were correctly extracted and that the majority 
of post-1700 ER citations recorded analogy use in the courtrooms. Based on the previous 
discussions and investigations I set out an interpretation of statutes and ER precedents as 
analogical basis for the construction of new legal rules and of ER citations as indicators 
of analogy use. I end with an evolutionary perspective on legal cumulative culture. 
Legal process 
Legal rules are particular social rules that - within a jurisdiction - are made, adjudicated, 
and enforced by clearly defined bodies of people. They define for specific social 
interactions a party’s rights (“you can”) and another party’s corresponding obligations 
(“you cannot”, “you must”)47. A legal case arises when one party (the plaintiff) claims 
that another party (the defendant) violated a legal rule and in so doing inflicted damage 
on the plaintiff (see e.g. Bruner, 2003, p. 37). To settle their accounts the two parties meet 
                                                 
47 This is inspired by Crawford and Ostrom’s (1995) analysis of social rules. 
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in court and are heard48 by a presumably neutral third party (the judges and possibly a 
jury). The legal hearing generally proceeds in a formal manner and aims to see the 
hearing’s specific case in general legal terms (see Berman, 1987). The judges and the 
parties’ legal advisers are well acquainted with the jurisdiction’s legal rules and regularly 
participate in hearings. The defendant and his legal advisors will try to argue that a legal 
rule was not violated, that the defendant was not the one violating the legal rule, or that 
harm was not done to the defendant. The plaintiff and his legal advisors will aim for the 
opposite. If a judge finds that the defendant has violated a legal rule and damaged the 
plaintiff, he will order that the defendant needs to make good the plaintiff’s damage 
and/or be punished. If the defendant does not comply with the judge’s order, the plaintiff 
can count on the help of law enforcers49. 
 In England the royal common law jurisdiction became the most important of 
various initially coexisting jurisdictions (e.g. ecclesiastical, feudal, manorial). Over the 
course of many centuries it came to dominate all other jurisdictions.  Beginning in the 
14th century feudal and manorial jurisdictions declined together with the feudal system 
while local courts took over most of their functions. Justices of peace - appointed by the 
king and overseen by royal judges - presided over the local courts. The 16th century saw 
                                                 
48 Having the possibility to be heard is - according to Berman - essential to all legal 
discourse. He writes: “The distinctive characteristics of legal discourse arise principally 
from the institution of the hearing, which is the basis of all legal activities, including not 
only adjudication but also legislation, administration, negotiation of legal transactions, 
and other legal activities. It is the opportunity of both sides to be heard that principally 
distinguishes adjudication from vengeance. Similarly, it is, above all, the opportunity to 
debate pending enactments that distinguishes legislation from mere commands, and it is 
the opportunity to petition for relief that distinguishes lawful administration from 
bureaucratic fiat.” (Berman, 1987). 
 
49 By settling the accounts of plaintiff and defendant the legal process fulfills a political 
function in that it reduces the likelihood of violent cycles of revenge. 
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the subjugation of the Church under the state of Henry VIII and correspondingly a 
diminished role of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Finally, the power balance within royal 
law changed over the course of the 17th century. The royal common law courts 
successfully rolled back the influence of the king’s prerogative courts (Berman, 2003). 
 In English common law the legal process unfolded in a specific manner. If the 
plaintiff wanted - for a specific rule violation by the defendant - to take recourse to royal 
justice at Westminster he purchased from the Chancery50 a writ that ordered the opposing 
parties to appear in one of the three common law courts51. The different king’s writs 
defined the rule violations that were heard by the common law courts. A king’s writ 
ordered the two opposing parties to a hearing, and one or more royal judges - generally 
aided by a jury - adjudicated the trial. Lawyers usually assisted the parties and, if 
necessary, sheriffs enforced the judges’ decision on the unwilling defendant. In case of 
error both defendant and plaintiff could appeal the judgment by turning to the King’s 
Bench, Exchequer Chamber, the King’s Privy Council, or the House of Lords. 
Written precedents and statutes 
Precedents that illustrated legal rules, principles and court strategies and statutes - legal 
rules made and explicitly laid down by a parliamentary assembly - constituted a 
fundamental part of the legal process and legal training. The written form of case reports, 
case abridgments, and statues reflects the professionalization of law. It enabled temporal 
persistence, enhanced interpersonal consistency and enabled a level of reflection that is 
                                                 
50 More precisely the Exchequer sold writs for his own court. 
 
51 Purchase of the writ was not necessary if the plaintiff filed his complaint in one of the 
Assizes where traveling judges (including two from the common law courts) visited their 
commission-assigned circuits. 
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more abstract and more sophisticated than the one that pertains to exclusively oral 
cultures. In England the first written statutes go back to times before the Magna Charta 
and first hand-written collections of case reports, the so-called yearbooks, apparently 
emerged as aides in classroom settings as early as the 13th century. From the 16th century 
onwards the printing press overtook manuscripting and made it possible to distribute 
collections of case reports and up-to-date statute texts among the legal profession at high 
accuracy and relatively low cost52. The rise of the doctrine of precedent in the 17th 
century amplified the importance of case reports, and transformed the meaning of cited 
cases. Preceding cases and their reports began to serve as actual basis of new rulings and 
not only as casuistic illustrations of general principles. 
 According to Berman (e.g. 2003, pp. 273–275) the doctrine of precedent came in 
two different varieties and was a specific (and peculiar) English expression of the 
Western cumulative legal tradition that intentionally preserved the old and created the 
new from the old53. The strict 19th century variety of the doctrine of precedent (stare 
decisis) would call for upholding any legal rule that was previously created by the 
                                                 
52 Manuscripts remained in use - their accuracy and cost were not abysmal. For an 
insightful and nuanced view on legal publishing in 16th century England see Ess III 
(1978). 
 
53 Berman (1983, p. 4) states this point succinctly: “To speak of a "tradition" of law in the 
West is to call attention to two major historical facts: first, that from the late eleventh and 
twelfth centuries on, except in certain periods of revolutionary change, legal institutions 
in the West developed continuously over generations and centuries, with each generation 
consciously building on the work of previous generations; and second, that this conscious 
process of continuous development is (or once was) conceived as a process not merely of 
change but of organic growth”. 
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common law courts54, whereas the earlier 17th and 18th century variation would only call 
for upholding of broader legal rules that were derived from a series of court decisions in 
analogous cases55 (so that a specific holding could be disregarded and overruled if it did 
not fit with the emerging broader legal rule; the broader rules emerged as a consequence 
of judges’ decisions in independent cases56). 
Holdings, analogies and images of law 
From the perspective of the doctrine of precedent the relevant features of a case are the 
legal issue, the operative facts, the holding, the ratio decidendi, and the dictum (see e.g. 
Berman, 1990). The legal issue is the point that is being disputed after contested facts 
have been settled, the operative facts are the facts that are necessary for a decision on the 
legal issue and that the court accepts as true. The court’s holding is the court’s decision 
regarding the legal issue (the decision essentially constitutes a legal rule in the form of an 
if-then statement: if this legal issue and these legal facts then the legal issue is decided as 
follows…) and the court’s ratio decidendi consists of the deeper reasons underlying the 
court’s decision.  Everything else in the case is subsumed to a residual category named 
dictum. The distinction between holding, ratio decidendi, and dictum of a case are neither 
clear-cut nor static because they depend on applications in later similar, i.e. analogous 
                                                 
54 Even at the height of the stare decisis not all holdings were upheld and applied (see e.g. 
Baker, 1990, p. 228). 
 
55 In Lord Mansfield’s (1762) words (Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burrow 1363 or 97 Eng. Rep. 
876): “the reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents.”. 
 
56 Berman (2003, p. 275) draws an interesting parallel between this variety of doctrine of 
precedent and occurring changes in natural philosophy: “The traditionary doctrine of 
precedent treated the judiciary’s repeated application of previous holdings to analogous 
cases as the best evidence of their probable validity, just as the repeated confirmation of 
the results of scientific experiments by the community of physicists.”. 
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cases. Later courts can even revise the ratio decidendi if they believe there exist better 
grounds to justify the holding. 
A specific holding is always very narrow and an identical case that falls under the 
holding is very unlikely to recur. Therefore, deciding what constitutes an analogous case 
and, similarly, when the provisions of a statute are applicable is of paramount importance 
(Berman, 1987; Amsterdam et al., 2002). In the 17th and 18th centuries analogous 
thinking was applied when cases were subjected to a broader legal rule or when cases 
were used to constitute it. In the 19th century a previous holding was directly applied to 
analogous cases. Judges needed to decide if subsequent cases were similar to a precedent 
or if they differed while lawyers of the opposing parties tried to convince judges that 
precedents suggesting a favorable outcome for their clients would be analogous, and a lot 
of debate in court revolved around the question. When no simple analogy was available 
analogical reasoning was used to construct a new legal rule that regulated a previously 
unregulated situation. Only when existing cases or statutes did not provide sufficient 
material for a new legal rule did common law judges draw on other sources (e.g. custom 
or equity). In general, analogy played (and plays) a central role in common law court 
hearings and legal reasoning (Berman, 1987). Apart from its dialectic role (“compare and 
contrast cases advanced by the opponents”) it is visible in law’s consistency (“treat alike 
cases alike”) and temporal stability (“treat alike precedents and current cases alike). 
 However, what counts as analogous to something else is not a simple application 
of logical thinking (Berman, 1987, pp. 16–17). Finding an analogy is essentially an 
interpretative act (see e.g. Amsterdam et al., 2002) that is constrained by the methods of 
the legal profession (e.g. the method of precedent) and by ideas about what makes good 
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law57 (from now on called images of law58). Images of law provide and prioritize59 
legitimate sources of law (e.g. tradition60 or history61, reason or theological thought or 
                                                 
57 Hutchinson (2005, p. 274), for example, states: “It is not that judges ignore the extant 
rules or that they follow the rules in a mechanical manner. It is that, in applying the rules, 
they are engaging in a profoundly political and value-laden act because what the rules are 
and what it means to apply them inescapably and inevitably implicates the very 
ideological commitments that they are supposed to avoid.”. 
 
58 The images of law concept is derived from Elkana’s (e.g. 1981) concept of images of 
knowledge . 
 
59 Winfield (1925, p. 40) summarizes hierarchies between and within tradition and law-
making for 19th century English law: “The statute prevails over the judicial decision, the 
judicial decision over the textbook, the textbook over the unprofessional book. And there 
are variations as to value in each of these classes. No one would take an unofficial print 
of the statutes as authoritative in comparison with an official edition, or put Lord 
Raymond on a level with Barnardiston as a reporter, or accept the rubbish in the Mirrour 
of Justices in preference to Britton.”. Coke, on the other hand, argued in the 17th century 
that statutes of Parliament that violate natural law, i.e. reason,  could be voided by the 
common law judges. For example”: “it appears in our books that in many cases the 
common law will control acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void; for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be 
void” (Baker, 1990, p. 241). 
 
60 Hutchinson (Hutchinson, 2005, pp. 5–8) states the often neglected point that tradition 
as a source of law is not a self-evident, value-free choice: “This commitment to the so-
called traditionality of the common law tradition is often premised on the unstated notion 
that there is something normatively compelling or worthy about what has come before; 
the past is not followed simply because it precedes but because it is superior to present 
understandings. Having withstood the test of time, tradition binds not simply because it 
has not been replaced or altered; it binds because it has its own normative force. For 
common lawyers, therefore, the legal past is not simply a store of information and 
materials but an obligatory source of value and guidance […] There is no compelling 
reason why a decision to follow the past is any less political than a decision to ignore the 
past. Both strategies depend on a much thicker theory about the worth of the past as a 
substantively attractive vision of present and future arrangements for social living than 
the traditionalists offer.”. 
 
61 See, for example, the Katzmann’s (2014) recent book where he argues for a 
consideration of history when interpreting statutes. 
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biology62, centralized law-making63). They establish and rank aims by which the system 
of existing legal rules can be evaluated (e.g. predictability, adaptability64, social justice 
and equity65, degree of codification66, consistency67, productive efficiency68, overall 
utility69). Images of law are usually not only time-dependent, but also domain-dependent. 
For example, Berman (1987, p. 17) states that American courts today do value 
                                                 
62 An exclusive focus on reason, theology or biology tend to result in the declaration of 
universal legal rights, i.e. natural laws (comp. Berman, 1988). For example, Kant is the 
best known modern proponent of natural law theory, various books of Frans de Waal 
argue that moral behavior is an evolutionary given (e.g. Waal, 2009). 
 
63 If centralized law-making is seen as the only source of law than this translates into the 
positivist belief that any law that comes from a legitimate ruler is legitimate (well-known 
exponents are Hobbes in 17th century Europe or Han Fei Tzu in 3rd century BC China; for 
a good introduction to the latter see Waley, 1939). 
 
64 In this context see e.g. Lord Mansfield’s famous quote "as the usages of society alter, 
the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind" in the ER case report 3 
Douglas 373. 
 
65 John Rawls is a recent example of a scholar who puts a very strong emphasis on 
reason, universal legal rights, and fairness (see e.g. Rawls, 1971). 
 
66 See e.g. the following quote in Hutchinson (2005, p. 2) “Nineteenth-century positivists’ 
savage assessment of the common law is as good a place as any to start. As unabashed 
enthusiasts for legislation and codification, they were no friends of the common law. 
Bentham and Austin’s extended and uncompromising analysis led them to the firm 
conclusion that “as a system of rules, the common law is a thing merely imaginary” and 
that it is a “childish fiction employed by our judges that . . . common law is not made by 
them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing . . . from eternity, and 
merely declared from time to time by the judges.” They were particularly concerned with 
the fact that the rules of law were nowhere available in any accessible or agreed-on 
manner.” 
 
67 For a proponent of legal consistency as the nearly exclusive aim of law see Kelsen 
(1945). 
 
68 The main worry in the law and economics movement (transferred from economics to 
law through Coase’s (1960) famous paper). 
 
69 This is arguably Jeremy Bentham’s universal concern. 
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predictability over adaptability in commercial law, but are more open to adaptation with 
regard to personal injury law. Within the legal profession there will always exist 
subgroups with differing images of law and their disagreements will manifest as 
professional debates (and sometimes even as violent conflict when the debates are linked 
to clashes outside the legal realm). The professionals’ images of law will be influenced 
by their non-professional lives, worldviews and debates70. Berman, for example, argues 
in his work for the strong influence of religious worldviews on the development of law. 
                                                 
70 I believe, with Amsterdam and Bruner, that it is generally a fruitful perspective to see 
culture as the coexistence of competing worldviews. In the words of Amsterdam and 
Bruner (2002, pp. 231–232): “…cultures in their very nature are marked by contests for 
control over conceptions of reality. In any culture, there are both canonical versions of 
how things really are and should be and countervailing visions about what is alternatively 
possible. What is alternatively possible comprises both what seems desirable or 
beguiling, and what seems disastrous and horrifying. The statutes and conventions and 
authorities and orthodoxies of a culture are always in a dialectical relationship with 
contrarian myths, dissenting fictions, and (most important of all) the restless powers of 
the human imagination. Canonicity and the ordinary are typically in conflict with 
imaginable “otherwises”—some inchoate and even private, some vocal or even 
clamorous, some quasi-institutionalized as cults or movements of dissent. The dialectic 
between the canonical and the imagined is not only inherent in human culture, but gives 
culture its dynamism and, in some unfathomable way, its unpredictability—its freedom.”  
Wallis (2014) makes a related argument from the perspective of an institutional 
economist: “the forces that generate institutional change are not necessarily the forces 
involved in the winnowing process that determine which institutional changes persist. 
New institutions are continuously generated, the winnowing process runs constantly as 
well, without ever reaching a point at which everyone is satisfied with the rules as well as 
their realized outcomes under the rules.” 
Hutchinson (2005) points to the materialization and continuous resurgence of 
these conflicts in law’s traditions: “…, the past is not the monolithic entity that defenders 
of a tradition-based approach to common law adjudication insist or pretend it is. It is not 
realistic to imagine accepting or rejecting the past holus-bolus. Like the social past on 
which it draws, the law’s traditions are rich, multiple, and competing; they are 
notoriously difficult to pin down with any specificity or precision. Like anything and 
everything else, traditions do not speak for themselves but must be spoken for.” 
 60
Meaning and influence of ER citations 
Case and statute analogies that legal professionals use in common law courts manifest as 
specific references in legal documents. In the US legal system they appear as case and 
statute citations, for example, in judicial opinions, whereas in the English legal system 
they appear mainly in case reports71. Judicial opinions justify the court’s decision and are 
written by judges involved in the trial. The case reports contained in the English Reports 
reflect the proceedings in common law courts. Legal professionals took and (take) 
citations very seriously and, thereby, pave the way for an approach that aims at an 
understanding of legal practice through quantitative citation analysis. In Posner’s (2000) 
words “Judges, lawyers who brief and argue cases […] could all be thought, with only 
slight exaggeration, to make their living in part by careful citation both of judicial 
decisions law-review articles and other secondary materials.” 
ER case report and statute citations reflect a good part of legal reasoning that 
occurred during the legal process over the centuries. English case reporters, from the 18th 
century onwards, regularly recorded case and statute citations when judges or counsel 
pointed to specific cases or statutes to advance their arguments. Before the 18th century 
case reporters rarely provided case and citations because most case reports were not yet 
printed and the doctrine of precedent was still emerging. Later editors frequently added 
                                                 
71 Posner’s (2000) whole statement regarding the role of citations in the American legal 
system reads: “Both adjudication, central practical activity of the legal system, and legal 
research are citation-heavy activities. Judges, lawyers who brief and argue cases, and law 
professors and students engaged in traditional legal-doctrinal research could all be 
thought, with only slight exaggeration, to make their living in part by careful citation both 
of judicial decisions and of law-review articles and other secondary materials. The 
seriousness with which the legal profession takes citations suggests that the analysis of 
citations in law is likely to uncover more systematic features, a more consistent practice, 
of citing than would a similar analysis in fields for which citing is of less consequence.” 
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case and statute citations to the earlier case reports they were publishing because they 
wanted to document the legal reasoning of a reported case. While the content and 
reliability of ER case reports changed from the late 17th to the 19th century and from case 
reporter to case reporter, the doctrine of precedent and Parliament’s statutes continuously 
played central roles. 
While scholars widely agree that citations play a central role in common law’s 
legal reasoning, they debate the meaning of a citation. Nearly all of the academic 
literature appears to focus on the US legal system. Within the context of US judicial 
opinions, two main opposing views emerged (Walsh, 1997). The first view sees citations 
as a clear indication of judges’ analogy-centered decision-making processes and 
reflection of an ongoing communication between courts. The second view sees citations 
as a legitimization exercise and mere ex-post rationalization of judicial decisions that 
occur largely without a pondering of precedents and statutes (the judicial decisions are 
seen as strongly influenced by judges’ world views - an argument that gained prominence 
with Segal and Spaeth (1993)). The first view allows insight into judges’ analogical 
reasoning processes whereas the second view allows insight into judges’ ideas about 
legitimacy. In line with the idea of analogies as interpretive acts Walsh (1997) and later 
authors (see e.g. Baum, 2006; Johnson and Spriggs, 2007; D’Elia-Kueper and Segal, 
2015) find that US judges exhibit both influences. For this study favoring one of the 
dichotomous views is not necessary because both views accept the significance of legal 
citations and regard citations as indications of analogies. 
Posner (2000) has a different perspective on citations in judicial opinions. He 
differentiates among five different meanings of a citation. According to him a citation 
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“can signify an acknowledgement of priority or influence, a useful source of information, 
a focus of disagreement, an acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of 
the cited work or its author”. At the same time Posner points out that in citation studies 
all these motives may be subsumed under a broad category of influence. This should hold 
even more true if one studies aggregates and not individual judicial opinions. 
 Scholars of the US legal system also discuss the relationship between influence 
and citation counts of judicial opinions. Put in simple terms they wonder if judicial 
opinions that are cited more often are more influential in the resolution of legal disputes 
and the creation of new law than the less cited ones. It now seems to be widely accepted 
that the number of citations a judicial opinion receives72 is a valid measure of its 
influence. Cross and Spriggs (2010) provide a good summary of potential challenges that 
citation analysis faces. They conclude that various objections to using case citation 
counts as a measure of influence do not stand up to closer scrutiny. For example, the most 
common criticism is the idea of a superprecedent (Sinclair, 2006), i.e. a judicial decision 
so influential that it settles a legal issue once and for all without generating later citations. 
However, deliberation renders the idea theoretically unconvincing. It is implausible for a 
holding to resolve all legal issues in a broad area in the present or future and not be 
challenged or used for innovation in other areas73. In other words it is improbable that a 
                                                 
72 The simple count of the citations a case receives can arguably be improved by 
constructing a centrality measure that incorporates second order effects by taking into 
account citation counts of citing and cited cases (Kleinberg, 1999; Fowler et al., 2007; 
Fowler and Jeon, 2008). However, the correlation between simple citations counts and 
centrality measures is high. Therefore, and because of the greater simplicity of citation 
counts I stick with simple citation counts for the subsequent analysis. 
 
73 In their early paper Posner and Landes (Landes and Posner, 1976) already wrote: 
“[S]uch cases are probably rare. If a case is highly specific, it will hardly qualify as a 
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precedent brings legal innovation in a broad area to a full stop and, if it really does so, has 
no analogical use in other areas. Even more importantly, to this day none of the few 
suggested candidates for superprecedent have withstood scrutiny (Cross and Spriggs, 
2010, p. 424).  
 Another criticism is the reverse of the first one: precedent that generates a large 
number of citations because of its vagueness and obscurity, but has nothing intrinsically 
influential to offer. This possibility appears even less convincing. On the one hand, vague 
and unclear precedents are likely to be distinguished and clarified quickly and then attract 
no further citations. On the other hand, if they do indeed continue to generate citations 
because of their ambiguities, then it appears fair to count the precedent as influential. The 
final criticism concerns so-called negative citations - citations where the cited case is 
overruled or used as an instance of an incompetent court decision (Cross and Spriggs, 
2010, p. 427). Negative citations would give a misleading picture of the influence of a 
judicial opinion if one conceives of a citation as a sign of constructive influence. 
However, a series of negative citations of a case does not imply that the case is not 
influential. Moreover, the number of negative citations turns often out to be very rare74. 
All in all citation measures have withstood the criticisms and shown strong 
correlation with other influence measures like expert-compiled lists or newspaper 
                                                                                                                                                 
“superprecedent”; by definition it will control only those infrequent cases that present 
virtually identical facts to those of the case in which it was originally announced. If it is 
highly general, and therefore more likely to be an important precedent, it is unlikely to 
decide—so clearly as to prevent disputes or litigation from arising—the specific form of 
the question presented in subsequent cases”. 
 
74 In practice negative citations usually mean overturning of precedents. Segal et al. 
(Segal et al., 2005, p. 316) report that the American Supreme Court overturns only about 
2 out of 1000 judicial opinions. Random sample analysis of ER case reports suggests 
comparable numbers. 
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coverage (Fowler et al., 2007). Nevertheless one should aim to limit noise in the measure 
due to heterogeneities that arise from differences in the hierarchy of citing courts, citing 
conventions, the quality of judicial opinions, the idiosyncrasies of judges, the population 
size of citers, citing time periods or the number of citing judicial opinions, etc. (see e.g. 
Posner, 2000; Cross and Spriggs, 2010).  
ER random sample: extraction reliability and citation content  
The findings regarding the meaning of citations in US judicial opinions and the legal 
influence of frequently cited cases are not immediately transferrable to citations in the 
English Reports and - to the best of my knowledge - an independent literature on citation 
networks of English case reports does not exist. An ER case report is not an official 
judicial opinion, but an unofficial or at best a semi-official text that includes citations 
from judges, counsel of the opposing parties, reporters and later editors. Therefore, a case 
report and its citations reflect not only the analogical reasoning and legitimizing efforts of 
judges (and their pondering of the opposing parties’ arguments), but very directly also the 
analogical reasoning and legitimizing efforts of the opposing parties themselves (and 
possibly distortions by the case reporter and later editors). Similarly, citations not only 
indicate influence on judges, but also influence on opposing parties. Arguably the English 
Reports reflect the dialectic court process more directly than the American judicial 
opinions, and the analogies that parties advance are less likely to be ex-post 
rationalizations of an unconscious decision-making process. Given the proximity between 
the English and American law systems, the previously outlined U.S. findings (and 
reservations) regarding citation frequency as a measure of legal influence plausibly 
generalize to the English legal system.  
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To go beyond plausibility arguments, explore the peculiarities of English case 
reporting, gain a better understanding of ER citation content and, at the same time, assess 
the reliability of the extracted data (as described in chapter 4) I drew on a random sample 
of ER case reports. By manually matching the information in the extracted data with the 
information in the original ER case reports I could determine success and error rates of 
the data extraction, and I could classify citations by categories (like party citing or 
negative-positive citation) that were not recognizable by the automated data extraction 
process. To construct the sample I randomly picked 25 combined case reports, compared 
the information with the original English Reports and manually classified the citations. 
The random sample contained 38 distinct case reports with 234 statute and case report 
citations.  
Table 3 reproduces the relevant information from the random sample and displays 
variables that assess the correctness of the extracted data and classify the citations. It lists 
the nominate citation of the potentially combined case report (citing nomcite), the name 
of the opposing parties for each distinct case (citing casename), the English Reports 
citation, the trial date of the case, and the court at which the trial took place. It further 
indicates if the nominate citation of the citing case (citing nomcite correct), the trial date 
of the citing case (citing date correct), and the nominate citation of the cited case/statute 
were correctly extracted (cited nomcite correct). It also lists citations as they appear in the 
original (citation in original), citations as they were standardized during the extraction 
process (cited nomcite), reasons if a citation was not extracted from the original (reason if 
not extracted), and reasons if a citation was incorrectly extracted (reason if cited nomcite 
incorrect). Finally, it contains three categories that classify the citation content of a 
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citation: the person citing - counsel, court, editor/reporter, ER editor (person citing), the 
type of the citation - analogy, analogy cited in multiple case reports, later analogy, same 
case reported - (citation type), and the presence of a negative citation (citation negative). I 
used personal judgment to assign citations to the different classification categories. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the reliability of the data extraction. The 
nominate citation and the date of the citing case were correctly extracted from all 38 
distinct case reports. To extract nominate citations of the cited cases posed greater 
challenges. Altogether the citing case reports references 234 documents. Of these 48 were 
not part of the ER series (20.5%) and 26 referred to ER case reports in the same volume 
by using the words ante or post in combination with a page number (11.1%). The 
majority of non-ER documents refers to later cases, much earlier cases in the yearbooks, 
or fairly obscure case reports - many of them not from the common law courts. Data 
extraction did not target these citations. ER citations using ante or post often refer to a 
different session of the same case that is being reported. Therefore, and because the 
potential for erroneous extractions was large data extraction did not target these citations 
either. Out of the remaining targeted 160 statute and ER case citations 132 were correctly 
extracted, 3 were incorrectly extracted, and 25 were not extracted at all. The 3 incorrect 
extractions happened due to OCR errors that shortened page numbers. 25 citations were 
not extracted because they deviated in 9 cases from the standard that the data extraction 
algorithm targeted (e.g. a comma separating reporter name and page number). In 8 cases 
OCR errors forbade extraction, in 4 cases I had dropped reporter abbreviations because of 
ambiguous reporter abbreviations, in 3 cases the original abbreviation did not appear in 
any of the sources I used to collect reporter abbreviations, and in 1 case the original 
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citation had a typo that was transcribed. This means that 82.5% of the targeted citations 
were extracted correctly. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the citation content classifications. Because of 
the emergence of the doctrine of precedent and because of the greater availability of 
printed reporter volumes there exists a significant difference between pre-1700 and post-
1700 content. Therefore, I present not only overall numbers, but also break down citation 
content by trial date of the citing case. Pre-1700 results show that the vast majority of 
citations (93.7%) were inserted by editors or case reporters as comments and not simply 
transcribed from courtroom proceedings. Because precedents played a different role 
before the emergence of the doctrine of precedent and because citations reflect less 
directly on courtroom proceedings, I decided to concentrate all subsequent analyses on 
post-1700 citations and will not discuss pre-1700 citations any further. 
The vast majority of citations in the post-1700 cases directly reflect the courtroom 
experience in that they apparently record references that were explicitly used during the 
trial: 54.4% of citations can be traced to arguments from counsel and 25.3% to arguments 
from the judges. Only 16.5% of citations stem from comments of the reporter or later 
editors. Many of these simply provided a nominate citation when only the names of the 
opposing parties were mentioned in the original case report. About 3.8% of citations were 
inserted by ER editors and exclusively point to later cases (I will drop these in all later 
analyses).  
Classification by citation type showed that nearly all of the citations point to 
similar cases and act as analogies. The vast majority of citations (82.7%) refer to proper 
precedents or preceding statutes. Because different case reporters frequently recorded the 
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same case, multiple case reports of the same case exist. As these might confound the 
interpretation of citations it is important to know if citations refer to distinct cases proper 
or to distinct case reports of the same cited case or to distinct case reports of the same 
citing case. Fortunately, it turned out that the confounding potential is limited. Only 6.2% 
of distinct citations in a citing case refer to the same case and only 7.4% of citations do 
not refer to a precedent, but point to an alternative case report of the citing case (these are 
easily identifiable because the trial dates of citing case and cited case are the same; I will 
drop these in all later analyses). 3.7% of citations pointed to later cases, i.e. they pointed 
to cases that used the citing case as precedent. Within the random sample all later 
analogies stem from ER editors (and were dropped later). Finally, I could not detect 
negative citations, i.e. cases that were cited as bad examples or overturned. Consequently, 
I estimate the presence of negative to be below 1%. 
 All in all analysis of the random sample suggests that more than 80% of targeted 
precedent and statute citations were correctly captured in the dataset. Moreover, the rate 
of false positives is very low (less than 2%) and the rate of false negatives is manageable 
(about 15%). In addition to this it seems clear that the vast majority of post-17th century 
case reports contains references to precedents (and preceding statutes) that can be traced 
directly to statements from court or counsel and reflect - in contrast to citations in US 
judicial opinions - the dialectic legal process in English courtrooms. Moreover, the 
likelihood is small that confounding occurs because of different case reporters having 
reported on the same case.  A final finding - in line with findings from the US literature - 
suggests that citations with negative character are rare (0 out 234 citations in the sample), 
 69
i.e. citations that overrule cases or statutes or citations that refer to them as examples of 
poor legal craftsmanship are the exception. 
Meaning of ER citation 
Drawing on the findings from the random sample analysis and insights from the literature 
on the US legal system I will interpret preceding statutes and preceding case reports from 
England’s highest royal law courts as analogical basis for the construction of new legal 
rules75. They constitute the stock of legal elements - in Landes and Posner’s (1976) words 
“the stock of legal capital” - that can be used to create the new from the old. The stock 
can depreciate when previous cases and statutes lose their value for the creation of new 
rules (for an overview of the US legal literature on depreciation see e.g. Black and 
Spriggs, 2013). Every newly reported case potentially increases the stock76. Citations of 
                                                 
75 (Berman, 2003) argues that even the notorious legal fictions - operative facts assumed 
as true though they were known to be false - were a way to construct the new in analogy 
with the the past. In his words (Berman, 2003, p. 280): “The utility of legal fictions 
introduced into the English common law in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was that they applied to new rules procedural and substantive law embodied in older 
rules. Thus new situations were converted into familiar terms of the past. This, indeed, is 
the chief virtue of legal fictions generally; in the words of the great nineteenth-century 
German jurist Savigny, the new rule expressed in a legal fiction “is joined directly on to 
an old and existing institution and in this way the certainty and development of the old is 
procured for the new.” In late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century England this had 
not only a practical but also a theoretical virtue: it reinforced the belief in the tradition of 
the common law. The resort to legal fictions by English judges was closely related to 
their resort to the doctrine of precedent. Both are ways of making new law—fictions 
directly and openly, precedent indirectly and more subtly. Both preserve continuity with 
the past—precedents directly and openly, fictions indirectly and more subtly.”. 
 
76 Similarly the full paragraph in Landes and Posner (1976) reads: “…, there appear to be 
regularities in the citation data (for example, the difference between citations to the 
Supreme Court and to other courts, and the effect of subject matter) that are not explained 
by assumed differences in the individual citation preferences of judges. A more 
promising approach is to ignore differences in tastes or preferences and instead utilize an 
economic framework in which precedents are viewed as constituting a stock of legal 
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specific precedents and statutes indicate their involvement in the innovative process. 
Frequent citation of the same case or statute is an indication of their particular importance 
in the innovation process.  
Two shortcomings of the ER case reports complicate the interpretation. First, the 
English Reports do not contain all of England’s surviving case reports and a large number 
of cases in England’s highest courts were never reported. Second, case reporters did not 
reference all the cases cited in court - about 25% of case reports do not contain any 
citation at all -, and judges or counsel most likely did not verbalize all the cases that 
crossed their minds. However, various factors mitigate the damage done by these 
shortcomings. The random sample analysis showed that the vast majority of citations in 
the ER volumes point to ER case reports. Moreover, while case reporters reported only a 
small number of cases, it is likely that unreported cases were forgotten quickly when 
memory of them faded and that important unrecorded arguments that recurred sooner or 
later found their way into recorded cases. With regard to the second shortcoming, it 
seems undeniable that the ER citations reflect only a subset of arguments advanced or 
pondered in court. However, it seems plausible that reporters left out references they 
found least conducive to the perceived overall argument. And that in the first place, 
references actually voiced in court were the ones thought to be central. If no case is cited 
in a case report it is because a case reporter felt no need to report it or because the 
analogical reasoning applied to the case on trial was not made explicit. Altogether then, 
even though not all cases are reported and not all analogies cited, it remains a valid 
                                                                                                                                                 
capital subject to depreciation and the production of precedents is treated as a form of 
investment.”. 
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perspective to see case reports as analogical basis for the construction of new legal rules 
and citations as indication of a constructive relationship. 
A limitation of this interpretation is that it can provide only very modest and 
indirect insight into the use of royal law outside the innovation process. Or in other 
words, while citations can illuminate the stock underlying legal innovation and the flow 
of legal innovation, they do throw only dim light on the uses of legal innovations. Once a 
new legal rule is created it is unclear how it will be used in lower courts (e.g. in the 
magistrate courts) or daily life77. As argued before an ER citation suggests that judges of 
the highest English courts or counsel in the courtroom regarded the cited case or statute 
as valuable, non-depreciated analogy. While it is likely that magistrate judges or the 
public would not have acted against a recently cited case or statute, the real use they 
made of them is uncertain. Finally, cases that lost value to the highest might still have 
been valuable in lower courts or daily life. 
Legal evolution  
It is possible to integrate the idea of case reports and statutes as innovation capital with 
ideas of combinatorial innovation and cultural cumulative evolution. One can 
conceptualize newly created legal rules as stemming from a combination of previously 
existing rules (holdings of cases and provisions of statutes that are transmitted from 
generation to generation through writing and legal training). Arthur (2009) proposes a 
mechanism for technological evolution that differs from the biological Darwinian 
mechanism. According to him new technologies arise as an autopoetic process from 
                                                 
77 There is an analogy to technological innovation. While one can retrace the elements in 
an innovation, the diffusion across a population remains unclear. 
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ongoing recombination of existing elements before they are subjected to a Darwinian 
type of incremental change and selection. Many other authors have used the idea of a 
combinatorial process to explain technological innovation (see e.g. Schumpeter, 1934; 
Needham, 1954; Usher, 1954; Basalla, 1988; Weitzman, 1998)78. However, most of these 
authors have applied the idea in case studies and historical analyses and not in a 
quantitative manner. The main difficulty of a quantitative treatment stems from the need 
to identify discrete units of technology. Youn et al. (2014) is one of the first attempts to 
overcome the difficulty.  
Fortunately, the discretization difficulty does not arise in legal evolution if one 
sees preceding cases and statues as discrete building blocks for new cases in an ongoing 
combinatorial process. Newly adjudicated cases then appear as legal innovations that 
arise from the recombination of preceding cases and statutes. Because adjudicated cases 
and enacted statutes persist through writing and legal training they create, in principle, a 
growing number of combinatorial elements even though a large number of these elements 
is not used or becomes useless in the legal innovation process. Persistence through 
inheritance, variation and innovation are features of cumulative cultural processes. If one 
adds selection to these features one arrives at cumulative cultural evolution - a path-
dependent, non-random search algorithm in a vast combinatorial space. 
The citation network that results from case and statute citations embodies the process of 
cumulative legal evolution. New network nodes (i.e. cases) are resolved by building on 
                                                 
78 The combinatorial approach to technological innovation - mainly a process that 
combines elements - finds support on the individual level in constructivist theories of 
psychology (Piaget, 1954; Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1996; Klein, 2013). 
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the preceding ones and new network links (i.e. citations) reflect the combinatorial 
innovation process.  
Figure 6 presents a simple example in the form of a graphical representation. In 
the figure nodes represent case reports from time periods 1, 2 and 3. Cases 11 and 12 
belong to time period 1, cases 21, 22, 23 and 24 belong to time period 2 and cases 31, 32 
and 33 belong to time period 3. Case 22, for example, uses the previous cases 11 and 12 
to construct a new rule, which is of no use in time period 3. Case 24 builds on case 12 
from time period 1 and then provides a building block for case 33 from time period 3.  
Network nodes persist through time and - if not used for the creation of new 
nodes - disappear from active cultural memory, i.e. they are forgotten and depreciate. 
Depreciation of the old to make space for the new can be seen as an essential feature of 
evolution in general and cumulative culture in particular. Because printed case reports 
were preserved for centuries it was possible, in principle, to rediscover and resurrect 
forgotten case reports. Consequently, a citation network then not only depicts available 
elements for combinatorial innovation, but also reflects a history of combinatorial 
innovations. Therefore, study of the ER citation network should allow insights into the 






Chapter 5: Patterns in the citation network 
With the previously developed interpretation and the reassuring findings from the ER 
random sample analysis in mind, I will now investigate whether the extracted citation 
network contains patterns that indicate meaningful content in the extracted data. I start by 
drawing attention to the substantial fluctuations in the yearly number of available case 
reports and then briefly introduce a random citing model. The model will serve as 
comparison in this and later chapters. In this chapter I explore five structural patterns that 
exist in the citation network. First, I confirm the expected separation between equity law 
and common law. Second, I show that the three common law courts have a significantly 
smaller, though noticeable bias towards their own courts. Third, I demonstrate that the 5 
most cited cases in common law were truly influential in England’s legal history, Fourth, 
I show that there exists a clear pattern regarding the age of cited cases. Fifth, I lay out that 
the frequency distribution of cases by the number of received citations follows a non-
normal distribution with a long tail and that new citations are biased towards cases that 
were cited frequently. Finally, I discuss strategies to control for heterogeneities in the 
data and present a citation model that captures the data’s statistical aggregate features. 
The citation model imagines a representative, infinitely lived courtroom whose members 
choose among aging citations with a bias towards frequently cited cases. The model 
makes it possible to account for case fluctuations and aids the analysis of persistent and 
changing features in England’s legal innovation process. 
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Fluctuations in the number of cases and case reports 
For this chapter and later investigations it is important to be aware of large fluctuations in 
the yearly number of ER case reports. An increasing number of newly reported cases 
increases the total number of citations that previous time periods will receive and changes 
the rate at which cases become available for later citation. Through these two effects they 
impact the number of citations a specific time period will receive. If one relies on citation 
frequency as a measure of influence it is import to take these effects into account. Out of 
all the other factors responsible for noise and heterogeneities (e.g. hierarchy of courts, 
conventions, quality of case reports, idiosyncrasies of judges, number of citers, time 
period; see page 62) the fluctuating annual number of case reports has arguably the 
largest potential for distortion. 
Figure 7 displays the fluctuating number of ER case reports by the year in which 
the reported cased was on trial79. For reasons that will become clear in the next paragraph 
reports from the equity law courts, i.e. from the Chancery, the Master of Rolls, and the 
Vice-Chancellor, are separated from the common law courts (i.e. King’s Bench, Common 
Pleas, Exchequer, and Nisi Prius cases). A few general features are visible. It is evident 
that the vast majority of equity law reports date from the time after 166080 while a 
substantial number of common law reports exist from earlier times81. The 17th century dip 
                                                 
79 Only a few nominate case reports from before 1580 exist and even fewer are available 
in the ER reports. Therefore, the figure display begins in the year 1580. 
 
80 Chancery reporting become regular practice around the year 1660 (Baker, 1990, p. 
127) even though some pre-1660 chancery reports exist. 
 
81 Many of the early reporter volumes combined King’s Bench, Common Pleas, 
Exchequer, and even Chancery reports (see. e.g. volume v of Holdsworth, 1922, pp. 359–
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in the number of common law reports is related to the turmoil of England’s Civil War. 
During these troubled times fewer case reports were produced and a good number of 
these the ER editors chose not to include in their series. The first half of the 18th century 
was characterized by a decline in the number of case reports in equity law and common 
law. This parallels a general decline in legal litigation: fewer cases were taken to trial and 
the number of lawyers decreased. Litigation, lawyers, and case reports began to increase 
again in the second half of the 18th century. Brooks (1989) discusses the phenomenon and 
provides statistics. Mokyr (2008) sets the phenomenon in the context of the prevalence of 
“gentlemanly” codes and private dispute resolution. Figure 8 reproduces a graph from 
Brooks (1998, p. 68) and reveals a fairly close association between the annual number of 
cases in advanced stages, i.e. cases where the defendant had appeared in court to respond 
to the plaintiff’s pleas, and the number of annual ER case reports (disregarding the civil 
war years whose reports are largely missing from the ER records).  
It should be evident that the number of actual trials and cases in advanced states, 
as well as the number of ER case reports fluctuated widely over the centuries. Even the 
year-to-year fluctuation of ER case reports is considerable. While only a small percentage 
of cases were reported there is a fairly close association between the number of ER case 
reports and cases in advanced stages (this can be asserted only for overall trends). Most 
of the post-1700 case reports originated in the King’s Bench or equity courts. As 
mentioned before fluctuations in the annual number of ER case reports is a potent 
confounding factor. To take the fluctuations into account I will often rely on two different 
statistical models. The first model - I call it the random citing model - is introduced in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
363). Because the ER editors assigned these volumes to one court the court number of ER 
case reports do not exactly match the actual numbers. 
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next section. The second model - I call it the representative courtroom model - is 
introduced in the last section. 
Random citing model 
The arguably simplest way to model the citation process makes the assumption that each 
precedent has the same probability of being cited when citing occurs. Expressed in 
mathematical terms the probability that the citing case i at time t (measured in years) cites 
the case j from time t’ is: 
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where t0 is the first year of a citable case report and nt is the number of cases reports in 
year t. The number of citable case reports and the number of citations in a given year are 
exogenously given and correspond to the actual citation network. 
 The justification for the use of such a simplistic model is twofold. On the one 
hand, the equal citing probabilities of case reports in the English Reports can be 
interpreted as case reports that are equally important in the legal innovation process. 
Because case reporters, in the first place, tend to report on important cases this is not an 
utterly absurd assumption. On the other hand, the random citing model serves as a 
standard comparison model in network science. It creates a context for comparison and 
makes sure that patterns in the network are not explained with sophistication when they 
could simply be the result of random effects. Because the number of citations and citable 
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cases is exogenously given the random citation model accounts for some of the effects of 
case report fluctuations on network patterns. 
Equity law - common law split 
Turning now to the structural investigation, I will study whether the commonly stated 
split between common law and equity law (see e.g. Baker, 1990, pp. 122–126) is 
reflected in the citation network. Historically the two royal law jurisdictions developed 
from different legal grounds. While the common law grew from the king’s writs, equity 
law essentially arose out of the need to bring justice to cases that did not fit the limited 
scope of the writs. In spite of their different origins the two jurisdictions competed and 
coevolved for centuries.  
Figure 9 depicts the intra- and inter-jurisdiction citations rates for equity law and 
common law courts during the time period from 1700 to1865. Case reports and citations 
are pooled by decade. The dashed lines represent expectations from the random citing 
model. The expected citation rate is independent of the citing jurisdiction. The probability 
that a case in the year t from jurisdiction j cites a case from jurisdiction j’ is: 
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At the beginning of the 18th century it appears that equity law courts cited 
common law cases about as frequently as equity law cases. Because reporter volumes of 
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the 17th century often mixed cases while ER editors classified these volumes usually as 
King’s Bench cases (see footnote 81), equity law, in reality, favored its own courts even 
more. This becomes clear in the subsequent decades. The citation rates of common law 
cases dropped to about 20% and intra-jurisdiction citations came to completely dominate 
equity law. The picture for the relative citation frequency of common law courts looks 
slightly different. From the 18th century onwards common law courts nearly exclusively 
cited common law cases. Equity law citations rarely accounted for more than 10% of a 
decade’s citations.  
To evaluate if the actually observed intra- and inter-jurisdiction citation rates 
might arose from a courtroom that randomly cites ER precedents, I calculated the 
expectation rates that would result from such a model. To do so, I counted ER equity and 
ER common law case reports that were available before a given citing decade and set 
them in proportion to all then available ER case reports. Because a randomly citing 
courtroom does not distinguish between jurisdictions the expected citation rates do not 
differ between citing courts. Because the number of reported common law cases always 
vastly outnumbered reported equity law cases, the expected citation rate of common law 
reports was always higher than the one for equity law. The rates move closer over the 18th 
and 19th century because equity law and common law reports began to be published in 
comparable numbers so that their relative proportion began to equalize. 
Comparison between expected citation rates and actual rates makes it clear that 
equity law and common law courts cited case reports from their jurisdictions significantly 
more often than the pure random citing would lead one to expect. For example, the 
random citing model would predict that around the year 1800 equity and common law 
 80
courts would cite common law case reports about 80% of the time. However, the actual 
rates amounted to about 20% for equity law courts and about 93% for common law 
courts. This means that equity courts in that decade were about 20 times more likely to 
cite cases from their own courts than cases from common law courts and common law 
courts favored their own cases with a ratio of 3:1. The bias towards intra-jurisdiction 
citations around 1700 was about 6:1 for equity courts and 8:1 for common law courts. 
The degree of intra-jurisdiction bias varied over the 18th and 19th centuries, however it 
existed without interruption. 
 Altogether, it is evident that equity and common law courts manifested a strong 
tendency to cite case reports from their own courts. This tendency obviously differs from 
predictions of the random citing model. On the other hand the findings are consistent 
with the idea of largely autonomous, but coevolving jurisdictions. As one would expect 
for largely autonomous bodies of law the vast bulk of citations occurred within their 
jurisdictions. Because the two jurisdictions were never completely independent and 
because lawyers working mainly in one of the two jurisdictions were usually well 
acquainted with the other jurisdiction, it is reasonable that a non-negligible amount of 
inter-jurisdiction citations occurred.  
Entanglement of common law courts 
Contrary to the separation between equity law and common law, it is usually accepted 
that the three common law courts had obtained comparable jurisdictions with some 
specialized functions by the end of the 17th century and that the King’s Bench court had 
supervisory function over the court of Common Pleas and the court of Exchequer (see 
e.g. Baker, 1990, pp. 59–61). Figure 10 shows the relative distribution of common law’s 
 81
intra- and inter-court citations. Also here case reports and citations are pooled by decade 
and citation rates expected from the random citing model are shown as dashed lines. 
Expectations are calculated analogously to the previous section. The only difference is 
that there are now three jurisdictions and not two, and that the denominator sums over all 
common law cases and not all common law and equity cases: 
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Over the decades most common law citations referred to cases in the ER’s King’s 
Bench series. Citations to the Common Pleas and Exchequer series occurred at about the 
same rate and made up the remaining citations. The dominance of King’s Bench citations 
decreased only over the 19th century when roughly equal numbers of King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas, and Exchequer reports appeared every year.  
Expected citation rates from the random citing model are again court independent. 
The high King’s Bench rates in the 18th century reflect the 17th and 18th century 
prevalence of King’s Bench ER reports (one should keep in mind that 17th century ER 
King’s Bench reports often mix reports from the different benches). 19th century 
publication of roughly equal numbers of case reports from the King’s Bench, Common 
Pleas, and Exchequer courts underlies the 19th century convergence of expected citation 
rates. 
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Comparison between actual and expected rates reveals a slight 18th century 
tendency of common law courts to cite cases from their own courts. This tendency was 
less visible than the analogous tendency of equity courts and the combined common law 
courts. In the 19th century the King’s Bench seemingly cited its own cases less while the 
Common Pleas and Exchequer courts seemingly began to strongly favor their own cases 
at rates around 3:1. However, the effect is overstated because time depreciation (see 
section on time depreciation below) impacted mainly the previously prevalent King’s 
Bench cases so that the number of non-depreciated 19th century cases differs less between 
the three common law courts. 
 In summary, the structure of the citation network is consistent with the 
entanglement that legal scholars ascribe to common law courts. Common law courts had 
a tendency to cite from their own courts. The tendency was always less pronounced than 
the analogous tendency in the relationship between equity and common law. The 
apparent 19th century move towards stronger separation of the three common law courts 
is likely an artificial effect that arises from time depreciation. Because of the 
entanglement of the three common law courts and the clear separation of equity law and 
common law I will focus subsequent analysis on only of the two. I opted for an analysis 
of common law because the latter is the older, better-documented and more central body 
of law. I leave the analysis of equity law to future research 
Five most cited common law cases 
Here I test if the number of citations a specific case report received is indeed an 
indication of the reported case’s influence on legal innovation as judged by other sources. 
Among legal experts the most cited cases should be known as influential in the 
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development of England’s common law. To do so I focus on common law citations only, 
i.e. citations from common law courts to common law courts, count the number of 
citations a case report received between the years 1700 and 1865 (this means that I 
capture overall influence in legal innovation between 1700 and 1865), and consult the 
legal literature to assess the importance of a handful of the most cited ones. Table 6 lists 
the 20 most cited (combined) common law cases. I will discuss extensively only the top 5 
cases and present the remaining cases mainly to show the prominence of Coke’s Reports. 
8 out of common law’s 20 most cited cases can be found in Coke’s Reports, often just 
known as The Reports. Baker (1990, p. 210) claims that they “have been perhaps the 
single most influential named reports”, but does not substantiate the claim. A simple 
citation count gives credence to the actual influence of Coke’s Reports.  
The most cited case report in common law is 1 wms saunders 319. It received 87 
out of the about 115,000 post-1700 citations. The corresponding relative share of 
citations is about 1 per mill and, thereby, similar to the relative share of the most cited 
majority opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court82 (see Cross and Spriggs, 2010, p. 432). 
Reported are the case of Pordage versus Cole, which was on trial in front of the King’s 
Bench in the year 1669, and the case of Clerke versus Pywell. Because, on closer 
inspection, nearly all citations refer to the former, I will not elaborate on the latter. In 
Pordage versus Cole the two parties had agreed that the defendant would pay a certain 
amount of money for the plaintiff’s lands. The plaintiff sued for full payment of the 
money before conveying while the defendant was unwilling to pay before the conveyance 
was complete. The court ruled that the transaction consisted of two independent 
                                                 
82 The most cited majority opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court is McCulloch v. 
Maryland (1819). It received 355 out of about 215,000 citations. 
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covenants (i.e. promises made official through a seal) and that each party could seek 
remedy in court for fulfillment of the covenant, but that neither party could reject 
fulfillment of the one covenant by pointing to non-fulfillment of the other. The covenants 
were seen as independent and the plaintiff had the right to receive the full payment before 
conveying the lands. The question when covenants would be dependent or independent 
played an important role in the development of contract law. Therefore, and because the 
ruling was contentious to many83 the case gained prominence around the mid of the 19th 
century until it was distinguished in various decisions and finally essentially overruled. 
The case was unusual in that it became most influential about more than 150 years after it 
went on trial (see Figure 11). More than two thirds of the citations occurred after 1830. 
 The second most cited case report is 1 coke report 93, a famous case from the 
King’s Bench known as Wolfe versus Shelley or Shelley’s case. It was cited 64 times in 
the post-1700 ER reports. Coke’s report from the year 1581 records an ancient and by 
then regularly applied rule holding “that when O conveys “to A for life then to A’s 
heirs”, A gets a fee simple absolute and his would-be heirs not even a future interest. O's 
intent that A get only a life estate is frustrated” (as stated in Reppy Jr, 1997, p. 83). 
Bluntly stated it means that the will of O in conveying land to A and limiting its use to 
the benefit of A’s heirs need not be respected by A, i.e. A can sell the land and need not 
pass it on to his heirs. The rule was contentious because it apparently defeated the 
conveyor’s intentions until it was abolished by statute in 1925. In a law school review 
from that period (“The Rule in Shelley’s Case Has Been Abolished,” 1935) it is stated 
that “Throughout the six centuries of its life, the Rule has been provocative of conflicting 
                                                 
83 In the words of Lord Kenyon - the Court of Chancery judge and later King’s Bench 
lord chief justice - it “outraged common sense” (see 4 term reports 761). 
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criticism” and illustrated with a footnote saying that at some point in time “the entire bar 
of England is said to have been divided into the "Shelleyites" and the "Anti-Shelleyites." 
[…] A fierce controversy followed the decision of the court of Exchequer Chamber 
which reversed the judgment of the King's Bench. Lord Mansfield, Lord Thurlow, Fearne 
and Hargrave participated in the hostilities […] So vehement were the attacks that a life- 
long friendship between Lord Thurlow and Hargrave terminated in a heated dispute.” The 
struggle over the rule continued in the United States (see e.g. Orth, 1988; Hoover, 1991; 
Reppy Jr, 1997). An American judge called it "a rule which has done more to produce 
litigation, and, when sustained, thwart the actual purposes of a testator than all the other 
arbitrary rules combined" (cited in Reppy Jr, 1997, p. 86). The case collected citations 
and remained influential from the beginning of the 18th century onwards (see Figure 11). 
 The third84 most cited case report is 1 burrow 38 or Robinson versus Robinson, a 
1756 case from Lord Mansfield’s King’s Bench. It received 60 citations. In the reported 
case Robinson, in his will, passed on his estate to a relative for the relative’s lifetime and, 
after the relative’s death, to the relative’s potential son for the son’s lifetime. In the 
absence of a son the estate would fall to Robinson’s cousin. The relative had two 
children, the relative’s first-born son died, the relative’s second son lived on, and 
Robinson’s cousin claimed the estate. After careful and diligent deliberation the court 
held that the general intent of Robinson’s will supersedes the particular intent and that the 
estate should remain with the second son. About 45 years later Lord Kenyon could state 
that it “has been the settled doctrine of Westminster Hall for the last forty or fifty years 
                                                 
84 I left out kelyng j 1 as third most cited combined case report because the original 61 
case citations it received referred to different cases in the reporter volume. They were all 
matched to kelyng j 1 as the different case reports were not differentiated in Juta Law’s 
electronic version of the English Reports. 
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that there may be a general and a particular intent in a will, and that the latter must give 
way when the former cannot otherwise be carried into effect.” Editors’ notes in 1 burrow 
38 indicate that it was frequently cited. Therefore, it is not surprising that the case 
continuously collected citations soon after it was resolved (see Figure 11). However, in 
the legal literature the case apparently does not figure prominently as an influential case. 
Citation analysis can serve here as a guide for future investigations. 
The fourth most cited case report is 6 adolphus and ellis 469 or Pickard versus 
Sears. In 1837 the King’s Bench under Chief Justice Denman held that a third party S 
who purchased unknowingly mortgaged property from a mortgagor while the mortgagee 
P - in spite of being actively involved in the sale - remained silent to all involved parties 
about his mortgage title, need not return the mortgage to the mortgagee P. The holding 
was based on the grounds that “where one by his words or conduct willfully causes 
another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that 
belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring 
against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.” The case counts 
as the first clear statement of the modern doctrine of equitable estoppel. For example, at 
the turn of the 19th century Ewart (1900, p. 8) states “Pickard v. Sears was [not] the first 
case of its kind, but it is indubitable that that decision marks an epoch in the history of the 
development of the law, and gave to the idea of estoppel by misrepresentation marked 
vitality and impetus. It formulated a principle which has spread into almost every 
department of the law”. Also references from the ER editors make it clear that the case 
served as analogy in numerous later cases. Moreover, a look on Figure 11 shows that the 
case collected an increasing number of citations right after it was decided. 
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The fifth most cited case report is 8 coke report 66, better known as Crogate’s 
case. In this 1608 case from the King’s Bench the judges held that the defendant M need 
not to make good for driving off C’s cattle from the commons because C’s technical 
reply of De injuria sua propria, absque residua causa85 to M’s statement of defense was 
technically incorrect. Coke’s summarized the court’s elaborate reasoning in four 
resolutions, which became fundamental element of common law’s peculiar and highly 
technical system of special pleading. As in Crogart’s case the technicalities of pleading 
came to be seen as counteracting justice86, and a judicial reform, laid down in the Hillary 
Rules of 1834 (comp. Holdsworth, 1923), was carried out under the auspices of Baron 
Parke. The reform turned out to complicate pleadings even further until various 
Judicature Acts of Parliament brought some relief (as discussed in Marcus, 2008). 
According to Hayes (1854) Crogart’s case was “familiar to every student of pleading”. 
However, it is only after the judicial reform of 1834 that the case appears as particularly 
influential in legal innovation. Most of its citations originate in these years (see Figure 
11). 
                                                 
85 Duhaime’s legal dictionary translates this as "The injury is a result of the defendant's 
actions and not the other proposed causes he sets out". 
 
86 The holding of Crogart’s case was satirized in a dialogue between Crogart and Baron 
Parke aka Baron Surebutter (Hayes, 1854). Here an entertaining excerpt: “Crogart: I don't 
know what resolutions the judges made; but I know one that I made myself, and that was, 
never to go to law again. However, it was too late: my beasts were sold to pay the 
lawyer's bills, and I was a ruined man. More shame for my judges, say I. 
Sur. Bar: Mr. Crogate, I am astonished at your sentiments. The· decision in your oase 
was a most sound one; it has been admirably reported by Sir E. Coke; it has given the 
rule to countless decisions since; and has, in fact, constituted one of the great. landmarks 




 In summary, all the 5 most cited cases were influential in English legal history, 
their citation patterns differ drastically, and even the most cited cases do not receive 
many citations. Apart from the artificially inflated citation of kelyng j 1, all 5 most cited 
cases have been clearly influential in English legal innovation after 1700. Apart from 1 
burrow 38 the cases are well-known and widely regarded as landmark cases in the legal 
literature. The lack of recognition of the influence of Robinson versus Robinson might be 
an area of legal research. Citation patterns of the cases differ: the cases reported in 1 wms 
saunders and 8 coke report 88 gained their main influence in legal innovation about 200 
years after they were decided (i.e. there exists the possibility of awakening dormant 
cases), while the influence of Shelley’s case (1 coke report 93) appears non-ending, and 
the 2 remaining top 5 cases (1 burrow 38, adolphus and ellis 469) gained influence nearly 
immediately after their resolution. Finally, it is noteworthy that the number of total 
citations case reports receive over their lifetime is very limited. The most cited common 
law cases do not receive more than 100 citations out of about 115,000 common law 
citations87, i.e. less than 1 per mill of all citations. The relative share of the most cited 
cases is comparable to the relative share of the most cited cases of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
Time depreciation - aging 
In this section I study the relationship between the age of cited precedents and the age of 
the citing cases. More precisely, I investigate whether the time difference between the 
cited case and the citing case affected the number of citations that preceding cases 
received and whether the relationship differs significantly from what one would expect if 
                                                 
87 As a reminder, equity law cases citing common law cases are excluded in the analysis. 
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cases had been randomly cited. To economists the notion of preceding cases as 
innovation capital for the creation of new law naturally suggests that the innovation value 
of precedents might depreciate (see the original application in Landes and Posner, 1976). 
Findings from the study of US judicial opinions corroborate this. For example, Black and 
Spriggs write that the “law, and the legal rules that comprise it, change in part as 
precedents are cited in court opinions. Judges’ choices to reduce or eliminate citations to 
cases, which results observationally in the depreciation of precedent, can thus influence 
the shape the law takes” (2013, p. 355). They then find that US precedents in the 
Supreme Court and the various courts of appeals indeed depreciate over time and that the 
depreciation is largely independent of case characteristics. Figure 12 depicts common 
law’s distribution of the ages of cited cases in the form of a histogram, whereas the 
number of citations one would expect from a situation where cases are cited randomly 
appear as a line graph. The histogram makes it clear that common law precedents did 
indeed depreciate. The older the precedents become the less likely they are to be cited. 
About 50% of all precedents are not older than 30 years. At the same time it is 
noteworthy that the histogram features a very long, non-negligible tail. More than 20% of 
cited precedents are older than 100 years. The depreciation pattern resembles a pattern of 
exponential decay. To estimate the overall depreciation rate88 I estimated a very simple 
linear model: 
 
ln2(3 =  + . ∙ ∆	 + 7, 7  ~ . . :. 
                                                 
88 Estimating an overall depreciation rate for the entire time period 1700 to 1865 
implicitly assumes that the depreciation rate is time independent. Later it will become 
evident that the depreciation rate actually shows an interesting time dependence. 
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Δti is the time difference between the citing case and the cited case, and qi is the number 
of citations with time difference Δti. Using linear regression to fit the data to a model of 
exponential decay results in an excellent fit with an R2 value of about 0.83 and a 
depreciation rate of about 1.4% (see column 1 of Table 7). Figure 13 displays the same 
data as in Figure 12, but utilizes a logarithmic scale that makes it easier to visually 
discern depreciation rates and provides, as red line, the predictions from the fitted model. 
Figure 12 clearly shows that the depreciation rate is age dependent. Indeed, restricting the 
data to precedents not older than 80 years would result in a depreciation rate of about 3%, 
while restricting the data to precedents older than 80 years and younger than 200 years 
would yield a depreciation rate of 0.8%.  
 To compare the actually observed time depreciation pattern in the histogram with 
predictions from the random citing model I calculated the time depreciation pattern one 
would expect from such a situation. Providing the random citing model with the annual 
number of ER case reports (common law cases between 1580 and 1865) and the annual 
number of new ER citations (common law citation between 1700 and 1865) allowed it to 
determine the expected distribution. While there is no discrimination between cases of 
different years in the random citing model, the fact that different years saw different 
numbers of cases and citations produces a time depreciation structure with non-trivial 
structure (see the red line in Figure 12).  
It is evident that the expected number of citations differs markedly from the 
actually observed distribution. Under the random citing model only about 20% of 
citations are expected to occur within the preceding 30 years and more than 50% of 
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citations are expected to go back more than 100 years. This amounts essentially to the 
reverse of the actually observed values of 50% and 20%. Moreover, in striking contrast 
with the actually observed distribution, a monotonous time depreciation pattern is absent 
from the expected distribution. Taken together the findings in this section make it clear 
that time depreciation of innovation capital actually exists within the ER data. 
Comparison with the random citing model should leave no doubt that the observed 
pattern is not the result of random citing behavior. The estimated depreciation rates of 
about 1.4% over the whole time period and of about 3% for the most recent decades 
appear reasonable. 
Distribution of citation frequency 
Subsequently, I study the frequency distribution of cases by the number of received ER 
citations and compare it with predictions from the random citing model. In network 
studies the distribution is named degree distribution and regarded as a key characteristic 
of networks and network formation processes (see e.g. Newman, 2010, chap. 4, 12–15). 
 To derive the expected degree distribution that would results from the random 
citing model, I simulated the corresponding network formation process. To do so I used 
the exogenously given annual number of ER case reports and new ER citations as inputs 
for the random citing process. Beginning in the year 1700, I randomly matched a case in 
the citing year with a precedent (one random number selected the citing case and another 
random number selected the cited case). I repeated the process until the correct number of 
annual citations was reached and then proceeded to the subsequent year. For example, in 
in the year 1700 I generated 694 random matches between the 461 cases from 1700 and 
the 30,310 precedents. After applying the procedure for every year between 1700 and 
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1865 the same number of citations as in the dataset were generated. Counting cases with 
the same number of received citations yielded the expected degree distribution. To 
eliminate random noise I repeated the simulation 100 times and then averaged the degree 
distributions. Figure 14 displays the actually observed degree distribution together with 
the predicted degree distribution. The left side of the figure shows the full distribution 
while the right side of the figure shows a magnified subset of the distribution.  
 The random citing simulations gave rise to a degree distribution that follows a 
Poisson distribution. This is not surprising because emergence of the Poisson distribution 
can be theoretically proven for the case of non-staggered random citing (see e.g. 
Newman, 2010, p. 401) and the additivity property of independent Poisson functions 
generalizes to the staggered random citing case. A look on Figure 14 and comparison 
between the actual distribution in the histogram and the distribution one would expect 
from random citing behavior makes it clear that their main difference is in their tail 
behavior. The actual distribution has a long tail whereas the random citing distribution 
falls off quickly. More than 10% of the actual cases have received more than 7 citations, 
whereas less than 1% of the cases from the random citing model have received more than 
7 citations. More than 1700 actual cases have received more than 10 citations compared 
to only 11 cases from the random citing model. Because the tail of the actual distribution 
is longer than the tail from the Bernoulli distribution and because the number of citations 
described by the distributions is the same, it follows that the body of the actual 
distribution must contain less observations. Indeed cases with 3 or less citations make up 
about 2/3 of the actual observations, whereas they account for about 80% of the 
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observations from the random citing model. It is clear that the actual observation differs 
from random citing behavior. 
As a next step I investigated whether more cited cases attract more citations at 
later times. To do so I constructed a figure that shows the relationship between the 
average number of new citations cases received and the number of citations they had 
received earlier (see Figure 15). To construct the figure I matched - for any post-1700 
decade - the number of citations a case had already accumulated with the number of 
citations it received in the given decade. For each decade I then grouped cases by the 
number of previously accumulated citations and averaged the number of the recently 
collected citations. Each decade produced a relationship like Figure 15. To condense the 
different decade graphs into one graph I calculated the frequency-weighted average over 
the different decades. The result appears in Figure 15 together with the prediction from 
the random citing model. While the predictions from random citing model show no 
tendency for new citations to prefer frequently cited cases, this is not so for the actual 
observations.  
In the network literature it is well known that a citing bias towards cases that have 
already received a number of citations, a so-called preferential attachment, will result in 
degree distributions with fat tails (see e.g. Price, 1976; Barabási and Albert, 1999; 
Newman, 2010, pp. 487–534). Figure 15 shows that preferential attachment indeed 
existed in the actual citation process and that preferential attachment followed a linear 
relationship. For example, cases that were referenced 10 times in previous time periods 
were expected to receive one citation per decade whereas cases that were referenced 20 
times could be expected to draw twice as many citations. Therefore, the observed 
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distribution of citation frequencies can be seen as a direct consequence of a preferential 
attachment process.  
To summarize: the distribution of received citations possesses a long tail and 
thereby differs from the Bernoulli distribution of the random citing model. Moreover, the 
citation network data reveal a linear citing bias towards previously more cited cases. This 
bias is called preferential attachment in the scholarly literature on networks and is known 
to give rise to the type of long tails that were observed in the ER data. 
Controlling heterogeneities 
From the preceding sections it is obvious that the statistical aggregate patterns of the 
common law citation network did not arise from random citing behavior of judges, 
counsel or reporters. For the later purpose of using citation counts to measure influence, 
one needs to take case fluctuations and heterogeneities into account (see, for example, the 
previously mentioned lists of confounding factors as they appear in Posner (2000) and 
Cross and Spriggs (2010)). Confounding through heterogeneities is lessened if one 
analyzes statistical aggregate patterns because some individual heterogeneities will 
average out. To address potential confounders in later investigations I essentially use 
three approaches: limit myself to groups that are as homogenous as possible, disregard 
some heterogeneities as negligible, and try to account for case fluctuations with the help 
of a statistical model. 
 To avoid confounding from court hierarchies, I limit the analysis to case reports 
from the three superior, essentially exchangeable common law courts, i.e. the court of 
King’s Bench, the court of Common Pleas, and the court of Exchequer (I also include 
ER’s Nisi Prius series, i.e. reports from cases that were initiated in Westminster, but 
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proceeded to a large extent locally under the supervision of an assize judge). The three 
common law courts were at the top of the common law hierarchy. They supervised 
common law trials that were more routine and held at the assizes by itinerant judges. 
Because common law and equity law were complementary and not in a clearly defined 
hierarchy, I focus on common law and completely disregard case reports from equity law. 
On an empirical level this is justified based on the previous chapter’s findings regarding 
the separation of equity law and common law citations. I further disregard a few volumes 
of case reports that contain cases from the House of Lords and Privy Council, which 
occasionally served as courts of appeal. Consequently, all case reports that underlie the 
analysis originated from courts with essentially the same hierarchy. 
  I will neglect heterogeneities that arise from idiosyncrasies of judges, counsel, 
and reporters. While the personalities of judges, counsel and reporters varied greatly and 
a large number of books on the differing personalities have been published89, it held true 
through the 18th and 19th century that case reporters recorded references from different 
sources, i.e. from different judges and opposing counsel (and occasionally their 
explanations). Because of the mixing of sources and because 4 judges sat in each 
common law court it is improbable that - unlike in US judicial opinions - strong personal 
idiosyncrasies will characterize the citation network 
 I will further disregard variation in the quality of law reports. While it is certainly 
true that some law reporters were deemed utterly unreliable and use of their case reports 
                                                 
89 E.g. for an extensive treatment of the reporters see Wallace (1882), for an extremely 
comprehensive collection of judges’ biographies see Foss (1870), for a very recent 
biography on one of the most important judges see Poser (2013), and for an entertaining 
antidote see the book on bad judges by Graeme (2013). 
 96
was not welcomed in court90, it is plausible that low quality case reports would receive 
few citations (recalling here that negative citations are rare in the English Reports). 
Moreover, misreporting of facts and arguments by poor case reporters does impact the 
citations less. As long as a case reporter does not invent court references it is enough that 
he records a reference even if he does not understand facts or arguments. 
 Also changing conventions regarding the law reports will affect the word content 
more than the citation content because independent of specific form the use of precedents 
played a central role in courts since the beginning of the 18th century. Examples for 
changing conventions were the movement from a focus on specific pleadings to a focus 
on overall arguments of counsel and the grounds for judgment, the movement towards a 
clear delineation of material facts, the appearance of a concise case summary or a simple 
increase in the length of case reports (all are exemplified in Burrow’s mid-18th century 
reports). Also here it is possible though that conventions lead to underreporting of 
relevant references. 
 I will further ignore fluctuations in the number of practicing judges, counsel, and 
reporters. For judges this is easily achieved because the number of judges at the superior 
common law courts remained, with a few 17th century exceptions, constant at 12 over the 
centuries. On the other hand the size of England’s legal profession underwent large 
fluctuations over the centuries (e.g. Brooks, 1998, pp. 63–148). While greater diversity of 
lawyers in the courtroom would have reduced idiosyncratic citation obsessions even a 
small body of professional lawyers should not have been large enough to grossly distort 
                                                 
90 For instance, in 1704, as reported in 2 Lord Raymond 1072, Chief Justice Holt voiced 
the concern that some “scrambling reports […] will make us appear to posterity for a 
parcel of blockheads”, or in 1779 Chief Justice Mansfield discouraged use of case reports 
from the famous William Blackstone and called them “not very accurate” (1 Douglas 92) 
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use of precedents in courtrooms. The most likely manifestation of a larger number of 
legal professionals is an increase in the number of cases in the superior common law 
courts. 
 Most of the above sources of heterogeneities are fairly homogenous across 
specific time periods. For example, fluctuations in the number of legal professionals, 
transformations of law reporting conventions, changes in the quality of law reports or 
even the extent of personal idiosyncrasies will manifest less variation within a specific 
time period than across time periods. Therefore, one possibility to limit bias from these 
sources would be to compare citations within narrow time periods and not across time 
periods. I will make use of this approach in later chapters when studying the use of 
innovation capital. 
The representative courtroom91 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the fluctuating number of case reports 
appears as the biggest obstacle for a coherent analysis of citation counts. More case 
reports first generate more citations to other case reports and later provide more 
opportunities to be cited. Ideally, the number of new case reports would be the same in 
each time period. To take the effect of case fluctuations into account and be able to 
provide a coherent analysis I here suggest an extension of the previously introduced 
random citing model: the representative courtroom model. The latter is designed to 
capture the presence of depreciation and preferential attachment effects that became 
evident in previous sections. 
                                                 
91 I cannot claim originality for the following model. Variants of it are common in 
network science models of citation networks. 
 98
 In the representative courtroom model I imagine an infinitely lived courtroom 
whose composition never changes. At the beginning of each year the courtroom learns 
how many new case reports come into being and how many citations each new case 
report is supposed to generate. It then goes to work. A look out of the courtroom window 
opens a vista on the network of all reported precedent cases and arrows connecting them. 
Older cases are further away, appear smaller and keep shrinking exponentially every 
year. However, precedent cases can be rejuvenated and increase in size. Whenever they 
receive an arrow they get a permanent boost. The boosts they have received over the 
years add up linearly92. Consequently, the interplay between shrinkage and growth 
determines the size of a case report. While enjoying the vista, the members of the 
representative courtroom randomly generate for each new case the needed number of 
citations and record them on a list. The vista does not change from one new case report to 
another. The selection probability of the precedents equals the size of the precedents (this 
is due to the fortuitous fact that the sizes of all the precedents sum to one). When the 
courtroom has generated the required number of citations for each new case report, the 
court session ends. The new case reports and citations materialize in precedent land. The 
courtroom reconvenes the following year. In mathematical terms the conditional citation 
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92 The wise courtroom ordered in its very first gathering that every reported case shall 
receive one boost just by being reported so that no case report will be completely 
invisible to the eyes of subsequent generations. 
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where kjt is the total number of citations that case j received during the years preceding 
time t. The representative courtroom model can reproduce statistical aggregate features 
that are present in the actual common law citation network including time depreciation 
patterns, preferential attachment, and a long-tailed degree distribution. Apart from a 
precedent’s age and number of received citations, it disregards any other distinctive 
features of precedents (including personalities of judges, counsel and reporter; the size of 
the pool from which courtroom members are recruited; citation conventions; the words 
inside a case report and consequently style, meaning, type of reported cases, etc.). 
 A slightly generalized form of model is frequently used in citation network 
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The parameter α can modulate persistence effects. Higher α values imply an increase of 
the strength of preferential attachment whereas lower α values imply a decrease. 
Obviously, if α values equals 1 the standard model results. 
 An aggregated version of the representative courtroom model will prove useful in 
later sections. Within the model, citation probabilities at any given time t are fixed and 
citations are declared independent. Therefore, it is possible to calculate the probability 
that a case in year t cites one of the cases in year t’ by simply adding up citation 
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Naming the total number of cases in year t’ nt’ and defining the total number of citations 
that cases in year t’ had accumulated by time t as 
  
F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one can state - within the standard model - the probability that a case in year t cites one of 
the cases in year t’: 
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 Analogously one can aggregate over years in the generalized model looks as 
follows: 
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Unfortunately, the aggregation is less straightforward because 
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However, if α does not stray too far away from 1 and if one is mainly interested in the use 
of probabilities, one can, as a rough approximation, use the latter term in spite of the 
former. Within the generalized model the approximate probability that a case in year t 
cites one of the cases in year t’ pit’ then becomes: 
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The year aggregated versions of the standard model (equation 1) and the generalized 
model (equation 2) I will use for estimations in later chapters. 
Meaningful network structure 
Summing up: the distinction between equity law and common law is clearly visible in the 
citation network. Courts from both bodies of law have a strong bias towards citing their 
own cases and operate as coevolving, but largely autonomous jurisdictions. While such a 
bias is still detectable among the common law courts it is much less pronounced. The 
three different common law courts belong to the same body of law. The 5 most cited 
common law cases have been clearly influential in common law’s legal history and 
corroborate the use of citation as measure of influence in English common law. The time 
difference between citing case and cited case has a clear impact on the number of 
citations that precedents receive. On average, the older the case the less likely it is to 
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receive citations. Therefore, the influence of precedents depreciates over time (and does 
so in an exponential manner). Finally, the citation network manifests a process of linear 
preferential attachment that is in line with the observed long tails of the degree 
distribution. Based on the findings in this chapter I conclude that the extracted citation 
network contains meaningful content that is not captured by a simple random citing 
model.  
 To prepare the subsequent analysis of persistent and changing features in 
England’s legal innovation process I discussed the confounding potential of various 
heterogeneities and annual fluctuations in case numbers. I then proposed ways to control 
the heterogeneities as well as possible and introduced another statistical model - the 
representative courtroom model - that reproduces the observed time depreciation and 
preferential attachments patterns. Estimating the model in later chapters will account for 
annual fluctuations of ER case report numbers. 
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Chapter 6: Persistence and change - case precedents 
In this chapter I will investigate the process by which the superior common law courts 
generated legal innovation. To do so I will study how they drew on reported cases, i.e. a 
good part of their innovation capital, to generate new rulings and how their use of 
innovation capital changed over time. The idea of capital immediately brings to mind 
notions of persistence and change: capital can be transferred from one time period to the 
next and thereby exhibit persistence; at the same time it can change through depreciation 
or additions to it. 
The concepts of persistence and change or constancy and flux go back to the pre-
Socratic roots of Western thought (Parmenides is often associated with the former while 
Heraclitus is linked to the latter (see e.g. Kirk et al., 1984; Barnes, 2002)) and have 
formed a theme93 in Western thought ever since. The idea of persistence is related to 
ideas of stability, regularity and memory. At its heart lies the image of an entity - like the 
economists’ idea of capital - that stays the same from one time period to another. Change 
on the other hand is the non-persistent, the unstable or irregular. The concept of time 
plays an essential role in the dichotomy of persistence and change. If one eliminates time 
there is no change and only persistence remains. 
While institutional persistence has taken center stage in the mainstream of 
institutional economics (possibly influenced by economists’ urge for causal identification 
and their strong bias towards equilibrium thinking), institutional change has moved to the 
sidelines (see the introduction for a discussion of the recent literature). The situation is 
                                                 
93 For the notions of a theme and thematic analysis of Western thought see Holton (e.g. 
1988); his quote “the main business of science is to trace in the chaos and flux of 
phenomena a consistent structure with order and meaning” (Holton and Brush, 2001, p. 
158) extends the notion of persistence to concepts. 
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uncharacteristic of much of fruitful Western thought where persistence and change rarely 
appear isolated from each other. For example, Plato combined Heraclitus’ idea of 
continuous flux with Parmenides idea of the unchanging, and created the dichotomy 
between the ever changing world of sense impressions and the stable world of ideas. The 
theory of the conversation of energy found constancy in ongoing flux. Darwin proposed a 
theory where persistent features are transmitted across generations and incremental 
innovation creates variation for an unchanging process of natural selection. Psychological 
constructivism is based on the belief that the new needs to be constructed from the 
persistent old. 
It is my belief that a more balanced view of persistence and change can benefit 
institutional economics. Persistence and change are the hallmarks of cumulative culture 
and social rules are part of cumulative culture. A near exclusive focus on persistence 
disregards the nature of institutions and is likely to mislead. In the following sections I try 
to treat aspects of persistence and change in a more balanced way. I will conduct different 
kinds of analyses and approach the question of institutional persistence and change from 
various angles. All of them revolve around the use of case reports as innovation capital. 
The time period under consideration covers citing cases between the years 1700 to 1865 
and cited cases between the years 1580 and 1865. The constructed dataset contains about 
118,00 citations of case precedents for this time period. Case reports’ temporal 
persistence as innovation capital is possible because the material artifact of a written case 
report can be transmitted largely unchanged over long time periods94. Unless all copies of 
a written case report are lost, a materially persistent precedent can - in principle - 
                                                 
94 Oral transmission over time is, of course, possible. However, it is less precise and far 
more prone to interruptions of the transmission chain. 
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influence later cases. In practice, the influence of precedents varies over time. While the 
influence of particular precedents is best studied in combination with profound legal 
expertise, the influence of groups of precedents can manifest emergent statistical 
aggregate patterns that provide insight into the legal innovation process without requiring 
comprehensive legal domain knowledge. Therefore, the focus of the subsequent analyses 
is on the comparison of groups of precedents and not on the investigation of particular 
precedents. 
First, I investigate if case law embodied in specific case rulings persisted for long 
time horizons and find that a good part of it did. Second, examining the age composition 
of common law’s most cited cases I find strong persistence in the 18th century and 
pronounced change in the 19th century. Third, I extend the study from the most cited 
cases and study the general use of innovation capital with the help of the random citing 
and representative courtroom models. It appears that one persistent mode of legal 
innovation transitions to another between the mid of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
century. Estimates from the representative courtroom model point to a quadrupling of 
depreciation rates and a decrease in attachment bias. Fourth, I apply a technique from 
network science called community detection to the full citation network and identify two 
very different types of communities. One community maintained close links across the 
centuries - partly by directly citing early precedents and partly by citing precedents from 
the previous generation that had built on its previous generation. The other community 
has contrasting features. While having maintained some ties with the past most of its 
links are with the 19th century. Apparently this body of law built nearly exclusively on 
the most recent precedents with little regard for the older past. 
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Long-term persistence of case rulings 
In this section I will estimate the extent to which rulings of cases remained binding, i.e. 
persisted, over long periods of time. To do so I study case reports from different decades 
and analyze their appearance as case references in later years. Citing a precedent in later 
cases not only indicates that the cited case was used to construct new law, but also - with 
great likelihood - that the judges considered the precedent’s ruling to be still binding in 
later circumstances95. Therefore, citing a precedent is a sufficient indication of the 
precedent’s persistent authority during the times of the citing case. At the same time, 
citing a precedent is not a necessary indication of persistent authority: a precedent that 
had not been cited for a long time only suggests that it was not useful in the construction 
of new law. However, it seems plausible that the majority of non-cited cases have not 
only lost their value in the construction of new law, but also their relevance and 
applicability to the life of the citing period. 
 To investigate the long-term persistence of case rulings, I focused on the time 
period from 1580 to 1700, split it into decades and determined for each case in a given 
decade the year of its most recent citation (beginning with citations from the year 1700). 
For example, when a case from the year 1586 was cited 3 times during the years 1839, 
1841 and 1845, I recorded the year 1845 as the case’s most recent (minimum) year of 
applicability. Figure 16 presents the resulting distributions for two representative 
decades: the decade of 1580 is the oldest decade with substantial coverage in the English 
Reports, the decade of 1700 is the first decade after the Glorious Revolution where 
potentially misleading editor comments became limited and the doctrine of precedent was 
                                                 
95 I rely here on one of chapter 0’s findings where cited cases in the English Reports 
apparently refer very rarely to overruled or outright incorrect case rulings. 
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firmly established. The distributions for the remaining decades do not differ much from 
the 2 representative examples and are shown in Figure 17 (the flat curves in the 1640’s 
and 1650’s result because very few case reports from this time period are included in the 
English Reports). To account for some of the impact of annual fluctuations in the number 
of cases I further determined the distribution one would expect from random citing 
model. To do so I relied on 100 realizations of a random citation network that I 
constructed following the procedure outlined in the previous chapter (essentially fixing 
the annual number of existing cases, new cases and new citations and creating citations 
between the new cases and existing cases in a random manner). The resulting 
distributions for the two representative decades appear together with the actual data in 
Figure 16. 
The upper left distribution shows the fate of 589 out of 1149 cases from the 
1580’s. Because only post-1700 citations are included the years before 1700 record no 
citations. 560 out of the 1149 cases were never cited after 1700. However, 589 cases 
apparently remained binding more than 100 years after they had gone to court (this 
corresponds to a 100-year term persistence rate of 51.2%) and the vast majority of them 
remained binding for an even longer time. For instance, more than 350 cases remained 
binding for more than 200 years, and about 150 cases remained binding more than 250 
years after the judges concluded the trials. 
These findings differ from predictions derived from the random citing model. The 
random citing model cites all preceding cases with the same probability, lacks time 
depreciation and thereby overcites older cases. This manifests in two ways: first, many 
more 1580’s cases show long term persistence than in the actual data (1147 versus 589); 
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second, the vast majority of the 1580’s cases are cited at least once during the 19th 
century when the number of new citations was large. More than 85% of cases are 
predicted to be binding 200 years after their occurrence and about two thirds are 
predicted to be binding more than 250 years.  
The lower left distribution depicts the afterlife of 1353 cases from the first decade 
of the 18th century. While 2016 cases were reported in that decade 643 cases never 
occurred in a case report during the subsequent 150 years and apparently ended in 
immediate oblivion96. Another 132 cases were cited five years after they were reported 
and then never again. After 100 years about 800 cases (implying a 100-year term 
persistence rate of 39.8%) and after 150 years about 200 cases remained binding. 
Noteworthy is also the pronounced hump around 150 years that arose as a consequence of 
a large number of 19th century citations.  
The citation behavior that is predicted by the random citing model for cases from 
the 1700’s is very similar to the one for the 1580’s scenario. 2006 out of 2016, i.e. 
virtually all, 1700’s cases are cited at least once towards the end of the citation period. 
This manifests in the concentration of citation counts around 150 years after the original 
case. Within the model more than 85% of case rulings remained binding about 100 years 
later, and about 30% of cases remained binding about 150 years later. 
 All in all it seems clear that long-term persistence and decay of case rulings went 
together. A large part of the early case rulings in common law not only persisted 
materially as written reports, but remained authoritative for centuries. This constitutes a 
                                                 
96 In principle, while unlikely it is always possible to bring information that is embodied 
and preserved in material artifacts back to life. 
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form of institutional long-term persistence that, however, coexisted with institutional 
change. Institutional change occurred through the continuous creation of new case rulings  
and decay of existing ones. While the citation network cannot provide complete certainty 
about the status of non-cited cases, plausibly cases that have not been cited for very long 
time periods have lost their practical applicability. The latter then suggests that 
institutional decay of case rulings figured prominently in common law. Institutional 
decay might have occurred for many reasons. For example, a case ruling might have 
become inapplicable because it was badly reported, because it was considered erroneous, 
because it concerned factual circumstances that were very narrow or ceased to exist (e.g. 
regarding problems of a feudal society), because it had been superseded by more 
elaborate rulings, or because it had paved the way of a legal road that was abandoned 
later.  
Rise and fall of common law’s top authorities 
Here I will focus on the age composition of common law’s most authoritative cases - the 
most used subset of the legal innovation capital - and study its persistence and change 
over time. To do so I use post-1700 citation counts as a measure of authority and 
determine each year’s most cited cases. I then pick 8 different subsets of the most cited 
cases and characterize their year-dependent age composition by standard summary 
measures of centrality and spread. 4 out of the 8 different subsets comprise the 10 top 
cited, the 50 top cited, the 100 top cited, and the 500 top cited cases. I characterize their 
age compositions by mean and standard deviation. The remaining 4 subsets comprise 
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cited cases in the top 99th, 95th, 90th, and 80th percentile97 and are characterized by 
medians and median absolute deviations. The approach follows methodological 
suggestions by Leicht et al. (2007).  
I find that the measures of centrality and spread point to a long time period where 
the temporal composition of the most authoritative cases remained largely unchanged. 
This time period was followed by a pronounced and continuous shift that began around 
the turn of the 19th century. Finally, I show that the identified pattern of persistence and 
change remains evident if one measures authority not by cumulative post-1700 citation 
counts, but by non-cumulative, decade-specific citation counts. Figure 18 presents the 
annual means and standard deviations of four groups of top cited cases. The first group 
comprises the 10 top cited, the second the 50 top cited, the third the 100 top cited, and the 
fourth the 500 top cited cases. Interpretation of the two graphs is straightforward. While 
the first decade produced noisy data because of low citation counts (due to 
interpretational ambiguities all pre-1700 citations are disregarded in the analysis) a stable 
temporal composition soon emerged and stayed largely unchanged until the turn of the 
18th century. This manifested across all four groups in 1:1 increases of mean ages and 
passed years, as well as largely unchanged standard deviations. However, starting around 
1800 the steady increase of the different mean ages stalled and standard deviations began 
to rise quickly. Clearly, a continuously increasing number of young precedents became 
part of the top authorities and replaced the older authorities. The general replacement 
                                                 
97 Note that groups defined by percentiles do possess an annually increasing number of 
group members. The benefit of this definition is that all citations with the same number of 
citations are either excluded or included in the top authorities group. The latter is not the 
case for groups with a fixed number of group members. There the sort order can 
determine if a case with the same number of citations is left out or included. 
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process continued over the course of the 19th century showing few signs of a slowdown. 
For example, the top 10 authorities resisted new entrants until around 1820. The 
displacements of the old top 10 authorities with newer ones resulted in jumps of the top 
10’s mean age and standard deviation: around 1820 the case 1 burrow 38 - a case from 
the year 1756 - and around 1860 the case 6 adolphus and ellis 469 - a case from the year 
1837 - joined the exclusive group.  
To substantiate the apparent pattern of change and persistence Figure 19 provides 
time-dependent medians and median absolute deviations of four different groups. The 
four groups comprise cases that have received a number of citations in the top 99th, 95th, 
90th, and 80th percentile. The figure tells essentially the same story of persistence and 
change. Until about 1800 the median age of the top authorities rose linearly with every 
year and the median absolute deviations remained largely unchanged. Around 1800 
young precedents had replaced a sufficient number of the oldest precedents to reduce 
medians and lower the median absolute deviations. Over the subsequent years they 
replaced more and more older precedents until around 1850 the majority of precedents 
were no older than 100 years. This resulted in steadily rising medians and median 
absolute deviations before the median ages underwent a sudden drastic drop. The shift of 
the center of the distribution of precedent ages then lowered the mean absolute 
deviations. 
Figure 21 illustrates the findings from Figure 18 and Figure 19 with four 
histograms that depict the age composition of the 100 most cited cases at four different 
points of time. In 1750 nearly all top 100 authorities originated at the beginning of the 
17th century or around the Glorious Revolution. Until 1790 the situation remained largely 
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unchanged. In 1810, a few cases from the end of the 18th century had appeared among the 
top 100 authorities. By 1850 precedents from the end of the 18th century already 
constituted about 40% of the 100 most cited precedents.  
Figure 22 demonstrates that the observed pattern of persistence and change would 
not arise from a combination of random citing behavior and a large increase in the 
number of 19th century case reports. Means increase steadily without interruption and do 
so directly proportional to the number of years. Standard deviations also increase 
steadily. They neither feature a period of constancy nor a period of rapid increase. Like 
the means medians increase proportional to the number of years until they undergo a 
minor downwards correction at the middle of the 19th century. Mean absolute deviations 
remain constant until they begin to rise slightly towards the mid of the 19th century before 
dropping back after the minor median corrections. This behavior reflects the fact that - 
within the random citing model - cases, on average, accumulate the same number of 
citations per year. Consequently, cases that occurred earlier in time are likely to have 
accumulated more citations than later cases. That, in principle, locks in the distribution of 
top authorities. The reason why some change occurs in the distribution is that there is not 
a lot of variation in the accumulated number of citations (for example, by the end of 1865 
the accumulated number of citations range from 1 to 12, the 90th percentile starts at 5). 
Therefore, when the number of new cases is large a small number of new cases can end 
up in the top percentile groups. This explains the rise of standard deviations and median 
absolute deviations. 
 Because citation counts accumulate over time a considerable degree of persistence 
in common law’s top authorities is expected. To get a better understanding of the process 
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that transformed the top authorities, I analyzed the temporal distribution of the 100 most 
cited cases in four narrowly confined time periods. Only citations that occurred within the 
confined time periods were taken into account to determine the period-specific 100 most 
cited cases. The first time period comprises the years 1740-1770, the second one the 
years 1770-1800, the third one the years 1800-1830, and the fourth one the years 1830-
1860. Figure 22 presents the temporal distribution of the 100 most cited precedents for 
the different time periods. Between 1740 and 1770 virtually all top authorities were more 
than 30 years old and the majority of them originated around the turn of the 17th century. 
During the years 1770 and 1800 the majority of the period’s top authorities was of recent 
origin, i.e. the corresponding trials were held in the second part of the 18th century. 
However, about one third of top precedents had its roots in the 17th century. During the 
time period of 1800 to 1830 the top precedents were of even more recent origin and less 
than 10% of top authorities derived from before 1750. The years from 1830 to 1860 
located about 60% of their top 100 precedents in the 19th century and (40% of these after 
1830) and partly rekindled interest into older precedents (about 20% stemmed from 
before 1700). 
Taken altogether the picture of persistence and change in common law’s top 
authorities is clear. If one focuses on citing behavior between the years 1700 and 1865 
one finds that the temporal composition of top authorities (as measured by the number of 
citation counts) remained largely unchanged for about 100 years98. Around the turn of the 
                                                 
98 Note that this does not imply that the most cited cases did not change over time. It just 
means that top authorities derived consistently from the same time period, i.e. if a top 
authority was replaced by another one the replacing authority was a case from the same 
era. Actually individual level persistence of top authorities is high, but not extremely 
high. For example, the overlap of top 500 authorities from the years 1760 and 1820 is 
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19th century the composition began a drastic change towards modern precedents. About 
50 years later the majority of most cited precedents were of modern origin. The change 
appears even more sudden if one focuses on newly cited precedents and not cumulative 
ones. In addition to these findings it is noteworthy that nearly all top authorities dated 
back to 4 distinct time periods: the decades around the turn of the 17th century, the 
decades before and after the Glorious Revolution and the decades before the beginning of 
the 18th century. The fourth distinct time period emerged late and was constituted by the 
second quarter of the 19th century. Until the end of the 18th century nearly all authorities 
originated in the first two distinct time periods.  
Time profiles 
In this section I will study persistence and change more generally and concentrate on the 
time-specific usage of legal innovation capital. To do so I introduce year-dependent 
temporal compositions of new citations and name them time profiles. In contrast with the 
previous section I focus on new citations and all cited precedents - not on cumulative 
citations and top cited precedents. To account for effects of fluctuations in the annual 
number of reported cases, I will return to the representative courtroom model and 
estimate parameters of the legal innovation process.  
First, I discuss the concept of a time profile and show how the random citing 
model and a specific application of the representative courtroom model are able to predict 
a good part of the actually observed time profile. In any given year, cases cited 
precedents when they created new rulings. While the meaning of citations on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
about 65%, and the overlap of top 500 authorities from the years 1800 and 1860 is about 
39%.. 
 115
individual case level is accessible only to the legal professional, emergent annual 
aggregate patterns of precedent use can reveal insights into the legal innovation process 
that are visible to the legally untrained and possibly hidden from the view of legal 
professionals. To analyze precedent use in a specific year I picked a citing year between 
1700 and 1865 and retained all case citations that originated in that year. Each of these 
pointed from the current citing year to cases from previous years. For each cited year I 
then counted the number of citations pointing to it and calculated its share relative to all 
new citations. The citing-year-dependent relative shares of all cited years I named time 
profiles. They are best thought of as the year-dependent temporal compositions of new 
citations. 
The time profiles show how the courtrooms drew on reported cases - the existing 
stock of innovation capital - to create new law and how their use of innovation capital 
changed over time. By creating new law the courtrooms added to the stock of innovation 
capital. Figure 23 presents an example time profile from the year 1780. The upper part 
shows the fraction of citations that went from cases in the year 1780 to cases in preceding 
years. The lower part shows the same data aggregated over semi-decades thereby 
simultaneously hiding some detail and reducing statistical noise. As in the section on 
common law’s top authorities pre-19th century precedents are drawn nearly exclusively 
from three distinct time periods: the period around the turn of the 17th century, the period 
around the Glorious Revolution and the latter part of the 18th century. The time-
aggregated graph shows this clearly. 
 Because the three distinctive time periods overlap with time periods where a large 
number of case reports became available it is difficult to disentangle the effect of 
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fluctuations in case numbers from changes in the citation behavior of the courts. As an 
attempt to limit confounding of these two factors I drew on the random citing model and 
the representative courtroom model. Figure 24 displays the actual time profile of the year 
1790 and compares it with predictions from the random citing model and the year-pooled 
representative courtroom model. The left side shows relative frequencies of the actual 
data and model probability predictions on an annual basis. The right side aggregates the 
relative frequencies and model predictions by semi-decade.  
Probability predictions from the random citing model are proportional to the 
annual number of reported cases and do not take into account time depreciation. 
Therefore, the probabilities tend to overpredict relative frequencies in earlier time periods 
and underpredict relative frequencies in later time periods. In Figure 24 this results in 17th 
century predictions that are generally too high and late 18th century predictions that are 
generally too low. Probability predictions from the representative courtroom model fare 
better than predictions from the random citing model.  The representative courtroom 
model captures time depreciation effects and can, more generally, incorporate shifting 
probabilities. For example, in Figure 24 it avoids the random citing model’s extreme 
overpredictions and underpredictions in the 18th century. In spite of a tendency to 
underpredict the most recent and the oldest time periods, the representative courtroom 
model reproduces the main features of the actual data. 
To quantify the goodness of fit I calculated the correlation coefficients between actual 
data and model predictions. This resulted in a correlation coefficient of 0.26 for the 
random model and of 0.51 for the representative courtroom model. The numbers confirm 
the superiority of the representative courtroom model. 
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I will now draw on time profiles and the two statistical models to analyze 
common law’s usage of innovation capital. First, I present graphical displays of the 
actually observed time profiles in an aggregated form and pool observations by decades 
and semi-decades. Second, I analyze a remarkable degree of long-term persistence in the 
annual time profiles, before, third, emphasizing a strong shift.  Other depictions of the 
data, so-called time trajectories, support the findings. Fourth, motivated by the 
representative courtroom model I estimate a conditional logit model and find that the 
strong shift in conditional time profiles can be seen as the result of a significant increase 
in time depreciation rates and loss of persistence through attachment bias. 
To gain an overview of the legal innovation process I now present time profiles 
from the actual data (see Figure 26). To limit the number of time profiles and ease 
detection of the overall patterns cited years are aggregated by semi-decades and citing 
years are aggregated by decades. Random citing model predictions appear as dashed lines 
and serve as an approximation of the impact of fluctuations in the number of reported 
cases. I will use the time profiles as motivation for more quantitative investigations of 
persistent and changing features in the legal innovation process. 
 During the first 6 citing decades (dividing up the years 1700-1759) the temporal 
composition of cited cases - a measure of the use of legal innovation capital - appeared 
stable and persistent. The vast majority of cited cases went back to the time period around 
the turn of the 16th century and the time period before and after the Glorious Revolution. 
The most recent cases, i.e. cases from the first half of the 18th century, were used rarely 
and less than the number of available case reports in combination with the random citing 
model would have predicted. Apart from overpredictions for the most recent cases, 
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underpredictions for cases directly after the Glorious Revolution, and the lack of time 
depreciation (manifest in the actual shrinking of the size of early peaks relative to older 
ones) the random citing model predicts the actual time profiles of the first six decades 
fairly accurately. 
 During the next 6 decades (covering the years 1760-1819) the temporal 
composition of cited cases underwent a major transformation. Beginning in the 1760’s 
more cases closer to the citing decade gained greater weight in the creation of new law 
and this development continued over the 18th century. At the beginning of the 19th 
century the majority of citations referred to case reports not older than a few decades and 
the influence of cases from older times had significantly decreased. As the increase in 
weight of the recent past did initially not coincide with an increase of reported cases, the 
random citing model severely underpredicts the share of case reports from the recent past 
and, as a consequence, overpredicts the share of older times.  
 The last 5 decades (running from 1820 to 1865) complete the transformation that 
started in the second half of the 18th century. At the end of the ER reporting era the 
majority of cases cited in the courtrooms dated back not more than 20 years and 80% of 
cited cases had gone to trial in the 19th century. Even though the number of reported cases 
increased drastically over the first half of the 19th century (reaching levels the number of 
reported cases not seen since the end of the 17th century), the shift in the use of 
innovation capital towards the present is out of proportion. Consequently, the predictions 
of the random citing model fare worst for citing behavior in the 19th century. All pre-19th 
century predictions severely overpredict while all 19th century predictions severely 
underpredict. 
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Apart from the drastic change in the use of innovation capital in the mid of the 18th 
century and the evidently persistent features of the legal innovation process before and 
after the transition there exists another aspect of persistence in the actual data. While it is 
evident that the center of gravity moved from relatively ancient times to the present, the 
characteristic temporal composition of past citing behaviors remained recognizable 
through the centuries. For example, if one would magnify the 17th and 18th century tails 
of the time profile from the 1860s one would easily recognize the citing behavior of the 
previous time periods. If one plots one decade’s fractions of citations from Figure 26 
against the fractions of another decade one finds that the values form a tight linear 
relationship. A look on the correlation matrix in Table 9 confirms that the corresponding 
correlations are indeed very high. Apart from correlations between the 1780s and some 
other decades (mainly subsequent ones) all correlations are around 0.8 or higher. The 
only decade with moderate correlation coefficients, i.e. the 1780s’, appears in Figure 26 
as the most uneven step in the transformation from past-oriented to present-oriented time 
profiles. Given that the decade time profiles emerged independently and repeatedly over 
the 18th and 19th centuries, the high degree of persistence is remarkable. This 
phenomenon is partly explained by differences in the annual numbers of reported cases 
(there is persistence in time profiles within the random citing model) and partly by 
preferential attachment bias towards more cited cases (the latter is likely a combination 
case reports’ intrinsic qualities of and cultural transmission of legal knowledge through 
teaching and courtroom practice). 
 A different view on the legal innovation process is possible through what I call 
time trajectories. A time trajectory arises if one follows the fraction of citations that cases 
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of a given year generate over subsequent years. Figure 27 presents pooled time 
trajectories for the years 1580 to 1860. Cited years are pooled by decade and subsequent 
years are pooled by semi-decade. Moreover, predictions from the random citing models 
are plotted as dashed lines in addition to the actual data. Over time, partly because more 
case reports became available (as visible in the predictions from random citing) and 
partly because the value of case reports depreciated, all time trajectories sloped 
downwards. At times some decades were represented more than their number of reported 
cases would have predicted. For questions regarding institutional persistence and change, 
the potentially most interesting feature is the change in time trajectories that became 
clearly evident in the 1760s. From then onwards peak heights increased, and citation 
fractions increased rapidly during the years immediately following the decade under 
consideration before falling off quickly again. The pattern became even more pronounced 
over the course of the 19th century. This feature is, of course, a different manifestation of 
the mid-18th century transition that previously emerged from the study of time profiles. 
Even though the mid 18th century change in the legal innovation process appears 
evident and out of line with predictions from the random citing model the large 
fluctuations in the number of case reports remain a noteworthy confounding factor. 
They raise the question if they might have caused the observed change while the legal 
innovation process itself remained essentially unchanged. To answer this question I rely 
on the two year-aggregated versions of the representative courtroom model (see chapter 
5). The model capture time depreciation, and preferential attachment results in persistent 
citing of previously cited cases. Moreover, while having a tendency to underfit the 
probabilities of the most recent case reports (due to their lack of cumulated citations) the 
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model fits the actually observed time profiles reasonably well and, unlike the random 
citing model, can adjust to changes in the legal innovation process. The two versions of 
the model are reproduced below:  
 
version 1 (standard model) 
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version 2 (generalized model) 
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I estimated the standard model and the generalized model for different citing 
years using maximum likelihood estimation. To increase comparability between the 
models I kept the number of citable years constant across citing years. In practice that 
meant, I disregarded years that dated back more than 120 years before the citing year (the 
number 120 results because the dataset begins in the year 1580 and, therefore, it was 
impossible to include more than 120 preceding years for the citing year 1700). Figure 28 
presents year-specific δ estimates and confidence intervals for the standard model. To aid 
perception of the overall pattern a lowess-smoothed curve is overlaid. A clear pattern 
emerges. Until the 1760’s the estimated depreciation rate δ is constant and averages about 
1%. Beginning around 1760 it rises rapidly below 3%, and then decreases temporarily to 
2% before increasing continuously to 4% and even 5%. It is clear that a time depreciation 
rate of 4 to 5% differs drastically from a depreciation rate around 1%. As an illustration, 
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case reports over the first half of the 18th century had, on average, a half-life of about 70 
years. With the beginning of the second half of the 19th century the half-life had shrunk to 
about 17.5 to 14 years - a rather dramatic and rapid change in the legal innovation 
process. The change indicates a type of transformation that will be resurfacing in various 
forms in later investigations. Therefore, I will reserve an extensive discussion for the last 
chapter. 
 Figure 29 displays results from the generalized model: α and δ estimates, 
corresponding confidence intervals and a lowess smoothed curve. While standard errors 
increased, the results reinforce the findings from the standard model. The δ estimates are 
nearly identical with the estimates from the standard model. The estimates of the α 
parameter, however, add more information. Within the 18th century the α estimates 
fluctuate only slightly around an average value of 1.1. Over the course of the 19th century 
α estimates rapidly decreased falling as low as 0.1 and averaging 0.3 around the mid of 
the 19th century. As low values of the alpha parameter diminish the influence of 
differences in accumulated citations, it follows that the decline of the alpha estimates is 
another indication of the reduced importance of past innovation capital.  
To evaluate the appropriateness of the generalized model in comparison with the 
standard model I carried out likelihood ratio tests for the different citing years. The tested 
hypothesis was that the standard model is the correct model and that the generalized 
model is the incorrect one. Until about 1800 the p-values would suggest use of the 
standard model because p-values are rarely statistically significant for any of the pre-
1800 years. However, there are two 19th century periods (about 1800-1820 and about 
1840-1865) where use of the generalized model is strongly indicated by p-values. These 
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two periods correspond exactly to times where the α estimates underwent noticeable or 
very drastic jumps. 
 Taken altogether, the study of time profiles and time trajectories point to a swift 
transition from a period with strong persistence in the use of innovation capital to a 
period where innovation capital depreciated quickly and persistence declined. Modeling 
citation behavior with the help of the representative courtroom model and thereby 
controlling for fluctuations in case report numbers reinforce these findings. Model 
estimates show a large increase of time depreciation rates that began in the mid of the 
18th century and accelerated over the course of the 19th century. They also exhibit a 
reduction of attachment bias and persistence that occurred over the course of the 19th 
century. Because the time profiles of the 19th century seem to converge to a specific 
pattern one could say that the data indicate a transition from a period with a stable legal 
innovation process to a period with another type of stable legal innovation process. 
Common law communities 
In this section I apply two community detection algorithms from network science to find 
out whether the common law citation network can be naturally split into a number of 
closely linked, non-overlapping99 groups of cases (also called clusters or communities) 
and what the temporal composition of these communities would be.  If the network can 
be split successfully one will find an above average number of links (i.e. case citations) 
within the detected communities and a below average number of links between them (see 
Figure 30 for an example citation network with 2 communities). The general hope in 
                                                 
99 Recent techniques from network science allow it also to detect overlapping 
communities. I not will apply them in the basic community detection study of this 
section. 
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community detection studies is to reveal network structure that enhances understanding 
of the studied networks and the complex systems that networks reflect. My particular 
hope here is to gain a better understanding of the citation network’s persistent and 
transient features that became evident in the previous sections. 
Community detection is a burgeoning field that has already produced an 
enormous number of publications. An extensive and fairly recent review of the literature 
can be found in Fortunato (2010). Subsequently, I will apply two different, well-
established community detection algorithms to the common law citation network. Both 
algorithms rely on optimization of an entity called modularity. Modularity is a measure 
that was first formulated by Newman and Girvan (2004) and quantifies for any given, 
non-overlapping network partitioning the degree to which the hypothesized communities 
possess more links within and less links between themselves than one would expect from 
a random citing model. While Newman and Girvan first used the measure to assess ex-
post the quality of network partitionings they had detected with other means, the measure 
soon became the objective of optimization algorithms100 (e.g. Newman, 2006) and the 
base of today’s most popular class of community detection methods101. Out of the vast 
                                                 
100 Unfortunately, because of its computational complexity the global modularity 
optimization problem is generally not solvable. Therefore, various heuristic optimization 
approaches exist. 
 
101 Modularity optimization techniques have the general limitation that they cannot detect 
communities below a certain, network-dependent size called the resolution limit 
(Fortunato and Barthélemy, 2007; Lancichinetti and Fortunato, 2011). Another limitation 
is that the global maximum of the modularity function is beyond the reach of heuristic 
optimization procedures and that the number of local maxima with very different, high-
scoring community partitions is usually extremely large (see e.g Good et al., 2010).  The 
first limitation poses no problem because I am trying to extract large communities and - 
for the time being - am not interested in the granular structure of the common law citation 
network. The second limitation applies mostly to large networks with a large number of 
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array of available modularity optimization algorithms I chose two that were applicable to 
directed networks and allowed it to limit the number of targeted communities. The first is 
the spinglass algorithm and the second is called Louvain algorithm102. 
Before I applied the community detection algorithms I removed about 19,000 
isolates from the common law network with its roughly 61,000 nodes103. Isolates are 
nodes or very small numbers of connected nodes that are virtually disconnected from the 
rest of the network. I used both algorithms on the remaining network of 42,000 nodes 
(case reports) and 118,000 links (case citations) and aimed for a partitioning of the 
network into 2,3 or 4 communities (groups of cases). Application of the spin glass 
algorithm was straightforward because community sizes could be specified directly. To 
apply the Louvain algorithm I experimented with the resolution parameter and repeated 
                                                                                                                                                 
communities. However, to avoid it as much as possible I searched for a small number of 
communities in the moderately sized common law citation network and compared results 
from two different, non-deterministic101 modularity optimization algorithms. 
 
102 The spin glass algorithm (Reichardt and Bornholdt, 2006) optimizes the modularity 
measure with the help of an efficient, physics-inspired optimization method called 
simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al.(1983)). The Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al., 
2008)) optimizes modularity through an iterative step-by-step process and is named after 
the university of its inventors. Both algorithms have the benefit that they are, in principle, 
directly applicable to directed networks and allow it to limit the number of desired 
communities. The spin glass algorithm allows it to directly set the maximum number of 
detectable communities, the Louvain algorithm allows it to indirectly modify a resolution 
parameter and thereby influence the number of detectable communities. I implemented 
community detection with the spin glass algorithm through the software package R 
(2014) and its igraph library (2006). Appendix C shows the R code used. Because the 
combination of R and igraph did neither permit modification of the Louvain resolution 
parameter nor application to directed graphs, I implemented the Louvain algorithm with 
the network software package Gephi (2009). After some experimentation with the 
number of communities I settled on the Louvain resolution parameters 3.75, 3.5, and 3. 
 
103 To accomplish this I applied the Louvain algorithm with resolution parameter 1 to the 
original network and removed out of the more than 10,000 detected communities the ones 
which contained less than 10 nodes (the next largest community contained more than 100 
members) 
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the algorithm a few times until I obtained the desired number of communities. The 
modularity scores for the 6 different detected partitionings are given in Table 8.  
They all lie within the typical range of 0.3 - 0.7 and increase with community size. The 
spin glass algorithm generally found network partitionings with higher modularities than 
the Louvain algorithm. Because higher modularity at the same community size suggests a 
more accurate partitioning I will mainly analyze the spin glass communities and use the 
Louvain communities as a cross-check only. To understand the differences between the 
detected communities I focus on their temporal composition. Both community detection 
algorithms assigned about half of the 42,000 case reports to each community (see Table 
10). Moreover, the communities they found overlap to a large extent: about 80% of case 
reports are assigned identically. 
Figure 31 depicts the temporal compositions of the spinglass and Louvain 2-
community-partitionings and contains the main finding of the section. The first spinglass 
community predominantly consists of 19th century case reports. At the same time about 
30% of the remaining case reports belong to the 18th and 17th century. The second 
spinglass community displays a much more balanced temporal composition. The majority 
- about 60% of its case reports - belong to the 18th and 17th century. The Louvain 
communities show a similar though less pronounced pattern. About 30% of case reports 
of the first Louvain community and about 55% of the second community belong to the 
pre-19th century era. On the one hand the findings indicate a strong split between the 19th 
century and 17th and 18th century within the first community. On the other hand the 
second community presents a close-knit community of cases across centuries. This 
suggests that the citation network contains a first large group of 19th century cases that 
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developed modern law building primarily on a 19th basis, whereas a smaller second group 
of 19th century cases relied during the legal innovation process on pre-19th century 
precedents to a much larger extent. Both groups show a persistent influence of pre-1800 
precedents, however, the degree of persistence in the second group is much higher.  
Figure 32 illustrates the differences between the two communities in another way. 
For any given year, it shows the fraction of total case reports that each community 
contains. Before the mid of the 18th century the second community comprises the 
majority of cases (uniformly about 75% in the spinglass and Louvain communities). 
Around 1750 a break in the relative composition is evident. The number of cases that 
belong to the first community increases relative to the second community. Cases around 
the year 1800 are equally represented in both communities whereas 19th century cases 
belong increasingly to the first community. At the mid of the 19th century the first 
community encompasses the majority of cases. 
These findings are robust to an increase in the number of communities and 
consistent across the two community detection algorithms. Figure 33 displays network 
partitionings with 2, 3 and 4 communities for each detection method. In all 6 network 
partitionings one can observe at least one type 1 community and one type 2 community. 
An increase in the number of spinglass communities to 3 results in one community 
dominated by 19th century cases (type 1), one community with a balanced composition 
(type 2) and one hybrid. 4 spinglass communities produce one type 1 community, one 
type 2 community, and 2 hybrids. 3 Louvain communities lead to two communities with 
19th century domination and one community with balanced structure. 4 Louvain 
communities generate one type 1 community, one type 2 community and two hybrids. 
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Figure 33 summarizes the findings for all 6 communities with the help of relative 
temporal compositions. 
As a final check of the detected community structure I compared its structure with 
one network realization from the random citing model. Analogous to the previous figures, 
Figure 34 and Figure 35 display the temporal composition of communities found in the 
random citing network. As expected, the community detection mechanisms assigned the 
post-1700 equally into two distinct groups near identical temporal composition. However, 
the pre-1700 nodes, which received the majority of citations and do not possess links 
between themselves, were assigned non-uniformly: the majority of pre-1650 nodes end 
up in one community and the remaining nodes in the other community. The lack of pre-
1700 interlinkages and the general sparsity of links generate this artifice. Other network 
realizations from the random citing model result in different pre-1700 community 
assignments. Averaging over a large number of network realizations would eliminate the 
effect. 
All in all it is evident that an integral part of common law’s citation network 
encompasses two very different types of communities. The first type of community has 
roots in previous centuries, but is concentrated on the 19th century. Its existence suggests 
the development of a body of law that started from inherited law, but towards the end of 
the 18th century apparently began to draw on its freshly added parts as the capital for 
future growth. Within this community old law’s use as innovation capital depreciated at a 
much quicker rate than it had in earlier times - in other words old law’s degree of 
persistence decreased. The second type of community maintained close ties with cases 
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from the previous centuries. Its body of law remained deeply vested in the past’s tradition 
and grew in a more organic way.   
Varieties of persistence and change 
In this chapter I examined different types of institutional persistence and change in the 
making of common law. All of them relate to how common law courts used the stock of 
case reports when generating new law. And all of them emerge as statistical aggregate 
properties of the common law citation network. First, I studied groups of reported 16th 
and 17th century cases and tracked their citation afterlife. It turned out that a large number 
of these cases were cited centuries after their trials had concluded. Taking this as 
indication that the cited case rulings were, in principle, applicable at the time of their later 
citation turns this finding into an instance of institutional persistence, long-term 
persistence for that matter. On the other hand the fact that a large number of the 16th and 
17th century cases was not or cited at later times or cited only for a limited number of 
years can be seen as indication of institutional decay or depreciation, i.e. institutional 
change. 
 Second, I investigated the 18th and 19th century age composition of common law’s 
top authorities, i.e. common law’s most cited cases. I found that until the beginning of the 
19th century the top authorities dated back to the same time period. This constitutes 
another form of institutional persistence. However, soon after the beginning of the 19th 
century the age composition of top authorities underwent a drastic change. It took only a 
few decades until the majority of top authorities were derived from the 19th century and 
the pre-19th century base was largely replaced. This constitutes another form of 
institutional change. 
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 Third, with the help of time profiles I focused on the annual general usage of 
reported cases. This brought into view a stable apparently past-centered legal innovation 
process that underwent a rapid transition during the second half of the 18th century and 
converged to another stable, present-centered innovation process. The former is 
characterized by low depreciation rates and high attachment bias, whereas the latter is 
characterized by much higher depreciation rates and a much reduced attachment bias. 
One can recognize here a persistence-change-persistence pattern in the functioning of 
legal innovation. Moreover, traces of the pre-transition legal process remain observable 
in post-transition time profiles and display another type of persistence. 
 Finally, I used basic community detection techniques to split the common law 
citation network into naturally coherent groups. A robust feature was the presence of two 
types of communities with very different temporal distributions. The first type consists 
essentially out of 19th century cases that have few links with the past. The second consists 
of closely connected cases that stretch from the 16th to the 19th century. One can see the 
former as the agent of disruptive legal change and the latter as the preserver of past and 
persistence.  
 While these four different approaches present different aspects of institutional 
persistence and change, all of them show the continuous coexistence and interplay of 
persistent and changing institutional features. The finding is in line with what one would 
expect from a cumulative cultural process. Moreover, the second, third, and fourth 
approaches - in spite of their differing methodological characteristics - all point to a 
significant change in how England’s common law was made. Over the second half of the 
18th century the reinvigorated common law courts changed the law-making process from 
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being strongly rooted in the past towards a process that builds on the recent past to create 
the new, but is focused on the present. The change accompanies the heyday of European 
Enlightenment, the developments leading to the French Revolution, and the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 Before ending the chapter I want to bring back to mind two major confounding 
factors that have the potential to severely distort the findings. First, the large fluctuations 
in the numbers of reported cases (and associated with fluctuations in the numbers of court 
cases) and second, the considerable differences in the quality and timeliness of case 
reports. I believe that I have sufficiently addressed the first confounding factor by taking 
recourse to the random citing and representative courtroom models. However, the second 
confounding factor poses greater, partly insurmountable difficulties.  
 It is well known that the quality, public accessibility and content of case reports 
showed large variation between time periods, case reporters and individual cases. Only 
over the course of the 19th century and with the rise of a narrow doctrine of precedent 
known as stare decisis did the case reports turn into judge-approved, promptly published, 
comprehensive descriptions of courtroom proceedings. Before case reports were more 
courtroom sketches that reflected idiosyncrasies and preferences of case reporters and 
often circulated among the legally knowledgeable before finding their way into print. The 
stagnation of common law business during the first half of the 18th century went hand in 
hand with a deterioration in the quality and publication time of case reports. Analogously, 
the revival of common law during the second half of the 18th century coincided with an 
improvement in the quality of case reports. In the year 1865 the continued expansion of 
19th century common law resulted in the professionalized, centralized and standardized 
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official Law Reports. The above poses the question if the findings of this chapter pertain 
to the legal innovation process or to the case reporting process. In other words the 
question is if the case reporting process influences developments in the legal process or if 
the legal innovation process influences developments in case reporting. Put even 
differently the question is if the supply of case reports drives the legal innovation process 
or if the supply and demands of the legal profession drive the case reporting process. 
 A balanced answer acknowledges both directions. It is clear that the availability 
of case reports is a necessary condition for their use as precedents in courtrooms. 
Moreover, prompter availability allows citing of more recent precedents and higher 
quality of case reports makes the cited precedent more convincing. Therefore, one would 
expect an increase of promptly published, high-quality case reports to shift courtroom 
precedents toward the present. On the other hand demands from the legal profession 
make it worthwhile to publish the notes of courtroom reporters in the first place. A large 
part of early case reports found their way into print because personal notes of legal 
professionals were requested by many of their colleagues. Even Burrow - the most 
famous case reporter of the 18th century - had originally produced case reports for his 
own use and published them only because his colleagues pestered him. Furthermore, it is 
doubtful if promptly published, high-quality case reports would have had much of an 
impact during the first part of the 18th century when England’s common law courts lost 
business and relevance for public life104. It is more likely that case reports became more 
                                                 
104 e.g. Mokyr (2008, p. 74) writes “Whether eighteenth century Britain was really 
becoming a kinder and gentler place is a difficult issue, but at least within the circles of 
commerce, finance and manufacturing, trust relations and private settlement of disputes 
seem to have prevailed over third party enforcement. Most business was conducted 
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reliable, were written by more able case reporters and published more promptly when the 
cases on trial regained social significance and important issues were decided in the 
common law courts. While some scholars went so far to state that the fame of Lord 
Mansfield, the most famous 18th century judge, derives more from the quality of his law 
reporters than from the quality of Mansfield105, it seems more appropriate to say that 
Lord Mansfield and Burrow gained their fame together because they were benefitting 
from each other and the times they were in. Without a Mansfield Burrow’s case reports 
would have attracted less interest, and without a Burrow Mansfield’s precedents would 
have been less influential. Had they both lived in the first half of the 18th century both 
able men would likely have chosen different careers or lived a life much less well known 
to posterity. Figure 36 uses the number of words in a case report as a very imperfect 
measure of case report quality to show that the expected association between higher 
quality of case reports and the number of citations they received apparently exists in the 
data. Overlaid on top of the scatter plot is a lowess smoothed regression line that clearly 
captures the association. More comprehensive case reports are associated, on average, 
with greater authority. At the same time the variation is very high.  
Figure 37 depicts the imperfectly measured quality of case reports over time. The 
red line shows the average number of words in any given year. It is evident that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
through informal codes of conduct and relied on local reputation and religious moralizing 
to imbue honesty and responsibility.”. 
 
105 See, for example the quote from Lieberman (2002, p. 89): “Mansfield, as his 
contemporaries fully recognized, was singularly blessed in the private reporters he 
attracted, and it is easy to mistake the novelty and distinctiveness of his judicial 
leadership simply on account of the unmatched quality of the law reports covering his 
tenure at King’s Bench.”. 
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number of long case reports and average length of case reports varied considerably over 
the centuries. The annual average ranged from about 500 to about 4000 words per case 
report. Until the mid of the 18th century increases, often drastic ones, in average length 
were transient. Around the time of Burrow’s first case reports the average length 
increased by about 40% and remained high until a temporary return to previous levels. 
Over the 19th century the length rose steadily before it reached its maximum at the end of 
the reporting period covered by the English Reports.  
With the data at hand I see no convincing way to disentangle the impact of case 
reports on the legal innovation process from the impact of the legal innovation process on 
case reports. However, the problem with marked differences of publication times and 
quality of case reports does not apply to statutes. Enacted statutes, at least since the 
Glorious Revolution, were available immediately and of comparable quality. Chapter 8 
will investigate how statutes were cited in courtrooms. If one finds similarities in the 
citing of statutes one could be confident that changes in citing of cases reflect changes in 
the legal innovation process and not primarily changes in law reporting. 
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Chapter 7: Persistence and change - U.S. case 
precedents 
To establish a high-quality context for comparison of the previous’ chapters findings I 
will briefly compare the citation behavior found in the English Reports with the citation 
behavior one finds in the majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Unlike the ER 
case reports the majority opinions do not suffer from heterogeneity issues and publication 
delays. Commonalities between findings from the previous chapters and patterns in the 
U.S. data would validate the ER data and results further; differences would make it 
possible to recognize the uniqueness of features in the ER data. 
The comparison between judicial opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court and case 
reports from the English common law courts seems justified. Even though there existed 
no written, codified English constitution, the common law - bound together by the 
doctrine of precedent - constituted a central pillar of the English legal system. And the 
three Westminster courts represented the highest authority in common law. The court of 
King’s Bench had appellate jurisdiction over local courts and the court of Common Pleas. 
Common law judges manned the Exchequer Chamber, which had appellate jurisdiction 
over the courts of King’s Bench and Exchequer, and until the mid 19th century the House 
of Lords rarely became active as ultimate appeals court. As far as the English law reports 
are concerned, they fulfilled a function similar to the American judicial opinions in that 
they encapsulated past legal decisions and transported them through time for later 
consideration. Like the US majority opinions they exist only for a subset of important 
cases and not for all cases that came before the court. 
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 Nevertheless, the comparison is not perfect. Neither is the Supreme Court a 
perfect match to the common law supreme courts nor is a majority opinion a perfect 
match to an ER case report. The U.S. Supreme Court is the highest federal U.S. court 
with ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving federal law and the power to 
interpret the US constitution whenever a case requires it. The most important cases under 
review end with a written judicial opinion that is issued by the court and authored by 
Supreme Court judges. If a majority of the involved judges can agree on the judicial 
opinion it is called a majority opinion and becomes a binding precedent. Most, though not 
all cases under written review result in a majority opinion. This contrasts with the 
common law courts and the English pre-1865 case reports. The common law courts were 
split in three, did not have ultimate appellate jurisdiction and did not interpret one clearly 
designated constitution. The case reports were not written by judges and generally 
recorded a good part of the dialectic courtroom experience and not exclusively the post-
trial rationale of the court’s decision.  
 It is fortunate that Fowler and others have compiled and made publicly available a 
citation network106 that they derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinions 
(Fowler et al., 2007; Fowler and Jeon, 2008). Their citation network incorporates 30,264 
majority opinions from the years 1780 to 2002 and 216,731 references to preceding 
majority opinions. In the next sections I will use methods from the previous two chapters 
to present and compare findings from U.S. law. The sections will discuss basic structural 
features, long-term persistence of case authorities, temporal patterns of U.S. law’s top 
authorities, time profiles with their time depreciation estimates, and common law 
                                                 
106 At the time of writing the dataset was available at http://fowler.ucsd.edu/judicial.htm 
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communities. The last chapter draws on these to develop conclusions that are more 
general than the ones presented in this chapter. 
Basic structural features 
In this section I present and compare basic structural features of the U.S. citation 
network. The features include the yearly number of publicly available case documents, 
overall time depreciation features, and the frequency distribution of citations that 
individual majority opinions received. First, I present the yearly number of majority 
opinions in comparison with the ER case reports (see Figure 38). The yearly number of 
majority opinions increased from a few dozen in the first half of the 19th century to about 
200 with temporary peaks around 300 in the second half of the century. The number then 
remained on a high level until, beginning in the 1920’s, it decreased steadily to about 100 
cases at the end of the 1950’s. A subsequent sudden rise followed by a sudden drop 
shortly before the year 2000 then concludes the available data series. What stands out 
next to the strong increase of majority opinions towards the end of the 19th century are 
the substantial and often sudden fluctuations. The degree of these fluctuations, the 
number of yearly majority opinions, and the existence of distinct periods with different 
degrees of activity are akin to the English situation107.  
Second, to compare depreciation effects I present Figure 39. The figure depicts on 
a logarithmic scale the number of citations that majority opinions and ER case reports 
received as a function of their age. The predictions from a simple exponential 
depreciation model appear as lines (see the model on 89). With an R2 value of 0.98 
                                                 
107 The annual average number of U.S. majority opinions is 136.3 with a standard 
deviation of 90.7. The annual average number of English common law case reports is 
173.5 and the corresponding standard deviation is 190.3. 
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(English precedents: 0.83) the simple model fits the actual US data even better than the 
ER data. The estimated US overall depreciation rate of about 4% (English precedents: 
1.4%) is about 3 times higher than the one derived from the English Reports. 
Third, I discuss and compare the distribution frequency of case citations. As 
mentioned above about 30,000 US majority opinions cite each other about 215,000 times, 
i.e. about 7 times per case. In comparison about 60,000 ER case reports cite each other 
about 120,000 times, i.e. about 2 times per case. The lower average number of citations 
partly reflects the omission of difficult-to-interpret pre-1700 ER citations, partly 
incomplete ER extractions, and partly the fact that references to other cases appear less 
often in ER case reports than in US majority opinions. The comparatively low ER 
citation frequency is reflected in the degree distribution. While the shape of the two 
distributions is similar Figure 40 shows that the US distribution of citations has a longer 
and more populated tail than the English one.  
Long-term persistence of case rulings 
Like the English common law courts the US Supreme Court kept citing specific cases a 
long time after their occurrence. 136 out of the 262 majority opinions from the 1800’s 
were cited at later times, 48 of these more than 100 years after the judgment. 
Analogously, 291 of the 395 majority opinions from the 1840’s were cited in later years 
and 36 of them more than 100 years later. This implies a 100-year-term persistence rate 
of 18.3% for the 1800’s and of 9.1% for the 1840’s. Rates of immediate oblivion are 
48.1% and 26.3%. Because overrulings are rare in the U.S. Supreme Court108 I see these 
numbers as evidence of long-term persistence of case authorities in American law. 
                                                 
108 See footnote 74. 
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Compared to English common law courts (100-year-term persistence rates of 51.2%109 
for the 1580’s and of 39.8% for the 1700’s, plus an immediate oblivion rate of 31.9% for 
the 1700’s) the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-term persistence rates in the 19th century were 
considerably lower than the English 16th and 18th century rates. At the same time the 
three rates of immediate oblivion appear similar. Unfortunately, the current datasets do 
not allow to make long-term comparisons between US and English courts for the same 
time period. 
U.S. Supreme Court’s top authorities 
Like in the previous chapters I use citation counts to study, for any given year after 1700, 
the age composition of top authorities. Analogously to common law I characterize the 
year-dependent age composition of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most cited cases by 
standard measures of centrality (means and medians) and spread (standard deviations and 
median absolute deviations)110. To do so I distinguish, for each year after 1820, 8 groups 
of top cited statutes (top 10, top 50, top 100, top 500; top 1%, top 5%, top 10%, top 20%) 
and characterize their age composition by measures of centrality and spread. Figure 42 
and Figure 43 depict the annual means and standard deviations, as well as annual 
medians and median absolute deviations for different groups of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
most cited cases. Because the years between 1780 and 1820 received only a small 
number of citations and resulted in very noisy data I have excluded these years from the 
data series. To ease comparison with English precedents I reproduced the analogous 
                                                 
109 More precisely this is a 120-year-term persistence rate. 
110 The findings in this section closely match the findings reported by Leicht et al. (2007) 
who use authority scores and restrict themselves to means of the top10, top 50, top 100 
and top 500 cases.  
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measures in the same figures. The comparison reveals a few striking differences and 
similarities.  
For instance, the English centrality measures attained much larger values than 
their U.S. counterparts. This is partly explained by the longer history of English case 
reports (covering a period of nearly 300 years). Moreover, a closer look reveals that, until 
the 19th century drop, English means and medians increased more rapidly than the U.S. 
ones. For example, the English means and medians increased between 1750 and 1800 
increased every passing year by one year whereas the American means and medians 
between 1820 and 1870 increased only about half as quickly.  
The measures of spread point to the reason for the different mean and median 
growth rates. While the English standard deviations and median absolute deviations 
remained essentially constant until the 19th century before undergoing a rapid increase 
(and for the medians a later rapid drop), the U.S. ones, with the exception of the 1880’s to 
1910’s, increased steadily over the centuries at about the same rate. This means, as 
mentioned earlier, that the English most authoritative cases persisted for about 100 years 
before being superseded to a large extent in a short period of time. For the U.S. it means 
that recent cases constantly joined the most authoritative cases and continuously 
displaced some of the older ones. Because not all of the older cases were replaced the 
standard deviation and means steadily increased. Figure 44 illustrates the proposition. 
Comparison with the corresponding English figure (Figure 20 and Figure 21) underlines 
the strong persistence of common law cases from previous centuries. The difference in 
the degree to which past cases persisted is also evident if one compare Figure 22 and 
Figure 45, which presents four temporal distributions of the 100 most cited U.S. Supreme 
 141
Court cases between the years 1830 to 1860, 1870 to 1900, 1910 to 1940, and 1950 to 
1980, respectively: at all times a good part of common law’s most cited cases reached 
back centuries, whereas the most cited U.S. Supreme court cases were rarely older than 
50 years. 
Figure 42 and Figure 43 further demonstrate that sudden decreases in means and 
medians of the age composition of the top cited cases are not unique to common law. In 
the U.S. data one can identify two of these: a strong one between 1870 and 1900 and a 
weak one between 1970 and 1990. While the weak one mainly involved the highest ranks 
of the most cited cases, i.e. the top 10 or top 1% of cases, the strong one comprised all of 
the top cited groups. In comparison with the sudden decrease in common law the two 
U.S. ones appear less pronounced. 
Time profiles 
In this section I present U.S. time profiles that were constructed analogously to the 
common law time profiles from the previous chapter. The time profiles in Figure 46 
provide a view on precedent use in the legal innovation process of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. As in the previous chapter cited years are aggregated by semi-decades and citing 
years are aggregated by decades. The time profiles span the decades from 1810 to 1999 
and predictions based on the random citing model are given as dashed lines. The shape of 
the time profiles and the type of legal innovation process appear similar over all decades. 
A head that rises above the most recent years and a tail that covers the older years 
characterizes the shape, particularly after the 1860’s. Routinely, up to 50% of cited cases 
were from the citing decade or previous decade. Time profiles of the first three decades 
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are very narrow because majority opinions date back only to 1780. The head of the time 
profiles broadened until the 1860’s when it became tighter and maintained its tight shape 
until the end of the data series. The only noteworthy new feature after 1860 is the 
temporary appearance of a small second peak in the 1960’s. Long-term persistence in the 
time profiles is low because precedents older than a few decades were generally rarely 
used in the legal innovation process. 
The random citing model does not fit the time profiles well. Random citing model 
predictions, right from the beginning, underpredict the use of recent precedents and 
overpredict the use of past precedents. The mispredictions stand out particularly after 
variation in the number of majority opinions increased. The year-aggregated version of 
the representative courtroom model produced estimates that are shown in Figure 47111. 
Until about 1860 the number of annual citations was low and estimates were imprecise. 
The first precisely estimated depreciation rates of the 1860’s averaged about 2 percent. 
Later estimates point to a change in the legal innovation process between 1880 and 1910. 
By 1910 depreciation rates had doubled from about 2.5% to about 5%. The early 
depreciation rate corresponds to a precedent half-life of 28 years while the latter 
corresponds to a half-life of only 14 years. After 1900 the depreciation rates remained 
essentially unchanged. 
                                                 
111 The figure shows estimates with initially incompatible time windows. For better 
comparability with the common law estimates I used a 120-year time window even 
though the window is not applicable to the U.S. Supreme Court data series before 1900. 
However, a comparison with 60-year window estimates produce qualitatively the same 
results. The transition from low to high depreciation rates starts around 1870 and 
continues until about 1900 without the temporary increase one can observe in Figure 47. 
Moreover, estimated depreciation rates after 1900 are naturally somewhat higher than the 
ones estimated with the 120-year window. They are estimated as about 6% to 7% 
compared with 120-year estimates of 5% to 6%. 
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 Most of the English time profiles stand in sharp contrast to the U.S. ones. 
Arguably it is not before the 1830’s or 1840’s that the shape with heavy head and long 
flat tail - characteristic of precedent use in the U.S. Supreme Court - emerged within the 
English time profiles. The shape became more pronounced in the 1850’s and in the 
1860’s closely matched the U.S. post-1860 time profiles. Until about 1770 estimated 
English depreciation rates of around 1% were lower than the U.S. pre-1880 depreciation 
rates of around 2% to 2.5%. Between 1770 and 1830 English depreciation rates averaged 
about 2% before rapidly approaching the 4% to 5% range and converging towards the 
U.S. 19th century depreciation rates. 
U.S. communities 
To take a fourth perspective on the U.S. citation network I the applied community 
detection techniques used in the last chapter. To ease comparison I used only the 
spinglass algorithm and restricted it to 2 communities. I removed about 5,000 isolates 
before applying the algorithm to the remaining network of 25,000 nodes (U.S. Supreme 
Court majority opinions) and 209,000 links (citation of majority opinions). The 
maximized modularity attained a value of 0.38 - similar in magnitude to the 0.41 value of 
the English network. Unlike the English network the two detected communities were of 
unequal size: the first community contained about 9,000 and the second about 16,000 
majority opinions. Figure 48 shows that the first community consists nearly exclusively 
of 20th century cases (less than 20% of cases belong to the 19th century) while the larger 
community contains 19th and 20th century cases about equally. Figure 49 depicts the 
yearly fraction of total majority opinions that each community contains and illustrates the 
differing temporal compositions in another way. Essentially all cases from before 1870 
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belong to the larger community. Beginning in the year 1870 a break becomes visible. 
Every year the proportion of cases belonging to the first community increases steadily 
until, over the course of the 20th century, the number of cases in the first community 
outnumbers the number of cases in the second community112. 
 Comparison with the English community structure reveals surprising similarities. 
The community structures of both countries point to the emergence of a first community 
that built on a comparatively small number of old cases (18th century ones in the England 
and 19th century in the U.S.) to develop a body of new law that appears to have been 
largely self-referential and less considerate of the past than the second detected 
community. The second community tightly links the oldest U.S. Supreme Court cases 
with cases of all the following generations. While its cases dominate the 19th century they 
are in the minority in the second half of the 20th century. It persists throughout the 
centuries and loses influence over the 20th century when the first community becomes 
visible and expands. 
Commonalities and differences: insights from the U.S. 
In this chapter I relied on methods from the previous two chapters to gain insights into 
persistent and changing features in the making of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and 
compare them with previously found features from the English common law courts. As in 
the previous chapter the analysis depended on the use of precedents in the legal process 
and corresponding statistical aggregate properties. 
                                                 
112 Also the findings in this section closely match the findings reported by Leicht et al. 
(2007).  Leicht et al. use an eigenvector algorithm that is different from the spinglass 
algorithm and they do not specifically analyze the temporal compositions of the different 
communities. However, the annual fractions of their communities, plus the 1870 onset 
and temporal unfolding of the break are very similar.  
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Basic structural properties of the U.S. and English network show fundamental 
similarities and some differences. For example, the yearly level and strong fluctuations of 
U.S. majority opinions were similar to ER case reports. Moreover, time depreciation 
occurred in the U.S. Supreme court’s precedent use as well as in the common law courts. 
However, largely due to different break points in year-specific depreciation, the overall 
depreciation rate of about 4% percent was about 3 times larger than the English one113. 
Another difference between U.S. and English case documents is the greater relative 
frequency of U.S. citations. U.S. majority opinions were, on average, cited about 7 times, 
whereas an English ER case reports were, on average, cited about 2 times. Consequently, 
the English citation network is sparser than the U.S. one. At the same time the U.S. and 
English distributions of citation frequencies followed essentially the same long-tailed 
distribution. 
 Studying the long-term persistence of U.S. majority opinions one finds that - as in 
the English counterparts - noteworthy long-term persistence apparently existed. 
Comparing the degree of U.S. long-term persistence to the English ER case reports one 
finds a remarkable difference. The studied U.S. 100-year-term persistence rates of around 
20% and 10% were about 3-4 times lower than the English ones clearly indicating a 
major difference in the legal innovation processes of the different time periods. 
 Investigating the age compositions of the most authoritative U.S. precedents and 
comparing them to the English counterparts it becomes evident that one major break and 
one minor break occurred in the U.S. time series as well. Though less pronounced the 
                                                 
113 The main reason for the difference is that the U.S. data contain about 100 years with 
low depreciation rates and 100 years with high depreciation rates, whereas the English 
data contain about 120 years with low depreciation rats and 40 years with high 
depreciation rates. 
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major break is comparable to the one observed in the corresponding English time series. 
A significant difference between U.S. and English precedent use also surfaced: the age 
composition of the most authoritative U.S. precedents changed at all times to a smaller or 
larger extent, whereas the age composition of English precedents remained nearly 
unchanged over the whole 18th century. This and the continuous English reliance on very 
old precedents suggests a greater degree of persistence in the English legal innovation 
process than in the U.S. one. 
 In addition to this, time profiles indicate that the U.S. legal innovation process, at 
least initially, functioned differently than the English one. From the beginning U.S. 
majority opinions cited mainly recent cases and usually did not reach back more than a 
few decades to create new law. The 1860’s and the next decades saw a further tightening 
of the temporal basis for legal innovation. This picture is very different in the English 
time profiles. At least until the beginning of the 19th century the English legal innovation 
process strongly relied on cases that date back more than a few decades. Interestingly, 
over the course of the 19th century the English time profiles started to resemble the U.S. 
time profiles more and more. The initial difference between the U.S. and English legal 
innovation processes and their later convergence is evident also in estimated time 
depreciation estimates of the representative courtroom model. U.S. depreciation rates 
started out between 2% and 2.5% and then increased to about 5%. English depreciation 
rates started out around 1% and then converged towards 4% over the first half of the 19th 
century. 
 Detected communities point to another commonality between the U.S. and 
English citation network. In both networks there seems to exist a community that 
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emerges without strong links to the past and then builds on itself to create new law (the 
U.S. community becomes visible around 1870 an the English community become visible 
around 1750). A second community seems to connect cases from all time periods and 
dominate cases before the emergence of the first community. 
 Taken altogether the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinions form a citation 
network that allows it to discern interesting commonalities with and differences between 
the English ER citation network. While the U.S. citation network is denser than the 
English one, basic structural features are similar. Four different views on institutional 
persistence and change paint a consistent comparative picture of coexisting and 
interplaying features. The second, third, and fourth views indicate the occurrence of a 
significant change in the U.S. legal innovation process. Towards the end of the 19th 
century the already present-focused U.S. innovation process accelerated further and 
disregarded past precedents quicker than before. All four views suggest that the U.S. 
innovation process showed lower degrees of persistence than its English counterpart at 
least until the latter underwent its transition from a past-rooted to a present-centered 
innovation process. Finally, it is noteworthy that the U.S. and English legal innovation 
processes appear to converge towards a process with nearly identical features. Moreover, 
the route by which they accomplish this - a quickly expanding community with weak 
links to the previous tradition - appears to be identical, too. 
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Chapter 8: Persistence and change - statutes 
In this chapter I investigate how the English superior common law courts used statutes in 
their legal innovation process. The investigation is insightful for two reasons. On the one 
hand, it illuminates the influence that the second major source of law had on the English 
legal landscape. On the other hand it serves as a check on the findings of chapter 6. While 
the chapter’s quantitative techniques painted a consistent picture of persistence and 
change, there remained some uncertainty about the findings due to considerable 
heterogeneity in the quality of case reports and publication dates. Statutes - at least since 
Tudor times - were written proposals drafted by Crown lawyers, and then discussed and 
deliberately adopted by Parliament and king (Baker, 1990, p. 237). Therefore, they were 
publicly available right after their enactment and their modern content and quality 
showed little variation. If the study of statute use reveals patterns of persistence and 
change that are similar to the ones that emerged from the study of precedents the findings 
would reinforce each other. 
 The analysis includes 41,850 post-1700 citations from common law cases to 
17,765 pre-1865 statutes114. This translates, on average, to about 2.4 citations per statute. 
The structure of the following sections mirrors the previous chapter on U.S. precedents. 
The only difference is that, because statutes do not cite other statutes or cases, I will not 
study network communities and instead briefly investigate the year-averaged relative 
share of statute citations. The next sections summarize findings regarding basic structural 
features, long-term persistence of statutes, temporal patterns of the most cited statutes, 
                                                 
114 The number of statutes is derived from the Chronological Table of and Index to the 
Statutes (1873). 
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time profiles and time depreciation estimates, as well as the annual relative share of 
statute citations. I will use these findings in the last chapter to draw conclusions that go 
beyond the basic ones in this chapter.  
Basic structural features 
In this section I discuss the yearly number of enacted statutes, the overall time 
depreciation of statutes, and the frequency distribution of citations that individual statutes 
received. Lists of English statutes usually begin with the Magna Carta in 1215 and 
continue to this day115. Figure 50 displays the number of statutes that were enacted from 
1215 onwards. A few features in the figure stand out. First, until the times of the Glorious 
Revolution there were many years where no statutes were enacted. This contrasts with the 
time following the revolution when statutes were enacted every year. The reason is that - 
as a consequence of the Glorious Revolution - Parliament was guaranteed annual sessions 
whereas previously it needed to be summoned by the king. Second, it is obvious that the 
number of enacted statutes increased steadily and drastically during the century following 
the Glorious Revolution before leveling off in the 19th century. Third, less striking, but 
still remarkable is the increased statutory activity in Tudor times (16th century) and the 
sudden drop in Stuart times (17th century). Tudor statutory activity is even more 
remarkable if one realizes that pre-16th century statutes were usually of a different kind 
than later ones. They usually embodied Parliament’s oral response to a complaint that 
was only later recorded by various clerks and private hands (Baker, 1990, p. 236). An 
early statute was often artificially divided into different chapters whereas in later times 
each chapter effectively corresponded to a distinct statute.  
                                                 
115 I relied on the 1873 edition of the Chronological Table of and Index to the Statutes. 
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Depreciation effects are evident in Figure 51. Analogous to previous chapters the 
figure depicts (on a logarithmic scale) the number of citations that statutes received in 
dependence of their age. Interestingly, there appear to be three distinct depreciation rates. 
The first is about 5% and applies to statutes that are not older than 50 years. Later we will 
see that this depreciation rate is characteristic of the 19th century. The second applies to 
statutes ages of 50 years to 350 years and is essentially equal to the overall depreciation 
rate of about 0.7% (see Table 7). The third depreciation rate applies to very old statutes 
that were enacted more than 350 years before they were cited. Their depreciation rate is 
essentially 0%. The first two depreciation rates show some similarity to the ER precedent 
depreciation rates in Figure 13. There, two different depreciation rates were discernible. 
The first concerned precedents no older than 80 years and was estimated as about 3%. 
The second concerned precedents between 80 and 200 years of age and was estimated as 
about 1.2%. The possibility of a third depreciation rate that mimics the statute is not 
decidable because the age of precedents was limited by the data series. Overall 
depreciation rates already suggest a certain consistency across the statute and precedent 
series. However, further conclusions are better obtained from time-dependent 
depreciation rates of a subsequent section. 
 The in-degree distribution of statute citations, i.e. the frequency distribution of 
citations that individual statutes received, is shown in Figure 52116. The shape of the 
distribution resembles closely the English precedent distribution. The main difference is 
that the tail of the statute distribution is much longer and some statutes received a very 
                                                 
116 To calculate the distribution I only counted citations that pointed to clearly identifiable 
statutes, i.e. to statute citations that included a specific chapter number. That implied 
dropping about 3,500 of the 41,850 statute citations. 
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large number of citations117. This suggests that some statutes had much wider 
applicability than single holdings of common law court. 
Long-term persistence 
Taking for granted, based on the studies in chapter 6, that a statute citation in the English 
Reports indicated that the statute was deemed applicable at the time of the citation, I 
investigate the long-term persistence of statutes. Technically, a statute remains in force 
until it is officially repealed or superseded by a subsequent statute. However, it is 
possible that a statute - though in force and never officially repealed - simply lost its 
relevance. Therefore, it is of some interest to study the long-term persistence of statutes. 
It is clear that some statutes have persisted a long time. For example, in the English 
Reports the most recent citation of Magna Carta appeared 1865, i.e. about 650 years after 
its enactment (later years are not covered by the dataset). The same held true for the 
Statute of Limitations and the Statute of Uses (comp. footnote 117).  
To compare statutes and ER precedents I followed the same procedure as in 
chapter 6. For two decades - the 1580’s and the 1700’s - that date back long enough to 
observe long-term persistence, I identified ER citations that referred to statutes that were 
                                                 
117 The five most cited statutes are: 
• the Statute of Limitations (from the year 1540): 1275 cites - an act setting limitation 
periods on land-related claims 
• the Statute of Frauds (1677): 1091 cites - an act requiring certain kinds of transactions 
to be recorded in writing 
• the statute 6 George IV, chapter 16 (1825): 544 cites - the first act on voluntary 
bankruptcy 
• the statute 4 William IV, chapter 42 (1833): 419 cites - an act regulating common law 
procedures 
• the statute 43 Elizabeth, chapter 2 (1601): 405 cites - an act regulating poverty relief 
(previously carried out by the church) 
• the famous Statute of Uses (1535) was cited 232 times and the Magna Carta (1215) 
197 times. 
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enacted in one these two decades, and recorded the most recent citation date. The time 
difference between the most recent citation date and the date when the statute was 
enacted provided an estimate of the statute’s degree-of long-term persistence.  
The Chronological Table of and Index to the Statutes (1873) lists 73 statutes 
between 1580-1589 and 264 statutes between 1700-1709. Many of these statutes were 
personal or local, i.e. they applied only to a particular individual or group, and were 
unlikely to surface in later court proceedings. 38 statutes from the 1580’s and 79 statutes 
from the 1700’s were cited in common law courts more than 100 years after their 
enactment. That translates to 100-year term persistence rates of 52.1% and 29.9%, 
respectively. The 1700’s rate of immediate oblivion was 56.4 percent (to recall for ER 
precedents the 100-year-term persistence rates were 51.2 percent for the 1580’s and 39.8 
percent for the 1700’s, plus a 1700’s immediate oblivion rate of 31.9 percent). The 100-
year term persistence rates were very similar for ER precedents and statutes. This 
suggests comparable degrees of long-term persistence. 
Top statute authorities 
Like in the previous chapters I use citation counts to study, for any given year after 1700, 
the age composition of top authorities. I identify, for each year after 1700, 6118 groups of 
top cited statutes119 (top 10, top 50, top 100; top 1%, top 5%, top 10%) and characterize 
their age composition by standard measures of centrality and spread. The summary 
                                                 
118 I dropped 2 groups (top 500 and top 20%) that I included in the analysis of precedents. 
The reason is that the small number of statutes that was being cited at the beginning of 
the 18th century resulted in in the inclusion of all statutes in the top500 group. 
119 as in the previous section I counted only post-1700 citations and disregarded all statute 
citations that did not point to a specific statute name or statute chapter. To recall that 
meant dropping about 3,500 of the 41,850 statute citations. 
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measures indicate that statutes following the Glorious Revolution gained influence during 
the first decades of the 18th century. Half a century then followed where the temporal 
composition of statute authorities remained largely stable with only minor recent 
additions. Finally, around the turn of the 18th century the temporal composition of top 
statutes underwent a pronounced and continuous shift towards statutes from the 19th 
century. 
Figure 54 and Figure 56 depict annual means and standard deviations, as well as 
annual medians and median absolute deviations for the different groups. Analogous 
measures for the ER precedents appear as dashed lines. One finds that means and 
medians, though initially very noisy, decrease over the first half of the 18th century while 
standard deviations and median absolute deviations decrease or remain unchanged. The 
increasing number of statutes that were enacted after the Glorious Revolution replaced a 
good part of older statutes as top authorities. This explains the decreasing centrality 
measures and spreads. After this period followed half a century where the temporal 
composition of top authorities remained essentially unchanged. As a consequence, means 
and medians increased each year by about 1 and spreads remained about constant. 
Finally, around 1800 the period of essentially unchanged top authorities came to an end 
when an increasing number of recently enacted statutes joined the top authorities and 
replaced the previous top authorities. This manifested as increasing spreads and fairly 
drastically decreasing centrality measures. For example, the mean of the top 10 statute 
authorities dropped from about 200 in the year 1830 to about 130 in the year 1840 when 
2 statutes from the 17th and 18thth centuries replaced statutes from the 13th and 16th 
centuries . 
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A different perspective on the persistent and changing features of common law’s top 
statute authorities provides Figure 56. It demonstrates that the temporal composition of 
top statute authorities comprised statutes that went back hundreds of years. It further 
shows that a large portion of top authorities originated in the time period around the 
Glorious Revolution while very few top authorities emerged between 1740 and 1810. 
However, by the year 1860 about half of all top statutes had their origins in the 19th 
century. Figure 57 demonstrates how the drastic change came about. Until the beginning 
of the 19th century time period-specific top authorities had a general inclination towards 
the past and particularly so towards statutes around the Glorious Revolution. Over the 
19th century first the inclination towards the past became attenuated and then a very 
strong inclination towards the present developed over the second quarter of the 19th 
century. 
Comparison with ER precedents exposes similarities and differences. First, 
statutes go back to the 13th century whereas the ER case reports go back only to the end 
of the 16th century. Therefore, it is not surprising that means and medians of statute top 
authorities were initially 2-3 times larger than the precedent analogues. Second, statutes 
enacted during the decades after the Glorious Revolution joined the group of most cited 
statutes, whereas ER precedents showed greater persistence during the 19th century. On 
the other hand, statutes and ER precedents together manifested strong persistence of top 
authorities’ temporal composition over the second half of the 18th century. Finally, both 
at about the same time underwent a 19th century transition that anchored the temporal 
composition of top authorities in the present. The transition appears to have been more 
radical for statutes than for precedents and so centralities and spreads converged in the 
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course of the 19th century. Possibly the fact that statutes were not bound by a doctrine of 
precedent is the reason that they could be replaced more radically than the more 
persistent precedents. 
Statute time profiles 
Statute time profiles, i.e. year-dependent temporal compositions of new statute citations, 
describe statute use in the English superior common law courts. The law courts drew 
regularly on statutes, i.e. social rules that originated in Parliament, to decide cases and 
create new law. Even though statutes differed from precedents in that they originated 
outside the law courts and were not constrained by doctrines of precedent they 
constituted another form of legal innovation capital whose use can be analyzed with time 
profiles. Courts had to take them into account when deciding cases, however, the 
meaning and applicability of specific statutes were open to interpretation. 
 Figure 58 presents statute time profiles from the common law innovation process. 
As in earlier chapters cited years are aggregated by semi-decades and citing years are 
aggregated by decades. The time profiles cover the decades from 1700 to 1865. To 
facilitate comparison with ER precedents I have restricted the cited semidecades to the 
time from 1580 to 1865 for which ER precedent data is available. Dashed lines in the 
figure represent predictions based on the random citing model. Because the random citing 
model predicts very poorly I will not discuss it further and simply record that a higher 
number of enacted statutes did not translate into a higher number of statute citations.   
The statute time profiles can usefully be separated into a pre-1800 period and a 
post-1800 period. During the pre-1800 period recently enacted statutes did not dominate. 
This changed around 1800 and the most recent statutes were cited far more frequently 
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than in earlier times. For example, in the 1860’s about 50% of cited statutes were less 
than 20 years old and 80% of statute citations were less than 50 years old. This compares 
to statute citations in 1780 when only 20% of statute citations were less than 20 years old 
and only 40% of statutes were less than 50 years old. This change is reflected in the shape 
of the corresponding time profiles. Pre-1800 time profiles are spread out over the cited 
semidecades and no semidecade dominates. After 1800 the shape changes into a head 
rising above the most recent years and a tail covering the older years. 
Analogously to the ER precedents there are two aspects of persistence in the 
statute time profiles. The first one is that the shape of time profiles stays largely 
unchanged during the pre-1800 period and, after a short transition period, seems to 
converge quickly towards a persistent shape (the shape further resembles that one that 
emerged from the U.S. data). The second aspect is the continued recognizability of earlier 
citing behaviors in later times. Even though the center of gravity shifted from the past to 
the present, the past remained recognizable even in the 1860’s. In other words if one 
would cut of the time profile’s head and blow up the tail one would obtain a decent 
representation of time profiles from a century ago. 
 Estimating the standard version of the year-aggregated representative courtroom 
model (where t’ is now the year of preceding statutes that could be brought up as part of 
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leads to Figure 59. The initially imprecise estimates begin with an average depreciation 
rate of about 1% before decreasing over the second half of the 18th century to about 0.5%. 
Around 1800 the estimated depreciation rates begin to increase, initially to 1% until about 
1820 and then rapidly to about 5% in the 1860’s. These findings confirm the distinction 
between a pre-1800 and post-1800 period and the existence of two different modes of 
innovation. 
 Summarizing the above and adding a few more observations one can say that the 
time profiles of statutes and ER precedents display strong similarities and some 
noteworthy differences. Time profiles of both underwent a swift transition from an 18th 
century period with strong persistence to a 19th century period where persistence declined 
and change dominated. Estimates from the representative courtroom model confirm the 
transition and produce similar depreciation between 0.5% and 5%. Moreover, the shapes 
of past time profiles are persistent in the sense that they remain recognizable in later 
times. Statute and precedent profiles differ in that precedents apparently begin their 
transition a few decades earlier - even though drastic change sets in for both around 1810. 
Moreover, the change of statute depreciation rates is more pronounced - rates increase 
from 0.5% to 5% - relative to precedent depreciation rates that increase from 1% to 4%. 
One might conjecture that the doctrine of precedent diminishes depreciation of 
innovation capital. 
Statute presence in courtrooms 
In the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and over the course of the 18th century 
statutory activity increased drastically (recall Figure 50). Because statutes directly 
influenced the making of new law in the common law courts one might wonder if the 
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observed changes in top authorities, time profiles and depreciation rates were brought by 
an increasing influence of statutes on decisions in the common law courts. As a first 
attempt to test the conjecture I created an approximate measure, the yearly average 








To do so I determined for each case report the relative share of statute citations relative to 
the case report’s total number of citations and averaged these proportions across case 
reports in a given citing year. The yearly average relative shares of statute citations are 
depicted in Figure 60. The figure shows that the influence of statutes doubled over the 
first half of the century from an average of about 0.15 to an average of about 0.3. From 
the mid of the 18th century onwards the value remained essentially unchanged. With due 
reservations regarding the preliminary nature of the measure the results suggest that the 
increased statutory activity indeed increased the influence of statutes on common law’s 
innovation process. However, further increases in statutory activity had no further effect 
and, therefore, the observed drastic changes in the use of innovation capital are not easily 
explained by ongoing changes in statutory activity. 
Commonalities and differences: insights from statutes 
Courtrooms drew on cases and statutes to resolve cases on trial. All things considered, the 
findings of the previous sections partly confirm and partly extend the findings from the 
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chapter on ER precedents. The Glorious Revolution was followed by an increase in 
statutory activity and courtroom use of statutes. A few decades after the revolution about 
3 out of 10 courtroom references involved statutes. Moreover, many statutes from the 
post-Revolution years soon constituted a long-persisting part of legal innovation capital. 
Decreasing statute depreciation rates in the first half of the 18th century further attest to 
this. The early 18th century emergence of persistent statute innovation capital had no 
equivalent in precedents. In the second half of the 18th century, however, existing statute 
and precedent authorities exhibited strong persistence. At the turn of the 18th century 
statute use and precedent use both underwent a quick transition to a legal innovation 
regime with low persistence of legal innovation capital. The transition in statute use 
appears more drastic than the precedent counterpart. Because statutes - at least since the 
16th century - did not suffer from issues of delayed publication and heterogeneous quality 
the correspondence between statute and precedent patterns of persistence and change 









Chapter 9: Conclusions and future research 
In this last chapter, I will briefly summarize the motivation of the previous investigations 
and the methods used, and thereafter review the main findings, derive more general 
conclusions and entertain a few conjectures, Finally, I will lay out a few avenues for 
further research. 
 Economists’ recent main interest in institutions arguably derives from the central 
role modern economic growth plays in economic studies. Persistent institutions are seen 
as a main driver - by some even as the ultimate driver - of economic growth. The recent 
mainstream institutional economics literature has aimed to establish the causal effects of 
persistent institutions through empirical studies that built on an imprecisely measured or 
simply proclaimed persistence of institutional outcomes. These studies, while being very 
valuable, have implicit biases that deflect from the study of actually enforced rules, tend 
to disregard the possibility of major institutional change in the absence of cataclysmic 
events, and lose focus of the continuous coexistence of institutional persistence and 
institutional change. To balance some of these biases I quantitatively studied persistent 
and changing features of the actually occurring legal innovation process in England’s 
common law between the years 1700 and 1865. The studied time period is free of 
cataclysmic events and saw the emergence and spread of the phenomenon of modern 
economic growth. The study does not aim to identify average causal effects, but instead 
does quantitatively describe long-term legal development within one important 
jurisdiction over an important time period (in comparison with one other important 
jurisdiction). The quantitative description led to unexpected patterns of persistence and 
change in the legal innovation process. Beyond their more general relevance these might 
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be a noteworthy contribution to the institution-sparse literature on the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 To execute the quantitative descriptive approach I chose a method that is well 
established and widely accepted in studies of U.S. law. It builds on actually enforced 
social rules and blends with recent developments in network science. The method 
consists in the construction of a citation network whose elements are cases or statutes and 
whose links are formed by citations. Cases and citations as they appear in the English 
Reports - the most comprehensive collection of pre-1865 case reports available - reflect a 
good part of the legal reasoning that occurred over the centuries in England’s common 
law courts. Analyzing statistical aggregate patterns of the citation network and focusing 
on temporal aspects resulted in the observation of persisting and changing features of 
English law making. During the analysis I was careful to distinguish the institutional 
features under investigation, the exact way of measuring the institutional feature, and the 
relevant time period. A benefit of the chosen method is that, in principle, it allows to 
return for detailed analysis to the specific cases and statutes that underlie the emergent 
aggregate pattern. 
Construction of citation network 
I invested considerable effort to construct, to the best of my knowledge, the first citation 
network that embodies English law. The significant challenge of extracting case and 
citation information from the English Reports was successfully accomplished with a high 
positive extraction rate (about 80% of references to statutes and ER precedents) and small 
error rates (false positives rate of about 2%, false negatives rate of about 15%). The 
extraction process aimed to minimize false positives at the expense of an increase in false 
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negatives. Analysis of a random sample showed that the majority of post-1700 ER 
references to earlier cases and statutes occurred as part of courtroom arguments and that 
negative citations were very rare. Structural patterns of the resulting citation network - 
like degree distribution, preferential attachment or overall time depreciation - resemble 
other well-studied citation networks and are an indication of meaningful and informative 
content. A plausible list of top cited cases (and statutes - see footnote 117), and the 
expected manifest split between equity law and common law reinforce this conclusion. 
Moreover, clear time-consistent patterns in top authorities, time profiles, and detected 
communities speak for meaningful information content. The new citation network should 
facilitate quantitative and comparative studies in law and network science. 
Long-term persistence 
Actually measurable long-term persistence of a large part of English precedents and 
statutes, at some point of time, seems to have been a fact: during the 1580’s and 1700’s 
apparently between 50% and 40% of precedents and 40% and 30% of statutes remained 
authoritative more than 100 years after trial or enactment. The extent of the observed 
long-term persistence of clearly identifiable social rules is unexpectedly large. 
Comparison with U.S. majority opinions from the 1800’s and 1840’s yields 100-year-
term persistence rates of 20% and 10% that are significantly lower.  
The high degree of English long-term persistence needs two reservations. On the 
one hand, because the ER data series ends in 1865 the measured long-term persistence 
pertains to legal rules from the 16th to the beginning 18th century (assuming continuity 
between 1580 and 1700) and not to legal rules from later times. On the other hand, the 
measured degree of long-term persistence is likely a lower bound because case holdings 
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or statute provisions could have remained authoritative, but their citations never made it 
into the ER case reports. 
 The large degree of long-term persisting rules from the 16th and 18th century 
England supports, in principle, the notion of a direct pathway to the long-term persistence 
of institutional outcomes and from there to beneficial economic outcomes. However, it 
should be clear that a vast number of English precedents and statutes appears to have lost 
authority after 100 years and a vast number of precedents and statutes were added to the 
long-term persisting ones. A mix of long-term persisting rules and recent rules might as 
well generate institutional outcomes that differ strongly from the outcomes that were in 
place when the long-term persisting rules came to life. Therefore, a direct persistence 
pathway remains a slippery slope unless one gains traction by showing that long-term 
persistence of social rules was concentrated on a specific legal area - for example, 
property rights or contract law, whose persistence resulted in institutional outcomes that 
are seen as economically beneficial by institutional economists. This is an avenue for 
future research that would improve on institutional economists’ more indirect approaches 
and their reliance on vaguely defined institutional outcomes or clusters of institutions. 
Being aware of foreseeable obstacles on the route and acknowledging the possibility that 
long-term persistence of institutional outcomes does not need to derive from long-term 
persistence of individual rules, I can see the desirability of grouping precedents (and 
statutes) by categories. These categories should be derived directly and in a systematic 
manner from the actual case reports (and statute texts) and not inferred based on partly 
imagined institutional outcomes. Ideally they would capture features like the issue at 
stake (or the topic of legislation), important notions relied on court, and ideally even 
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images of law (see chapter 4). Modern text mining techniques have already advanced 
enough to perform some of these tasks. This is another avenue for future research. 
Statute influence on law making 
The decades after the Glorious Revolution saw a permanent change in the influence of 
statutory activity on common law making. Careful study of the most authoritative 
statutes, analysis of time profiles that record time-specific citation behavior and the 
examination of statutes’ share in courtroom citations point to this conclusion. Following 
the Glorious Revolution Parliament convened yearly and the number of enacted statutes 
increased. As evidenced in time profiles and the most authoritative statutes this translated 
into post-revolutionary statutes that quickly gained influence in courtrooms and 
maintained it over the course of the 18th century. Evidently this also translated into a 
permanent change of statutory authority in courtrooms. The relative share of statute 
citations doubled from about 15% to about 30% over the first half of the 18th century and 
then remained constant and insensitive to further increases in the annual number of 
enacted statutes. One could see this as an early sign of the coming of Berman’s purported 
(post-18th century) age of positivist law (expounded e.g. in Berman, 2000), i.e. the 
increasing influence of the legislative branch on law-making. At the same time it is 
important to remember that, even after statutes had gained greater influence on common 
law making, precedents constituted the vast majority of used innovation capital: about 
70% of courtroom citations point to precedents and not statutes. Although the reach of 
case holdings is much narrower than the provisions of statutes, this finding suggests that 
common law judges enjoyed a substantial amount of judicial freedom. 
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Transition in legal innovation 
Possibly the most striking finding of this study is a drastic change in the making of 
common law. Beginning with precedents not long after the mid of the 18th century, 
followed by statutes around the turn of the 19th century and intensifying during the first 
decades of the 19th century the common law innovation process underwent a radical 
transformation. A legal innovation process with low depreciation rates and strong past-
persistence rapidly transitioned to a present-focused innovation process with significantly 
higher depreciation rates and weak past-persistence. The transition is visible in the most 
authoritative precedents and statutes, in time profiles, and in detected communities. 
The strong pre-transition persistence is reflected in temporal compositions of 
common law’s top authorities that remained essentially unchanged over the whole 18th 
century (precedents) and the latter half of the 18th century120 (statutes). However, the 
innovation value of the previously important 18th century precedents and statutes was 
depressed to near-insignificance within only a few decades around 1800. Consequently, 
soon after 1800 the majority of cited precedents and statutes originated in the 19th 
century. Even though fast-paced change seems to be the only regularity in 19th century 
legal innovation, a closer look revealed a sizeable number of persisting top authorities 
from previous centuries and the trace of 18th century time profiles in the ones from the 
19th century. Community detection techniques corroborate the sharp transition in the legal 
innovation process. They carved out two similarly sized communities: the first 
community appears to be the carrier of disruptive change, whereas the second community 
appears to provide persistence that stretches from the 16th century to the 19th century. 
                                                 
120 increased statutory activity after the Glorious Revolution explains the lack of 
persistence in the first half of the 18th century 
 166
Application of the same quantitative techniques to majority opinions from the 
U.S. Supreme Court exposed a less striking, but similarly pronounced transition towards 
the end of the 19th century. The U.S. legal innovation process apparently was never as 
past-centered as the English one. However, the speed of the transition to a present-
focused innovation process with significantly higher depreciation rates and weak past-
persistence are very similar. The reasons for the comparably low degree of U.S. past-
centeredness are unclear. It might be due to the Supreme Court not coming into existence 
until the U.S. constitution was ratified in 1789, the American legal system having 
borrowed from the English common law system that was transitioning in the 19th century, 
or the English common law system being unique. 
The striking finding of an English legal innovation process that rapidly transitions 
from one steady-state like process to another is most likely not an artifact produced by 
case report heterogeneities (e.g. quality of case reports) or fluctuations in case numbers. 
Measurable changes in case report heterogeneities only partially coincided with the 
transition, statutes - where heterogeneity was limited - exhibited the same transition, and 
fluctuations in the number of case reports were accounted for by a representative 
courtroom model. Moreover, the similarly pronounced transition in the citation network 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinions - official, immediately published case 
documents with much lower variation in quality and content than the ER case reports - 
strongly suggests that sharp transitions in legal innovation processes are a historical 
reality. Finally, another quantitative study - one of the very few existing advanced 
quantitative studies on the development of English law - locates profound legal change 
around the turn of 19th century and thereby supports the current findings:  Klingenstein et 
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al. (2014) show that criminal law’s crucial distinction between violent and non-violent 
acts began to emerge around 1800, was clearly detectable one or two decades later and 
continued to strengthen over the century121. 
What then follows from the observed rapid transitions in the legal innovation 
process? First, the rapid transformation of the English legal innovation process 
demonstrates that even in the absence of cataclysmic events important change in a legal 
system can happen swiftly. While Enlightenment thought, revolutionary sentiment and 
the Napolean wars stirred England, they did not turn it upside down. The English political 
order remained largely unchanged since the Glorious Revolution, and the frequently 
emphasized event of the Great Reform Act of 1832 occurred too late to have initiated the 
transformation (and might even be better seen as a manifestation of ongoing legal 
changes). A rapid transformation of a legal system in non-cataclysmic times goes against 
the grain of the mainstream’s inclination towards institutional persistence in the absence 
of cataclysmic events, Berman’s framework of accelerated legal change in revolutionary 
times, and the legal professions’ standard view of legal development.  
The current mainstream literature in institutional economics tends to emphasize 
persistent institutional outcomes and to look for changes in institutional settings that 
occur as a consequence of cataclysmic events. The notion that important institutional 
change might consist in a rapidly changing legal innovation process during non-
cataclysmic times does not fit that research agenda. Berman would recognize radical 
                                                 
121 Related preliminary findings that further support the notion of significant legal 
changes around the turn of the 19th century are available as video recording (Harrison, 
2013) 
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legal change only in revolutionary times and places122 while acknowledging weakened 
later repercussions in the rest of Europe. A radical transformation in legal innovation 
outside a revolutionary context appears at odds with his framework123. The legal 
professions’ mainstream view of steady, incremental, ever unperturbed legal change124 
contrasts with the other two views. Obviously it is incompatible with a drastically 
changed innovation process. In sum, none of the three views easily accommodate the 
finding of a radical transformation in legal innovation. 
Second, the observed transition to increased depreciation and present-centered 
innovation is a feature of the process that generates new legal rules and not a feature of 
the legal rules as such. In economists’ (and accountants’) parlance the transition concerns 
the flow of institutions and not the stock of institutions. While it is clear that the character 
of the stock of institutions will begin to change when the flow of institutions undergoes a 
transformation, the resulting change in the stock of legal rules is likely more gradual than 
the transformation of the flow. This might be the reason why the drastic change in legal 
innovation went unnoticed. Unfortunately, the citation network does not allow 
quantitative assessments of the stock of institutions.  
Third, the common view that nothing particularly noteworthy happened to legal 
institutions over the course of the Industrial Revolution (see e.g. Mokyr, 2009; 
McCloskey, 2010) probably needs some revision. To the best of my knowledge not one 
institutional economics study tried to quantitatively follow legal innovation over the 
                                                 
122 Compare footnote 14. 
 
123 Seeing the observed transformation as a weakened repercussion of the French 
Revolution seems a stretch. 
 
124 Compare footnote 10. 
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Industrial Revolution. I showed that, in the decades before and after the turn of the 19th 
century, the English legal innovation process underwent a drastic change. Past-centered 
innovation where precedents and enacted statutes had long-lasting value became present-
centered and depreciation accelerated. The acceleration of the innovation process 
accompanied the Industrial Revolution. The observed changes in the innovation process 
might be an example of Mokyr’s general notion of institutional adaptive flexibility that, 
in the particular case of common law, overlaps with the self-image of many in the legal 
profession125. In that regard, it seems plausible that the transformation was an 
institutional adaptation that was necessary to the continued unfolding of the Industrial 
Revolution. A failed transformation might have curbed it. Needless to say that 
substantiation of these speculations requires further research.  
 Fourth, the remarkable parallels between English and U.S. data, and particularly 
the rapid transition, at very different points of time, from a low-depreciation period to 
high-depreciation period provide weak evidence for a bold conjecture: Is it possible that 
the development process of modern economic growth necessitates exactly one major 
transition in the legal innovation process? Unfortunately, the English data series does not 
extend beyond the major transition and, therefore, it is not possible to determine if 
another major transition followed the first one. On the other hand, the U.S. data - while 
mute about the time before the 18th century - indicate that no additional major transition 
                                                 
125 Out of many well-known quotes along these lines a 20th century one from Justice 
McCardie might serve as an example: “The object of the common law is to solve 
difficulties and adjust relations in social and commercial life. It must meet, in so far as it 
can, sets of fact abnormal as well as usual. It must grow with the development of the 
nation. It must face and deal with changing or novel circumstances. Unless it can do that, 
it fails in its function and declines in its dignity. An expanding society demands an 
expanding common law.” [1924] KB 570. 
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occurred after the one around the end of the 19th century. Extrapolating from the U.S. 
data series one can wonder if the observed English and American transitions are the only 
major ones that feature in development towards modern economic growth. While the 
transition occurred in England over the Industrial Revolution, it occurred in the United 
States in times of large structural change in the economy (see e.g. Hughes and Cain, 
2011): in 1880 output shares of the industrial sector and the services sector had overtaken 
the agricultural output share, over the second half of 19th century the quickly expanding 
railway system drastically increased the scale of commercial interaction, infant mortality 
rates nearly halved between 1880 and 1900, and government policy became sympathetic 
to intervention in the private sector (e.g. by enacting antitrust legislation like the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890). Should the conjecture hold true it would lead to another question. 
What institutional structures allow the transition to occur and then maintain it? 
Fifth, I hope to have illustrated that looking out for actually enforced social rules 
and the continuous coexistence of clearly defined persistent and changing institutional 
features can benefit institutional analysis and lead to new and unexpected findings. These 
findings present a richer picture of institutional processes than dichotomous categories of 
long-term persistence and cataclysmic change. The non-dichotomous approach 
simultaneously endorses institutional persistence and change as hallmarks of cumulative 
culture and, thereby, reconnects with a fertile Western tradition of thought in which 
persistence and change coexist. In that way it can balance the current inclinations of 
institutional economics. 
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Unfolding of the transition 
The remarkable similarities between the detected network communities in the English 
and U.S. data series suggest that the observed transitions unfolded in a specific, possibly 
general manner: it seems that in each country a new body of law arose around the onset 
of the transition (beginning in the 1760’s in England and the 1870’s in the U.S.) out of a 
relatively small number of precedents and then developed in a self-referential manner126. 
Simultaneously the body of law that existed at the time of the transition continued even if 
its yearly share diminished. At the end of the two data series the new body of law was 
widespread, but the old body of law had remained substantial. One could see here an 
analogy to the way how disruptive technological change diffuses: disruptive change in 
well-functioning market economies appears not to be brought by the incumbents who rely 
on existing technologies, but by new entrants who use new technologies and grow their 
business at faster rates than the incumbents (for a recent review see Haltiwanger, 
2015)127. 
                                                 
126 What that new body of law is (and if it really exists - see the reservations below) I do 
not know. If one would have to pick one area of law contract law with its notion of the 
freedom of contract (for an account see Scheiber, 1998) would be a potential candidate 
for the English transition because of its centrality to markets. It embodies the modern 
conception of the social world as consisting of atomistic individuals who voluntarily 
enter into mutually beneficial agreements. The conception that gave birth to the social 
contract theories of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau found its way into the reform-centered 
thought of Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Smith or Jeremy Bentham around the time 
of the English transition. 
 
127 One could also see an analogy to the spread of disruptive scientific theories. They 
rarely emerge from the center of a discipline, but often from the periphery (e.g. Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, Einstein’s theory of relativity, or the quantum theories of Bohr, 
Heisenberg and Schrödinger; for a impressive illustration of a classical physicist’s 
response to the new entrants see McCormach (1982)). 
 172
 Identification of a general pathway of disruptive legal change is tempting and 
would be a step towards answering La Porta et al.’s (2008, p. 326) crucial questions 
regarding the evolution of legal systems128. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that 
the findings of this study are only preliminary. To establish that the pathway really exists 
and one does not reify statistical artifacts, further research is needed129. For example, 
manual investigation of a representative sample of precedents from the detected 
communities would give a first indication of the communities’ character. And - even 
though imprecise - modern-text mining techniques like topic analysis would allow it to 
generalize the analysis to the whole dataset. Finally, emerging network science 
techniques allow it to detect and track communities at different points of time. Should 
one indeed be able to track a growing disruptive community from the beginning of the 
transition to the end of the data series and should one be able to assign specific areas of 
law to the community, the case for a pathway of disruptive legal change would be 
considerably strengthened.  
                                                 
128 “From our perspective, the crucial open questions deal with the evolution of legal 
systems: How do they deal with crises? How do they enter new spheres of regulation? 
How do they approach reforms? We have offered many illustrations from the historical 
record, but a comprehensive account of legal and regulatory evolution under common 
and civil law does not exist.” (ibid). 
 
129 At the same time the idea of a new body of law emerging in the second half of the 18th 
century and reaching to today is not unheard of among the legally knowledgeable. As an 
example the following quote from a biography of Lord Mansfield: “What is surprising 
about the English common law of the second half of the eighteenth century is how much 
of it is familiar. Many of the basic ideas and approaches that describe the Anglo-
American legal landscape of the twenty-first century were forged in this earlier time.” 
(Oldham, 2004, p. 364). 
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Accelerated legal innovation 
Apart from the speed of the transition, its occurrence in a time free from cataclysmic 
events, and the appearance of a disruptive community another aspect stands out. 
Depreciation rates after the transition drastically increased. Before the transition year-
dependent depreciation rates were about 1% for precedents and about 0.5% to 1% for 
statutes. After the transition they reached about 4% for precedents and about 5% for 
statutes and seemed to increase further. This means that the innovation value of past 
precedents and statutes decayed much quicker after the transition. Or in blunt words, after 
the transition precedents and previously enacted statutes became quickly useless for 
innovative purposes. The initial average precedent half-life of about 70 years and the 
initial average statute half-life of about 70 to 140 years became significantly shorter. In 
the second half of the 19th century average precedent half-life had shortened to about 17.5 
years and average statute half-life to 12 years.  
Interestingly the phenomenon is not restricted to English common law, but was 
similarly observable in majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The first precisely 
estimated pre-transition depreciation rates date from around 1860. Precedent depreciation 
rates then were between 1% and 2% (corresponding to a precedent half-life of 70 to 35 
years). After the transition they equaled between 5% and 6% (corresponding to a half-life 
of 14 years to 11.7 years) and remained essentially unchanged over the entire 20th 
century. In spite of largely non-overlapping time periods the estimated U.S. pre-transition 
rates were very similar to the English ones and the English post-transition rates were 
apparently converging towards the level of the U.S. post-transition rates.  
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The phenomenon of accelerating depreciation rates seems to have escaped the 
attention of legal scholars. Although they noticed the general phenomenon of precedent 
depreciation decades ago (Merryman, 1954) they are usually more interested in the 
reasons why individual, recent cases depreciate differently and less in the historical 
patterns of aggregated entities. Or they see different time periods and different 
depreciation rates as confounding factors that need to be controlled, but not studied. For 
example, Landes and Posner (1976, 1980) picked a random sample of cases from a hand 
full of post-WWII years and derived depreciation rates between 2 and 5 percent (not 
controlling for attachment bias). Others (e.g. Spriggs and Hansford, 2002) take time 
depreciation into account to make their case for a different argument. Black and Spriggs 
(2013) take a close look on various factors that influence time depreciation of cases and 
in doing so combine post-WWII years in their estimation. 
Legal scholars seem to ascribe the depreciation of precedents (and presumably 
statutes) to changing circumstances. In the words of Landes and Posner (1976) a 
“precedent does not "wear out" in a physical sense, it depreciates in an economic sense 
because the value of its information content declines over time with changing 
circumstances. Changes in social and economic conditions, in legislation, in judicial 
personnel, and in other parameters of legal action reduce the value of precedents as a 
source of legal doctrine”. Black and Spriggs (2013) add “As judges analogically reason 
their way to conclusions, older cases are less likely to contain issues, principles, and 
reasoning appropriate for contemporary legal problems.” If one agrees that a higher pace 
of social and economics change in a society translates into higher depreciation rates, one 
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can also use higher depreciation rates as an indication of an accelerated pace of social and 
economic change. 
The notion of an accelerated pace of modern life has often surfaced in comments 
on modernity. Marx’s statement in the Communist Manifesto that “all that is solid melts 
into air”130 is in that regard one of the best-known manifestations. A Goethe character 
would confer: “it is terrible that one can’t learn anything for life anymore… Our 
ancestors held firm to what they had learned in their youth; but we have to learn 
everything over again every five years if we are not to be totally behind the times.”131 
These two statements encapsulate the decay part of cumulative culture and hint to the 
counterpart of accelerated innovation. Harold Berman illustrates the modern drive for 
change with the ideology underlying Enlightenment thought: “The political, economic, 
and social implications of the religion of Deism are apparent. Its individualism and its 
rationalism led inevitably to an emphasis on reform of existing conditions for the benefit 
of the majority of individuals living in a given society.” On an individual level, Marshall 
Berman (1981, p. 13) sees a modern experience where people “are moved at once by a 
                                                 
130 The whole middle paragraph reads “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly 
revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, 
and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of 
production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all 
earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of 
life, and his relations with his kind.” (Marx and Engels, 1848). 
 
131 the quote is from Goethe’s Elective Affinities and is cited in Rosa and Trejo-Mathys 
(2013, p. 108); that Goethe estimated the average half-life and implicit depreciation rate 
so admirably about 200 years before I did proves the genius of my German compatriot 
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will to change - to transform both themselves and their world - and by a terror of 
disorientation and disintegration, of life falling apart. They all know the thrill and the 
dread of a world in which "all that is solid melts into air"”. 
If modernity consists of accelerated innovation and decay one would expect to see 
it reflected in its cumulative culture. As a final speculative stretch, I hypothesize that it 
would also manifest in its legal innovation processes and the depreciation rates of the 
current study. The sudden and sustained increase in depreciation rates would then 
confirm notions of a rapid transition to an accelerated pace of modern life. A life that set 
in around the turn of the 19th century in England and around the end of the 19th century in 
the United States. At the same time it would not support the idea of an ever-accelerating 
pace of life as expounded, for example, in a recent work by Rosa and Trejo-Mathys  
(2013).  
Further research 
At the end of this investigation I will concretize some of the avenues of research I already 
hinted at and point to a few additional ones. Obviously, it would be possible to apply the 
techniques of the current study, as well as the extensions discussed below, to citation 
networks from other common law countries. For example, occurrence of exactly one 
major transition in each country and similarity of pre- and post-transition rates would 
broaden the findings of this study. If one focuses on the English and American datasets of 
this study one can carry out further research by using exactly the same data and 
techniques, by extending the datasets and using the same techniques, and by using more 
advanced techniques with the same or extended datasets. 
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Some further questions can be addressed by using the current data. For example, 
to gain greater confidence in the reliability of results one can simply apply the methods of 
this study to ER equity cases - a very sizeable subset of the dataset - that were only 
briefly studied here. Other questions need to be answered by expanding the time horizon 
of the English and U.S. datasets by extending them. For example, adapting and applying 
data extraction techniques of this study to the publicly available dataset of U.S. Supreme 
Court majority opinions, would allow it to locate citations of ER precedents in the 
majority opinions. Because the American legal system is a continuation of the English 
legal tradition, one would be better able to judge its degree of past-centeredness.  Slightly 
modifying data extraction techniques of this study would allow it to apply them to the 
official series of post-1865 law reports. One would then be able to find out if time 
depreciation rates converged to the American ones and remained stable after their 
convergence. One would also be able to determine if other major transitions occurred in 
the English legal innovation process. 
 Adding additional techniques to the analysis extends the range of questions one 
can ask and answer. Two promising avenues seem to be the use of more advanced text 
mining and network science techniques. Klingenstein et al. (2014) relied on automated 
coarse-graining of the complete texts of individual trials to automate the detection of 
meaning and classification of texts. Topic analysis (see e.g. Blei, 2012; Rule et al., 2015) 
is another promising technique that would allow classification of cases based on their 
content. Network science has recently invested in the analysis of dynamic networks 
(often by finding ways to reiteratively apply techniques from the analysis of static 
networks). One useful method consists in the tracking of communities’ growth and decay, 
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birth and death, as well as merges and splits. These techniques, used individually or in 
combination, make it possible to characterize the content of groups of cases, e.g. all 
cases, all long-term persisting cases of a specific period, or cases of a detected 
communities. This would better understanding of the character of different groups and 
their temporal trends. Ideally, one would even be able to make progress with the 
extraction of images of law. Application of these techniques could be particularly helpful 
if one wants to understand the process of apparently disruptive legal change. Needless to 
say, that collaboration with legal scholars who have been trained to extract the meaning 
of individual cases could be very beneficial when trying to make sense of aggregate 
patterns - e.g. through interpretation of randomly sampled cases. Vice versa, even legal 
scholars might profit from locating individual cases in emerging aggregate patterns. 
 It is my hope that future research and the findings of this study will add to 
the understanding of the nature of institutions and particularly to the understanding of 
institutional change. Ultimately, one would wish that a better of understanding of 








Table 1: Variables names and descriptions of the citation dataset 
name varlab 
citing_citation case report not citing, citing case, or citing statute (citing) 
citing_uidcombined unique id number of combined case report (citing) 
citing_uid unique id number of single case report (citing) 
citing_nomcite nominative citation (citing) 
citing_nomcitevol nominative citation volume (citing) 
citing_nomcitepage nominative citation page (citing) 
citing_nomciterep reporter volume (citing) 
citing_casename name of combined case report (citing) 
citing_casenamefirstparty first party, i.e. plaintiff, of combined case report (citing) 
citing_casenamesecondparty second party, i.e. defendant, of combined case report 
(citing) 
citing_ercite ER citation of combined case report (citing) 
citing_ercitevol ER citation volume of combined case report (citing) 
citing_date date of combined case report (citing) 
citing_decade decade of combined case report (citing) 
citing_court court where reported case is presented (citing) 
citing_numwords number of words in combined case report (citing) 
citing_nomcitevolyearstart starting year of reporter volume (citing) 
citing_nomcitevolyearend ending year of reporter volume (citing) 
citing_nomcitepagestart starting page of reporter volume (citing) 
citing_nomcitepageend ending year of reporter volume (citing) 
citing_nomcitelawfrench law french used (citing) 
cited_uidcombined uid of combined case reports (cited) 
cited_uid uid of single or combined case reports (cited) 
cited_nomcitematched nominative citation by best matching method (cited) 
cited_nomcitematchedvol nominative citation volume by best matching method 
(cited) 
cited_nomcitematchedpage nominative citation page by best matching method (cited) 
cited_nomciterep reporter volume (cited) 
cited_nomcitematching matching method used for nominative citation (cited) 
cited_casename name of combined case report (cited) 
cited_casenamefirstparty first party, i.e. plaintiff, of combined case report (cited) 
cited_casenamesecondparty second party, i.e. defendant, of combined case report 
(cited) 
cited_ercite ER citation of combined case report (cited) 
cited_ercitevol ER citation volume of combined case report (cited) 
cited_date date of combined case report (cited) 
cited_decade decade of combined case report (cited) 
cited_court court where reported case is presented (cited) 
cited_nomcitenum number of case reports in combined case report (cited) 
 180
cited_numwords number of words in combined case report (cited) 
cited_nomcitevolyearstart starting year of reporter volume (cited) 
cited_nomcitevolyearend ending year of reporter volume (cited) 
cited_nomcitepagestart starting page of reporter volume (cited) 
cited_nomcitepageend ending year of reporter volume (cited) 
cited_nomcitelawfrench law french used (cited) 
cited_citecontext context of nominative citation (cited) 
cited_nomciteoriginal nominative citation unmatched (cited) 
cited_nomciteoriginalvol nominative citation volume unmatched (cited) 
cited_nomciteoriginalpage nominative citation page unmatched (cited) 
cited_statutedate date of cited statute 
cited_statuteregnalyear regnal year of cited statute (if available) 
cited_statutechapter chapter reference of cited statute (if available) 
cited_statutename name of cited statute (if available) 
cited_statutecitecontext context of statute citation 
cited_statutechapterstotal number of total enacted statutes in year of cited statute (if 
available) 




Table 2: Data summary of citation dataset 
name observations mean sd min max 
citing_citation 462857 1.1 0.5 0 2 
citing_uidcombined 462857 64233.0 36035.3 1 129042 
citing_uid 435488 63960.0 35659.5 1 129042 
citing_nomcitepage 462857 341.7 268.8 1 2833 
citing_ercitevol 462857 89.3 43.6 1 618 
citing_date 459933 1777.7 83.0 1061 1999 
citing_decade 459598 1773.3 82.9 1500 1860 
citing_nomcitenum 462857 1.3 0.7 1 15 
citing_numcites 360385 20.0 45.4 1 607 
citing_statutenumcites 75103 4.4 5.9 1 83 
citing_numcasesyear 462857 655.6 418.3 1 2418 
citing_numcasesdecade 462857 6017.7 3714.2 2 11051 
citing_numwords 462857 4006.7 6692.5 13 198233 
citing_nomcitevolyearstart 435477 1768.5 90.3 1220 1871 
citing_nomcitevolyearend 435477 1784.6 78.5 1400 1893 
citing_nomcitepagestart 435488 23.8 139.1 1 2586 
citing_nomcitepageend 435488 671.4 264.0 14 2827 
citing_nomcitelawfrench 435488 0.0 0.1 0 1 
cited_uidcombined 360385 58784.6 34171.0 1 128928 
cited_uid 360385 58784.6 34171.0 1 128928 
cited_nomcitematchedpage 360385 331.6 303.6 1 2827 
cited_nomcitematching 360385 2.1 0.5 1 3 
cited_ercitevol 360385 81.7 40.8 1 176 
cited_date 360385 1756.1 81.3 1580 1865 
cited_decade 360385 1751.6 81.3 1580 1860 
cited_nomcitenum 360385 1.3 0.7 1 15 
cited_numcasesyear 360385 509.0 355.7 3 1276 
cited_numcasesdecade 360385 4876.3 3446.6 351 11051 
cited_numwords 360385 2898.7 4758.1 13 117913 
cited_nomcitevolyearstart 360385 1745.2 86.4 1220 1865 
cited_nomcitevolyearend 360385 1763.0 78.0 1581 1893 
cited_nomcitepagestart 360385 43.2 213.2 1 2586 
cited_nomcitepageend 360385 650.0 302.7 42 2827 
cited_nomcitelawfrench 360385 0.0 0.2 0 1 
cited_nomciteoriginalpage 360385 333.7 328.5 0 9713 
cited_statutedate 75103 1694.8 153.7 1235 1900 
cited_statutechapter 66589 38.0 38.5 0 194 
cited_statutechapterstotal 75103 69.3 48.3 1 196 
cited_statutechapterspublic 75103 60.9 47.5 0 194 
 
Table 3: Random sample of 25 case reports used in the process of data validation; the data was collected by manual inspection of the 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of data reliability variables in random sample with 25 case 
reports 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of citation content variables in random sample with 25 case 
reports 
 pre-1700 post-1700 total 
person citing    
counsel 0    (0%) 43  (54.4%) 43 
court 1    (1.3%) 20  (25.3%) 21 
editor/reporter 74  (93.7%) 13  (16.5%) 89 
ER editor 4    (5.1%) 3    (3.8%) 7 
    
citation type    
analogy 32  (40.5%) 67 (82.7%) 99 
later analogy 32  (40.5%) 3   (3.7%) 35 
analogy (same case cited) 6    (7.6%) 5   (6.2%) 11 
same case (reported) 9    (11.4%) 6   (7.4%) 15 
    
citation negative    




Table 6: List of the 20 most cited common law case reports (citations between the years 
1700 and 1865) 
cited_nomcitematched cited_date cites 
1 wms saunders 319 1669 87 
1 coke report 93 1581 64 
1 burrow 38 1756 60 
6 adolphus and ellis 469 1837 59 
8 coke report 66 1608 59 
3 coke report 25 1591 56 
1 ventris 225 1672 54 
2 lord raymond 909 1703 54 
2 wms saunders 380 1671 53 
3 coke report 19 1587 52 
3 term reports 51 1789 50 
1 wms saunders 228 1669 50 
8 coke report 121 1610 49 
3 coke report 80 1601 49 
6 coke report 16 1595 49 
8 coke report 146 1610 49 
cases temp hardwicke 28 1734 48 
2 douglas 684 1781 47 
1 salkeld 13 1698 47 







Table 7: Estimations of exponential model to capture overall time depreciation; English 
case precedents, U.S. case precedents, English statutes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 logcites uslogcites statutelogcites 
timediff -0.0142*** -0.0405*** -0.00710*** 
 (0.000382) (0.000378) (0.000151) 
    
_cons 7.287*** 8.984*** 5.338*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0427) (0.0531) 
N 282 195 606 
R2 0.83 0.98 0.78 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 8: Modularity scores for the 2 different community detection algorithms and 3 







   
2 0.41 0.37 
3 0.53 0.47 





Table 9: Time profile correlations between cited semi-decades of select citing decades 
(compare Figure 26) 
 1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 
          
1700 1.00         
1720 0.93 1.00        
1740 0.91 0.94 1.00       
1760 0.87 0.91 0.96 1.00      
1780 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.68 1.00     
1800 0.85 0.93 0.95 0.81 0.53 1.00    
1820 0.89 0.85 0.90 0.81 0.45 0.90 1.00   
1840 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.83 0.53 0.85 0.77 1.00  












    
spinglass  community 1 15,465 5,443 20,908 
 74.0% 26.0%  
    
spinglass  community 2 3,311 18,062 21,373 
 15.5% 84.5%  
    
total 18,776 23,505 42,281 





Figure 1: Stylized view on the Court of King’s Bench (back left), the Court of Chancery 
(back right), and the Court of Common Pleas (right), and the surrounding life in 




                                                 
132 The source of the illustration is http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/ 
collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=3300618&partId=1 
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Figure 2: Reproduction from English Reports of the first volume of Taunton’s Court of 
Common Pleas reports: page 210; the nominate citation is 1 Taunton 210, the English 
Reports citation is 127 ER 813 
  
 209
Figure 3: Reproduction of case report 1 Taunton 210 after export from Juta Law database 
(compare with previous page); targeted case information is shaded in dark gray, targeted 
case citations and statute citations are shaded in light gray 
Finlay v Seaton 1 Taunton 210, 127 ER 813 
Report Date: 1808 
 FINLAY v SEATON. May 5, 1808. 
[Applied, Reeve v Gibson, [18911 1 Q. B. 658. Discussed, North. Metropolitan 
Tramways Company v London County Council, [1898] 2 Ch 145.] 
 Neither a certificate from the Judge, nor a suggestion on the roll, is necessary to 
entitle a Defendant to double costs, under 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 21. 
 Trespass for seizing a cable. The Defendant pleaded the general issue; and upon 
the trial proved in evidence that he had taken it as a distress for rent due from a third 
person, on whose premises it had been placed by the Plaintiff. Double costs having been 
taxed for the Defendant under the directions of the statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19 s. 21, 
Vaughan, Serjt. had obtained a rule nisi that the prothonotary might review his taxation. 
Being called upon to support his rule, he contended that to authorize the allowance of 
double costs, it was necessary, either that the Defendant should previously obtain from 
the Judge who tried the cause, a certificate that the case came within this act; or that a 
suggestion should first be entered on the record, whereby the nature of the action might 
appear. He urged, that the prothonotary could not again try the cause at the taxation of 
costs; he could only look at the roll; and upon the roll the circumstances of the cause of 
action do not appear. If a certificate was necessary, it was now too late to obtain it, [1-
Taunton-211] according to the doctrine laid down in the case of Grindley v Holloway, 1 
Doug. 308, which arose on the statute 7 Jac. 1, c. 5. He also contended, that the owner of 
the cable not being the lessee, this could not be considered as a question between landlord 
and tenant. 
 MANSFIELD C. J. This act gives the Judge no authority to certify, therefore the 
omission to apply to the Judge cannot in this case deprive the landlord of his remedy. 
There is no question but that the double costs are to be paid: the only remaining question 
then is, whether a suggestion upon the record is requisite to shew on what ground they 
are given. But it does not appear on the record that the Defendant has double costs; 
therefore it is not necessary to suggest on the recoid, that there is a cause for double costs. 
It is not necessary that the judgment should specify more than that a certain sum is 
allowed for costs, and then all will be right; and it is admitted that no precedent of such a 
suggestion is to be found. No fact was in dispute between the parties before the 
prothonotary; it was not denied that the action was brought against the landlord for a 
distress, so that the prothonotary had sufficient information for his guidance. 
 HEATH J. observed, that in cases on the small debt acts the courts have allowed a 
suggestion to be made on the record, although no suggestion is given in the acts. 
 LAWRENCE J. [Adverting to Vaughan's last argument]. This case clearly comes 
within, the act, the purpose of which is to enable landlords the better to recover their 
rents. 
 Shepherd, Serjt. contrA. 




Figure 4: Reproduction from the English Reports of two case reports with the same 
















Figure 5: Part of citation network that is a depiction of the case reports (nodes) and 
citations (links) mentioned in the ER case report 1 taunton 210 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of how cumulative cultural evolution is reflected in a citation 
network; cases (numbered nodes) build on cases of previous periods to construct new 



























Figure 7: Annual number of ER case reports for common law and equity law courts; the 
red line lowess-smoothes the data 
  
 
Figure 8: Cases in advanced stages in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, 1640-1830; 





Figure 9: Relative distribution of citations between equity law and common law; dashed 
lines represent predictions from a random citing model; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 10: Relative distribution of citations between common law’s courts of King’s 
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer; dashed lines represent predictions from a random 




Figure 11: Frequency distribution of citing dates of the 5 most cited common law cases; 




Figure 12: Frequency distribution of citations by the age of cited cases (age is the time 
difference between the date of the citing case and the date of the cited case); predictions 
from random citing model model appear as red line; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 13: Log frequency distribution of citations by the age of cited cases (age is the 
time difference between the date of the citing case and the date of the cited case); 
predictions from simple exponential model appear as red line; English case precedents 
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Figure 14: Frequency distribution of cases by number of received citations, also known as 
indegree distribution (complete on the left side, restricted enlarged on the right side); 





Figure 15: Decade average number of new citations relative to previously accumulated 
citations (weighted by citations and averaged over decades); English case precedents 
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Figure 16: Degree of long-term persistence of case rulings for two representative decades 
(1580-1589 and 1700-1709); the degree of long term-persistence is the time difference 
between the trial date of a case and its most recent citing date; actual observations on the 
left (589 cases from the 1580’s were cited at least once in the 18th and 19th centuries; 
analogously, 1353 cases from the 1700’s were cited at least once in the 18th and 19th 





Figure 17: Degree of long-term persistence of case rulings for all decades between 1580 
to 1700;  the degree of long term-persistence is the time difference between the trial date 
of a case and its most recent citing date; English case precedents 
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Figure 18: Means and standard deviations of annual age composition of common law’s 
top authorities (1700-1865); means and standard deviations are for 4 different groups: top 




Figure 19: Medians and median absolute deviations of annual age composition of 
common law’s top authorities (1700-1865); medians and median absolute deviations are 
for 4 different groups: top 1% authorities, top 5% authorities, top 10% authorities and top 
20% authorities; English case precedents 
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Figure 20: Means and standard deviations, medians and median absolute deviations of 
annual age composition model top authorities of data that was generated based on the 
random citing model (1700-1865); means and standard deviations are for 4 different 
groups: top 10 authorities, top 50 authorities, top 100 authorities and top 500 authorities; 
medians and median absolute deviations are for 4 different groups: top 1% authorities, 
top 5% authorities, top 10% authorities and top 20% authorities; English case precedents 
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Figure 21: Annual age composition of common law’s top 100 authorities in 4 different 
years; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 22: Annual temporal composition of common law’s top 100 authorities during 4 
different tri-decades (only citations occurring during the tri-decades are taken into 
consideration); English case precedents 
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Figure 24: Comparison between actual common law’s case precedent time profile of the 
year 1780 and two model predictions: one model is the random citing model, the other 
model is the representative courtroom model (on the left time profiles by cited year; on 
the right time profiles by cited semidecade); English case precedents 
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Figure 25: Time profile pairwise scatter plots between cited semi-decades of select citing 
decades; English case precedents 
 
Figure 26: Time profiles for the years 1700-1850; cited years are aggregated by semi-decade (x-axis) and citing years by decade 
(boxes); English precedents 
 
 
Figure 27: Time trajectories of cited decades; citing years are aggregated by citing semi-decades (x-axis); ; English precedents 
 228
Figure 28: Estimation of year-aggregated, standard representative court room model: 
year-dependent parameter estimates of depreciation rate and 95% confidence intervals for 
the; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 29: Estimation of year-aggregated, generalized representative court room model: 
year-dependent parameter estimates of depreciation rate and scaling parameter and 95% 
confidence intervals for the; English case precedents 
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Figure 31: Temporal composition of two communities detected with spinglass and 
Louvain algorithms; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 32: Relative temporal compositions of two communities detected with spinglass 




Figure 33: Relative temporal compositions of two, three and four communities detected 




Figure 34: Simulated (based on random citing model) temporal composition of two 
communities detected with spinglass and Louvain algorithms; English case precedents 
 
 
Figure 35: Simulated (based on random citing model) relative temporal composition of 




Figure 36: Relationship between number of words in ER case report and number of 
received citations (subset of case reports; jitter added) 
 
 




Figure 38: Annual number of ER case reports and U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions 
 
 
Figure 39: Log frequency distribution of citations by the age of cited cases (age is the 
time difference between the date of the citing case and the date of the cited case); 
predictions from simple exponential model appear as red line; the analogous English data 
appear as dashed lines for comparison; U.S. case precedents 
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Figure 40: Frequency distribution of cases by number of received citations, also known as 






Figure 41: Degree of long-term persistence of case rulings for two representative decades 
(1800-1809 and 1840-1849);  the degree of long term-persistence is the time difference 
between the trial date of a case and its most recent citing date; actual observations on the 
left (136 cases from the 1800’s were cited at least once in the 19th and 20th centuries; 
analogously, 291 cases from the 1840’s were cited at least once in the 19th and 20th 




Figure 42: Means and standard deviations of annual age composition of U.S. Supreme 
Court’s top authorities (1780-2000); means and standard deviations are for 4 different 
groups: top 10 authorities, top 50 authorities, top 100 authorities and top 500 authorities; 
U.S. case precedents 
 
 
Figure 43: Medians and median absolute deviations of annual age composition of U.S. 
Supreme Court’s top authorities (1780-2000); medians and median absolute deviations 
are for 4 different groups: top 1% authorities, top 5% authorities, top 10% authorities and 
top 20% authorities; U.S. case precedents 
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Figure 44: Annual age composition of U.S. Supreme Court’s top 100 authorities in 4 
different years; U.S. case precedents 
 
 
Figure 45: Annual temporal composition of U.S. Supreme Court’s top 100 authorities 
during 4 different tri-decades (only citations occurring during the tri-decades are taken 
into consideration); U.S. case precedents 
 
 
Figure 46: Time profiles for the years 1700-1850;  cited years are aggregated by semi-decade (x-axis) and citing years by decade 
(boxes); U.S. case precedents 
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Figure 47: Estimation of year-aggregated, standard representative court room model: 
year-dependent parameter estimates of depreciation rate and 95% confidence intervals for 





Figure 48: Temporal composition of two communities detected with spinglass and 




Figure 49: Relative temporal compositions of two communities detected with spinglass 






Figure 50: Annual number of English enacted statutes 
 
 
Figure 51: Log frequency distribution of citations by the age of cited statutes (age is the 
time difference between the date of the citing case and the date of the cited statute); 




Figure 52: Frequency distribution of statutes by number of received citations, also known 
as indegree distribution (complete on the left side, restricted enlarged on the right side); 





Figure 53: Degree of long-term persistence of statutes for two representative decades 
(1580-1589 and 1700-1709);  the degree of long term-persistence is the time difference 
between the trial date of a case and its most recent citing date; actual observations on the 
left (38 statutes from the 1580’s were cited at least once in the 18th and 19th centuries; 
analogously, 115 statutes from the 1700’s were cited at least once in the 18th and 19th 




Figure 54: Means and standard deviations of annual age composition of top statute 
authorities (1700-1865); means and standard deviations are for 4 different groups: top 10 
authorities, top 50 authorities, top 100 authorities and top 500 authorities; English statutes 
 
 
Figure 55: Medians and median absolute deviations of annual age composition of top 
statute authorities (1700-1865); medians and median absolute deviations are for 4 
different groups: top 1% authorities, top 5% authorities, top 10% authorities and top 20% 
authorities; English statutes 
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Figure 57: Annual temporal composition of top 100 statute authorities during 4 different 




Figure 58: Time profiles for the years 1700-1850; cited years are aggregated by semi-decade (x-axis) and citing years by decade 




Figure 59: Estimation of year-aggregated, standard representative court room model: 
year-dependent parameter estimates of depreciation rate and 95% confidence intervals for 












Appendix A: Python code for citation extraction 
ER search 
#### main code that creates database, applies manual corrections, calls matching 
patterns, separates combined text files, extracts case report information, calls functions 
detecting case and statute citations, and records information to database 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
 










# set start time 
time_start = time.asctime(time.localtime(time.time())) 
 
# decide if ER files need to be recopied and recorrected (datainstall = 1) 




### delete and recreate sqllite database 
# open volume attributes input file 
input_volumes = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/input/table 
volumes.csv' 
input_csv_volumes = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_volumes, 'rU')) 
 
# delete existing database 
try: 
    os.remove('/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/db/ER.sqlite') 
except: 
    pass 
 
# create new database 
ER_db = sqlite3.connect('/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/db/ER.sqlite') 
ER_db.text_factory = str 
ER_db_cursor = ER_db.cursor() 
 
ER_db_cursor.execute("""CREATE TABLE "case_attributes" 
               ("uid" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY  NOT NULL  UNIQUE, 
                "nom_cite_raw" TEXT, 
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                "nom_cite" TEXT, 
                "nom_cite_letter" TEXT, 
                "case_name" TEXT, 
                "ER_cite" TEXT, "date" INTEGER, "num_words" INTEGER, 
                "case_text" TEXT)""") 
 
ER_db_cursor.execute("""CREATE TABLE "statute_citations" 
                    ("uid" INTEGER NOT NULL, 
                     "stat_cite_year" INTEGER NOT NULL, 
                     "stat_cite_regnalyear" TEXT NOT NULL, 
                     "stat_cite_context" TEXT NOT NULL, 
                     "stat_cite_chapter" TEXT, 
                     "stat_cite_name" TEXT)""") 
 
ER_db_cursor.execute("""CREATE TABLE "case_citations" 
                    ("uid" INTEGER NOT NULL, 
                     "case_cite" TEXT NOT NULL, 
                     "case_context" TEXT NOT NULL)""") 
 
ER_db_cursor.execute("""CREATE TABLE "volume_attributes" 
                    ("RID"  INTEGER PRIMARY KEY  NOT NULL  UNIQUE, 
                     "rep_vol" TEXT NOT NULL  UNIQUE, "rep_vol_num" INTEGER, 
                     "rep" TEXT, "court" TEXT NOT NULL , "ER_vol" INTEGER, 
                     "vol_year_start" INTEGER, "vol_year_end" INTEGER, 
                     "vol_page_start" INTEGER, "vol_page_end" INTEGER, 




for v in input_csv_volumes: 
    ER_db_cursor.execute("""INSERT INTO volume_attributes 
    (RID, rep_vol, rep_vol_num, rep, court, ER_vol, vol_year_start, 
     vol_year_end, vol_page_start, vol_page_end, law_french) 
    VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""", 
    [v[0], v[1], v[2], v[3], v[4], v[5], v[6], 






### copy and correct ER text files 
if datainstall == 1: 
 
    # copy ER text files to target directory 
    from shutil import copytree, ignore_patterns 
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    source = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/ER' 
    destination = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/ER' 
    copytree(source, destination, ignore=ignore_patterns('*.pdf','*.xlsx')) 
 
    # apply desired data corrections to ER text files 
    input_ER_corrections = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/input/ER 
corrections.csv' 
    input_ER_corrections = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_ER_corrections, 'rU')) 
 
    # apply corrections to the different input files 
    vol = 0 
    for c in input_ER_corrections: 
 
        if int(c[0]) == 1: 
            instr = '%s' % c[4] 
            exec instr 
            text = textin.read() 
 
            outstr =  '%s' % c[5] 
            exec outstr 
 
 
        if int(c[0]) != vol and int(c[0]) != 1: 
            textout.write(text) 
            textout.close() 
            outstr =  '%s' % c[5] 
            exec outstr 
             
            textin.close() 
            instr = '%s' % c[4] 
            exec instr 
            text = textin.read() 
         
        print c[6] 
        substr = '%s' % c[6] 
        exec substr 
 
        vol = int(c[0]) 
 
    textout.write(text) 
    textout.close() 
 
 
                         
### prepare matching patterns 
#create pattern for nominative and explicit statute citations 
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rulers_pattern, rul_pattern, dict_rulers = search_statutes.create_statute_cite_pattern() 
dict_rulers_years = search_statutes.create_dict_rulers_years() 
statutenames_pattern, dict_statutenames_years = 
search_statutes.create_statute_name_pattern() 
 
# create pattern for nominative case citations 
cases_nomcit_pattern, cas_nomcit_pattern, dict_cases_nomcit, cases_nomcit = 
search_cases.create_case_nomcit_pattern() 
 
# create regular expression pattern to extract nominative citations from Juta citations 
rep_volumes_pattern =  '[\s\.\(\),;]' + cas_nomcit_pattern + '\.{0,1}\s([0-
9]{1,4})\s{0,1}[a-zA-Z]{0,1}\Z' 
 
# create regular expression pattern to split Juta case reports and extract information from 
Juta header 
reader = csv.reader(open('/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/input/dict 
cases nomcit.csv', 'rU')) 
jutanames = [] 
for row in reader: 
    jutaname = re.sub('\.','\.', row[0]) 
    jutanames.append(jutaname) 
jutanames.sort(key = len, reverse = True) 
     
juta_pattern = '(?:' + '|'.join(cases_nomcit) + ')' 
juta_pattern = "(\n.+? " + juta_pattern + " [0-9]{1,4}\s{0,1}[a-zA-Z]{0,1}, [0-9]{1,3} ER 
[0-9]{1,4}\n)" 
juta_pattern2 = '(' + '|'.join(cases_nomcit) + ')' 
juta_pattern2 = "\n(.+?) " + juta_pattern2 + " ([0-9]{1,4})\s{0,1}([a-zA-Z]{0,1}), ([0-




### define function that cuts reporter volumes into case chunks, extracts case specific 
information, and calls statute/case search modules 
# initialize unique case identifier and errror uid 
uid = 1 
 
# define main function 
def rep_volume_search(rep_volume): 
 
    print rep_volume 
    # set global scope of uid 
    global uid 
 
    # open reporter volume text file 
    text = open(rep_volume, 'r') 
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    text = text.read() 
 
    # split reporter volume into separate cases  
    chunks = re.split(juta_pattern, text) 
 
    # recombine case header and case text 
    casenames = chunks[1::2] 
    casetexts = chunks[2::2] 
    chunksnew = [] 
    for zname, ztext in zip(casenames, casetexts): 
        chunksnew.append('%s @@@ %s' % (zname,ztext)) 
 
    # extract case-specific information (nominative citation, ER citation, report date) 
    # from each case chunk 
    for c in chunksnew: 
 
        # print unique case identifier 
        print '\nuid: ', uid 
 
        # find juta citation that identifies beginning of case 
        try: 
            juta_path = re.search(juta_pattern2, c, re.IGNORECASE) 
            juta_cite = juta_path.group(0) 
            print juta_cite 
        except: 
            print '\nError: Could not extract Juta citation.' 
            print c[0:250], '\n' 
 
 
        ## extract case attributes from Juta header and text chunk 
        if juta_path: 
             
            # extract and standardize nominative citation from juta header 
            nom_cite_raw = juta_path.group(2) + ' ' + juta_path.group(3) 
            print nom_cite_raw 
            nom_cite_vol = juta_path.group(2) 
            nom_cite_vol = re.sub('\.', ' ', nom_cite_vol) 
            nom_cite_vol = ''.join(nom_cite_vol.split()) 
            nom_cite_vol = nom_cite_vol.lower() 
            nom_cite_vol = dict_cases_nomcit[nom_cite_vol] 
            nom_cite_page = juta_path.group(3) 
            nom_cite_page = int(nom_cite_page) 
            nom_cite = "%s %s" % (nom_cite_vol, nom_cite_page) 
            print nom_cite 
 
            # extract possible nominative citation letter from juta header 
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            try: 
                nom_cite_letter = juta_path.group(4) 
            except: 
                pass 
 
            # extract case name from juta header 
            case_name = juta_path.group(1) 
            print case_name 
 
            # extract ER citation from juta header 
            ER_cite = juta_path.group(5) 
            print ER_cite 
             
            # extract report date from chunk 
            try:         
                date = re.search('Report Date: ([0-9]{4})', c) 
                date = date.group(1) 
                print 'Report date: %s' % date 
            except: 
                print 'Error: Could not extract report date.' 
                print c[0:500], '\n' 
 
            # count number of words in text chunk 
            num_words = len(c.split()) 
 
 
            ## extract nominative case citations from text chunk  




            ## extract nominative statute citations from text chunk 
            statutenomcites_years, statutenomcites_regnalyears, statutenomcites_contexts, 
statutenomcites_chapters, statutenomcites_names  = 
search_statutes.search_statute_cites(c) 
 
            # extract explicit statute citations from text chunk 
            statutenames_years, statutenames_regnalyears, statutenames_contexts, 
statutenames_chapters, statutenames_names  = search_statutes.search_statutenames(c) 
 
            # combine nominative and explicit statute citations 
            statute_years = statutenomcites_years + statutenames_years 
            statute_regnalyears = statutenomcites_regnalyears + statutenames_regnalyears 
            statute_contexts = statutenomcites_contexts + statutenames_contexts 
            statute_chapters = statutenomcites_chapters + statutenames_chapters 





            ## write case attibutes to database 
            ER_db_cursor.execute("""INSERT INTO case_attributes 
                (uid, nom_cite_raw, nom_cite, nom_cite_letter, ER_cite, case_name, 
                date, num_words, case_text) 
                VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""", 
                [uid,nom_cite_raw, nom_cite, nom_cite_letter, 
                 ER_cite, case_name, date, num_words, 
                 c]) 
 
 
            for st, strgy, sttxt, stcha, stnam  in zip(statute_years, statute_regnalyears, 
statute_contexts, statute_chapters, statute_names): 
                ER_db_cursor.execute("""INSERT INTO statute_citations 
                                    (uid, stat_cite_year,  stat_cite_regnalyear, stat_cite_context, 
stat_cite_chapter, stat_cite_name) 
                                    VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""", 
                                    [uid, st, strgy, sttxt, stcha, stnam]) 
 
                 
            for ca, catxt in zip(case_nomcites, case_nomcites_contexts): 
                ER_db_cursor.execute("""INSERT INTO case_citations 
                                    (uid, case_cite ,case_context) 
                                    VALUES(?, ?, ?)""", 
                                    [uid, ca, catxt]) 
 
            # write to database 
            ER_db.commit() 
 
            # update unique case identifier and temporary nominative citation identifier 




### run code on all file in target directory 
tree = os.walk('/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/ER') 
for dirs in tree: 
    for filename in dirs[2]: 
        if filename[-4:] == '.txt': 
            rep_volume = dirs[0] + '/' + filename 
            rep_volume_search(rep_volume)    
 





# display end time 





#### search_cases function that detects and extracts case citations 
# import required libraries 





# define input files 




# create search pattern for nominative case citation search 
# create dictionary for correspondence between possible ruler abbreviations and standard 
def create_case_nomcit_pattern(): 
    # create needed empty lists and dictionaries 
    global cases_nomcit_pattern 
    global dict_cases_nomcit 
    cases_nomcit = [] 
    dict_cases_nomcit = {} 
 
    
    # import all abbreviations of nominative reports 
    reader = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_cases_nomcit, 'rU')) 
    for row in reader: 
        for i in range(len(row)): 
            if row[i] != '': 
                # create dictionary of case abbreviations 
                dict_abb = re.sub('\.',' ', row[i])                                  # replace dots with 
whitespace 
                dict_abb = ''.join(dict_abb.split())                              # remove all whitespaces 
                dict_abb = dict_abb.lower()                                       # lowercase dict entries 
                dict_cases_nomcit['%s' % dict_abb] = row[0].lower() 
 
                # create basic search pattern components 
                rep_abb = re.sub('\.','\.{0,1}\s{0,1}', row[i])                 # allow missing/existing 
dot with or without space 
                rep_abb = re.sub('\(','\(\s{0,1}', rep_abb)                     # allow empty space 
behind opening bracket 
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                rep_abb = re.sub('\)','\s{0,1}\)', rep_abb)                     # allow empty space 
before closing bracket 
                cases_nomcit.append(rep_abb) 
 
                 
    # check for double entries in list with nominative citations 
    cases_nomcit.sort() 
    for i, c_n in enumerate(cases_nomcit): 
        if c_n == cases_nomcit[i-1]: 
            print 'Warning: duplicate enptry in case dictionary: ', c_n 
 
             
    # create search pattern for nominative case citations 
    cases_nomcit.sort(key = len, reverse = True) 
    cas_nomcit_pattern = '(' + '|'.join(cases_nomcit) + ')' 
    cases_nomcit_pattern = '[\s\.\-\(\)\[\],;]\s{0,1}' + cas_nomcit_pattern + 
'\.{0,1}\s{0,1}([0-9]{1,4})' 
 
    return cases_nomcit_pattern, cas_nomcit_pattern, dict_cases_nomcit, cases_nomcit 
 
 
# define function that searches string for pattern of nominative case citations 
def search_case_cites(string,rep_vol): 
    # remove white space occuring more than 1 times in a row 
    string = ' '.join(string.split()) 
     
    case_nomcites = [] 
    case_nomcites_contexts =[] 
    #determine and write number of total words and pattern matches    
    found_patterns = re.finditer(cases_nomcit_pattern, string) 
     
    # extract and clean various contexts of matched patterns 
    for pat in found_patterns: 
 
        # clean found pattern & translate into standard format 
        case_nomcite_vol = re.sub('\.', ' ', pat.group(1)) 
        case_nomcite_vol = ''.join(case_nomcite_vol.split()) 
        case_nomcite_vol = case_nomcite_vol.lower() 
        case_nomcite_vol = dict_cases_nomcit[case_nomcite_vol] 
        case_nomcite_page = pat.group(2) 
        case_nomcite_page = int(case_nomcite_page) 
        case_nomcite = "%s %s" % (case_nomcite_vol, case_nomcite_page) 
        if case_nomcite_vol != rep_vol:                 # make sure that case references 
artificially generated by the Juta Law website are not included 
            case_nomcite_context = string[pat.start() - 50 : pat.end() + 50] 
            print case_nomcite_vol, case_nomcite_page, ': ', case_nomcite_context 
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            case_nomcites.append(case_nomcite) 
            case_nomcites_contexts.append(case_nomcite_context) 
 
    return case_nomcites, case_nomcites_contexts 
 
search statutes 
#### search_statute function that detects and extracts statute citations 
# import required libraries 




# define input files 
input_rulers = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/input/dict rulers.csv' 
input_statutes = '/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/Python/input/stat names & 
years.csv' 








### create search pattern for nominative statute citation search 
# create dictionary for correspondence between possible ruler abbreviations and standard 
def create_statute_cite_pattern(): 
    # create needed empty lists and dictionaries 
    global rul_pattern 
    global rulers_pattern 
    global dict_rulers 
    rulers = [] 
    rulers_short = [] 
    dict_rulers = {} 
    
    # import abbreviations of rulers as list, create a dictonary of equivalent 
    # ruler abbreviations 
    reader = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_rulers, 'rU')) 
    for row in reader: 
        for i in range(len(row)): 
            if row[i] != '': 
                dict_rulers['%s' % row[i]] = row[0] 
                rul_abb = re.sub('\.','\\.', row[i]) 
                rulers.append(rul_abb) 
        # create and append short forms of rulers like edw. 1 (= edw.), geo. 1 (= geo.), etc. 
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        # and append at the end of ruler list to set priority in regular expression search 
        ruler_short = re.search('\. [1]\Z', row[0]) 
        if ruler_short: 
            ruler_short = row[0][ : ruler_short.start()] 
            dict_rulers['%s' % ruler_short] = row[0] 
            rulers_short.append(ruler_short) 
    rulers.extend(rulers_short) 
 
    # create search pattern for rulers 
    rul_pattern = '|'.join(rulers) 
    rulers_pattern = '[\s\.\-\(\)\[\],;]\s{0,1}(([0-9]{1,2})(th(\sof){0,1}){0,1}\s' + '(' + 
rul_pattern + ')' + '[\s\.\(\)\[\],;])'  




### create dictionary for correspondance between regnal years and calendar years 
def create_dict_rulers_years(): 
    global dict_rulers_years 
    dict_rulers_years = {} 
    reader = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_regnalyears, 'rU')) 
    for row in reader: 
        row_temp = row[0] + ' ' + row[1]  
        dict_rulers_years[' '.join(row_temp.split())] = int(row[2]) 




### create dictionary with maximum regnal year of rulers 
def create_dict_rulers_years_max(): 
    global dict_rulers_years_max 
    dict_rulers_years_max = {} 
    reader = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_regnalyears, 'rU')) 
    ruler_temp = '' 
    year_temp = '' 
    for row in reader: 
        if ruler_temp != row[1] and ruler_temp != '': 
            dict_rulers_years_max[ruler_temp] = int(year_temp) 
        ruler_temp = row[1] 
        year_temp = row[0] 
    dict_rulers_years_max[ruler_temp] = int(year_temp) 






### define function that searches string for nominative statute citations and checks their 
validity   
def search_statute_cites(string): 
    statutecites_years = [] 
    statutecites_regnalyears = [] 
    statutecites_contexts = [] 
    statutecites_chapters = [] 
    statutecites_names = [] 
     
    # regular expression search for nominative statute citations   
    found_patterns = re.finditer(rulers_pattern, string, re.IGNORECASE) 
     
    # extract and clean various contexts of matched patterns 
    for pat in found_patterns: 
        context1 = string[pat.start() - 20 : pat.end() + 20] 
        context1 = ' '.join(context1.split()) 
        context2 = string[pat.start() - 15 : pat.end()] 
        context2 = ' '.join(context2.split()) 
        context3 = string[pat.start() : pat.end() + 15] 
        context3 = ' '.join(context3.split()) 
         
        # rules to check if found pattern corresponds to statute 
        #1: classified as statute 
        #0: classified as non-statute 
 
        # set initial classification 
        statute_found = 0 
         
        # check if variants of statute appear closeby    
        if re.search('\s(statute|statutes|stat\.)\s', context1, re.IGNORECASE): 
            statute_found = 1 
 
        # check if the words Act or Acts appear closeby 
        if re.search('\s(Act)s{0,1}\s', context1): 
            statute_found = 1 
 
        # check if variants of court session references appear shortly before 
        if 
re.search('(Mich|Michaelis|Michaelmas|Pasch|Paschie|Easter|East|Trin|Trinity|Hil|Hill|Hil
larii|Term)[\.\,]{0,1}\s', context2, re.IGNORECASE): 
            statute_found = 0 
 
        # check if variants of chap. or sect. appear closely behind 
        if re.search('\s(c|ch|cap|chap}s|sec|sect)\.\s[0-9]{1,3}', context3, re.IGNORECASE): 
            statute_found = 1 
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        if statute_found == 1: 
            output_text_statutes.write('\n--------------------------------\n') 
            output_text_statutes.write('%s %s \n' % (pat.group(2), pat.group(5))) 
            output_text_statutes.write('%s \n \n' % context1) 
            #print pat.group(0), ": ", context4 
 
            ruler = pat.group(5) 
            ruler = dict_rulers[ruler.lower()] 
            regnal_year = pat.group(2) 
            regnal_year_context = string[pat.start() - 30 : pat.end() + 30] 
            print regnal_year, ruler, ": ", regnal_year_context 
             
            statutecites_regnalyears.append(' '.join([regnal_year, ruler])) 
            statutecites_contexts.append(regnal_year_context) 
 
            try: 
                year = int(dict_rulers_years[' '.join([regnal_year, ruler])]) 
                output_text_statutes.write('Dictionary translation of ruler: %s \n' % ruler) 
                output_text_statutes.write('Dictionary translation to year: %s \n' % year) 
            except: 
                year = 0 
                output_text_statutes.write('Error: regnal year cannot be translated into calendar 
year \n') 
                print 'Error: regnal year cannot be translated into calendar year' 
                print ' '.join([regnal_year, ruler]) 
 
            statutecites_years.append(year) 
 
 
            try: 
                chapter = re.search('[\s\.\-\(\)\[\],;]\s{0,1}(c|ch|cap|chap)\.\,{0,1}\s([0-9]{1,3})', 
context3, re.IGNORECASE) 
                chapter = chapter.group(2) 
            except: 
                chapter = '' 
 
            statutecites_chapters.append(chapter) 
 
            statutecites_names.append('') 
 





### import names of specific statues as list, create a dictionary of statutes names 
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# and corresponding year of origin 
def create_statute_name_pattern(): 
    reader = csv.reader(open('%s' % input_statutes, 'rU')) 
    global statutenames_pattern 
    global dict_statutenames_years 
    statutenames = [] 
    dict_statutenames_years = {} 
    for row in reader: 
        dict_statutenames_years[row[0]] = row[1] 
        stat_name = re.sub('\.','\\.', row[0]) 
        statutenames.append(stat_name) 
 
    # create search pattern for statutes 
    statutenames_pattern = '|'.join(statutenames) 
    statutenames_pattern = '((?:statute|statutes|stat\.)(?:\sof|\sde){0,1}\s(' + 
statutenames_pattern + '))|((' + statutenames_pattern + ')(?:\sAct\s' +'))|(' + 'Magna 
Carta|Magna Charta|Bill of Rights|Act of Settlement)' 
    #statutenames_pattern = '(statute|statutes|stat\.)(\sof|\sde){0,1}\s{1,3}' + '(' + 
statutenames_pattern + ')' 
 





# define function that searches string for pre-defined statute names 
def search_statutenames(string):         
    statutenames_years = [] 
    statutenames_regnalyears = [] 
    statutenames_contexts = [] 
    statutenames_chapters = [] 
    statutenames_names = [] 
 
    #define dictionary with equivalent statute names 
    statute_name_dict = {'articulis cleri': 'articuli cleri', 'articulis super chartas': 'articuli 
super chartas', 'charta forresta': 'charta forrest', 
                                     'circumspecte agatis': 'circumspect agatis','circumspectee agatis': 
'circumspect agatis', 
                                     'conjunctim feoffatis': 'conjunctim feoffat','de donia': 'do nis' , 
'distribution': 'distributions', 'glocester': 'gloucester', 
                                     'jeofail': 'jeofails', 'limitation': 'limitations', 'magna carta': 'magna 
charta', 'magna chara': 'magna charta', 
                                     'magna chart': 'magna charta', 'marlberge': 'marlbridge', 'modus 
levandi':  'modus levandi fines', 
                                     'scandalum magnatum':  'scandalis magnatum', 'scandalo 
magnatum': 'scandalis magnatum', 'scan. mag.': 'scandalis magnatum', 
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                                     'westminst.':  'westminster', 'westmin.':  'westminster', 'westm.':  
'westminster'} 
     
    #determine and write number of total words and pattern matches    
    found_patterns = re.finditer(statutenames_pattern, string, re.IGNORECASE) 
     
    # extract and matched statute names 
    for pat in found_patterns: 
 
        if pat.group(2): 
            statute_name = pat.group(2) 
        if pat.group(4): 
            statute_name = pat.group(4) 
        if pat.group(5): 
            statute_name = pat.group(5) 
 
        statute_name = statute_name.lower() 
        try: 
            statute_name = statute_name_dict[statute_name] 
        except: 
            pass 
 
        statute_name_context = string[pat.start() - 30 : pat.end() + 30] 
        print "%s: %s" % (statute_name, statute_name_context) 
     
        try: 
            year = int(dict_statutenames_years[statute_name]) 
 
        except: 
            year = 0 
 
        statutenames_years.append(year) 
        statutenames_regnalyears.append('') 
        statutenames_contexts.append(statute_name_context) 
        statutenames_chapters.append('') 
        statutenames_names.append(statute_name) 
 






Appendix B: Stata code for data cleaning 
1_prepare case information & volume attributes 
clear 
set mem 200m 
set more off 





*** prepare datesets 
** case_attributes 
* extract reporter volume, page number, and ER volume 
insheet using "$path/_db input/case_attributes.csv" 
 
** generate or regenerate variables 
ren nom_cite nomcite 
ren nom_cite_letter nomcite_letter 
ren case_name casename 
ren er_cite ercite 
 
* regenerate nominative citation volume 
gen nomcite_vol = trim(regexs(1)) if regexm(nomcite,"(.*)( [0-9]+)$") 
 
* generate nominative citation page 
gen nomcite_page = trim(regexs(2)) if regexm(nomcite,"(.*)( [0-9]+)$") 
destring nomcite_page, replace 
 
* extract first party name from case name 
gen casename_firstparty = trim(regexs(1)) if regexm(casename,"([a-zA-Z']+)( v )([a-zA-
Z]+)") 
replace casename_firstparty = "Rex" if casename_firstparty == "R" 
replace casename_firstparty = "" if length(casename_firstparty) < 3 
 
* extract second party name from case name 
gen casename_secondparty = trim(regexs(3)) if regexm(casename,"([a-zA-Z']+)( v )([a-
zA-Z]+)") 
replace casename_secondparty = "" if length(casename_secondparty) < 3 
 
* make sure both party names are present 
replace casename_firstparty = "" if casename_secondparty == "" 
replace casename_secondparty = "" if casename_firstparty == "" 
 
* extract party name if there is only one party mentioned, and use as first party name 
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*gen casename_onepartyonly1 = trim(regexs(2)) if regexm(casename,"(In re |in re |Ex 
parte |ex parte )([a-zA-Z']+)") 
*gen casename_onepartyonly2 = trim(regexs(1)) if regexm(casename,"([a-zA-Z']+)( case| 
Case)") 
*replace casename_onepartyonly2 = subinstr(casename_onepartyonly2, "'s", "", .) 
*replace casename_onepartyonly2 = subinstr(casename_onepartyonly2, "s'", "s", .) 
*gen casename_onepartyonly = casename_onepartyonly1 
*replace casename_onepartyonly = casename_onepartyonly2 if casename_onepartyonly1 
== "" 
*replace casename_firstparty = casename_onepartyonly if casename_firstparty == "" 
*drop casename_onepartyonly* 
 
* generate ER volume 
gen ercite_vol = trim(regexs(1)) if regexm(ercite,"([0-9]+)( ER)") 
destring ercite_vol, replace 
 
* save file with informaton on all case reports 




*** combine case reports with identical nominative citations 
* keep only relevant variables 
keep uid nomcite nomcite_letter nomcite_vol nomcite_page casename 
casename_firstparty casename_secondparty ercite ercite_vol date num_words 
order uid nomcite nomcite_letter nomcite_vol nomcite_page casename 
casename_firstparty casename_secondparty ercite ercite_vol date num_words 
 
** generate attributes of combined case reports 
* uid (first/lowest uid in group) 
bysort nomcite (uid): egen UID = min(uid) 
 
preserve 
keep uid UID 
save "$path/uid-UID.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* nominative citation (first in group) 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen NOMCITE = nomcite[1] 
bysort nomcite_vol (uid): gen NOMCITE_VOL = nomcite_vol[1] 
bysort nomcite_page (uid): gen NOMCITE_PAGE = nomcite_page[1] 
 
* date (most frequent or first date in group) 
gsort nomcite -uid 
gen DATEFIRST_temp = date 
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by nomcite: replace DATEFIRST_temp = DATEFIRST_temp[_n-1] if 
DATEFIRST_temp >= . 
by nomcite: gen DATEFIRST = DATEFIRST_temp[_N]  
sort uid 
 
bysort nomcite: egen DATEMODE = mode(date) 
 
gen DATE = DATEFIRST 
bysort nomcite: replace DATE = DATEMODE if DATEMODE != . 
 
drop DATEFIRST_temp DATEFIRST DATEMODE 
 
* word count (sum of all words in group) 
bysort nomcite: egen WORDS = total(num_words) 
 
* ER citation (first in group) 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen ERCITE = ercite[1] 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen ERCITE_VOL = ercite_vol[1] 
 
* casename (first in group) 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen CASENAME = casename[1] 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen CASENAME_FIRSTPARTY = casename_firstparty[1] 
bysort nomcite (uid): gen CASENAME_SECONDPARTY = casename_secondparty[1] 
 
* drop reduandant observations from combined cases 
collapse (count) NOMCITE_NUM=uid, by(UID NOMCITE NOMCITE_VOL 
NOMCITE_PAGE DATE WORDS ERCITE ERCITE_VOL CASENAME 
CASENAME_FIRSTPARTY CASENAME_SECONDPARTY) 
order UID NOMCITE NOMCITE_VOL NOMCITE_PAGE NOMCITE_NUM DATE 
WORDS ERCITE ERCITE_VOL CASENAME CASENAME_FIRSTPARTY 
CASENAME_SECONDPARTY 
label var NOMCITE_NUM "" 
 
ren UID uid 
ren NOMCITE nomcite 
ren NOMCITE_VOL nomcite_vol 
ren NOMCITE_PAGE nomcite_page 
ren NOMCITE_NUM nomcite_num 
ren DATE date 
ren WORDS num_words 
ren ERCITE ercite 
ren ERCITE_VOL ercite_vol 
ren CASENAME casename 
ren CASENAME_FIRSTPARTY casename_firstparty 






*** add inferred dates 
** add manually inferred dates 
ren date date_juta 
gen date = date_juta 
merge m:1 nomcite using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/2_cleaning/_dates 
added/datesadded.dta", update 




** fill in isolated dates based on neighboring cases 
* calculate missing dates indicators 
preserve 
gen datemissing = 0 
replace datemissing = 100 if date == . 
 
bysort nomcite_vol: egen datemin = min(date) 
by nomcite_vol: egen datemax = max(date) 
gen daterange = datemax - datemin 
 
gen dateincreasing = . 
by nomcite_vol: replace dateincreasing = 100 if (date[_n-1] <= date[_n] | _n == 1) & 
date[_n] != . 
replace dateincreasing = 0 if dateincreasing == . & date != . 
 
collapse (count) uid (mean) datemissing (mean) dateincreasing (mean) daterange, 
by(nomcite_vol) 
keep nomcite_vol datemissing daterange dateincreasing 






* merge missing dates indicators 
merge m:1 nomcite_vol using "$path/_temp/datesmissing.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
* replace date with previous date if certain criteria are met 
replace date = date[_n-1] if date[_n] ==. & /// 
        (nomcite_vol[_n] == 
nomcite_vol[_n-1]) & /// 
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        (datemissing <= 10) & 
(dateincreasing >= 70) & (daterange <= 30)       
 (daterange <= 20) 
*/ 
          
 
** count cases, and save file 
* create variable with annual number of case reports 
bysort date: egen numcasesyear = count(uid) 
egen decade = cut(date), at(1500(10)1870) 
bysort decade: egen numcasesdecade = count(uid) 
 
* sort and save modified case attributes 
sort nomcite_vol nomcite_page 
order uid nomcite nomcite_vol nomcite_page nomcite_num ercite ercite_vol casename 
casename_firstparty casename_secondparty date decade numcasesyear numcasesdecade 
num_words 





insheet using "$path/_db input/volume_attributes.csv" 
drop rid rep_vol_num er_vol 
ren rep nomcite_rep 
ren rep nomcite_vol 
ren vol_year_start nomcite_volyearstart 
ren vol_year_end nomcite_volyearend 
ren vol_page_start nomcite_pagestart 
ren vol_page_end nomcite_pageend 
ren law_french nomcite_repvollawfrench 
order nomcite_vol nomcite_rep court nomcite_volyearstart nomcite_volyearend 
nomcite_pagestart nomcite_pageend nomcite_repvollawfrench 
 
save "volume_attributes.dta", replace 
 
2_merge cases data  
clear 
set mem 600m 
set more off 









*** merge case citations with case and volume attributes 
clear 
insheet using "$path/_db input/case_citations.csv" 
 
*** extract information on cited case 
ren case_cite nomcite 
ren case_context citecontext 
 
* generate volume and page number of cited case 
gen nomcite_rep = regexs(2) if regexm(nomcite,"([0-9]?)([a-zA-Z' ]+) ([0-9]+)$") 
gen nomcite_vol = regexs(1) if regexm(nomcite,"(.*) ([0-9]+)$") 
gen nomcite_page = regexs(2) if regexm(nomcite,"(.*) ([0-9]+)$") 
destring nomcite_page, replace 
 
* drop erroneous case citations that were extracted from case header 
drop if citecontext == "" 
 
* drop erroneous case citations that result from volumes with common names 
gen temp1 = "(re |v\.? )" 
gen temp2 = proper(nomcite_rep) 
egen temp3 = concat(temp1 temp2) 
gen mismatch = regexm(citecontext,temp3) 
drop if mismatch == 1 
drop nomcite_rep temp1 temp2 temp3 mismatch 
 
* correct volume assignments based on page numbers (dyer, plowden, salkeld, lord 
raymond,strange, blackstone, burrow, cowper, douglas, lutwyche) 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 dyer" if nomcite_vol == "dyer" & inrange(nomcite_page,1,106) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 dyer" if nomcite_vol == "dyer" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,107,252) 
replace nomcite_vol = "3 dyer" if nomcite_vol == "dyer" & nomcite_page > 252 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 plowden" if nomcite_vol == "plowden" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,401) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 plowden" if nomcite_vol == "plowden" & nomcite_page > 401 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 salkeld" if nomcite_vol == "salk" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,410) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 salkeld" if nomcite_vol == "salk" & nomcite_page > 410 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 lord raymond" if nomcite_vol == "ld.raym" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,750) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 lord raymond" if nomcite_vol == "ld.raym" & nomcite_page > 
750 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 strange" if nomcite_vol == "str" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,676) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 strange" if nomcite_vol == "str" & nomcite_page > 676 
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replace nomcite_vol = "1 blackstone w" if nomcite_vol == "blackstone w" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,681) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 blackstone w" if nomcite_vol == "blackstone w" & 
nomcite_page > 681 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 burrow" if nomcite_vol == "burrow" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,652) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 burrow" if nomcite_vol == "burrow" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,653,1234) 
replace nomcite_vol = "3 burrow" if nomcite_vol == "burrow" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1235,1924) 
replace nomcite_vol = "4 burrow" if nomcite_vol == "burrow" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1925,2584) 
replace nomcite_vol = "5 burrow" if nomcite_vol == "burrow" & nomcite_page > 2584 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 cowper" if nomcite_vol == "cowper" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,419) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 cowper" if nomcite_vol == "cowper" & nomcite_page > 419 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 douglas" if nomcite_vol == "douglas" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,411) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 douglas" if nomcite_vol == "douglas" & nomcite_page > 411 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 lutwyche" if nomcite_vol == "lutwyche" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,912) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 lutwyche" if nomcite_vol == "lutwyche" & nomcite_page > 
912 
replace nomcite_vol = "1 anstruther" if nomcite_vol == "anstruther" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,1,342) 
replace nomcite_vol = "2 anstruther" if nomcite_vol == "anstruther" & 
inrange(nomcite_page,343,626) 
replace nomcite_vol = "3 anstruther" if nomcite_vol == "anstruther" & nomcite_page > 
626 
 
* cut off strings behind case citation 
gen citecontext2 = substr(citecontext,1,length(citecontext)-50) 
 
* extract first party name from case name and delete party names that are too short, 
artifical or non-capitalized 
gen casename_firstparty = trim(regexs(2)) if regexm(citecontext2,"([a-zA-Z']+ v [a-zA-
Z]+.* )*([a-zA-Z']+) (v |v\.|v\. )([a-zA-Z]+)") 
 
gen casename_firstpartylen = length(casename_firstparty) 
replace casename_firstparty = "" if casename_firstpartylen < 3 
 
replace casename_firstparty = "" if inlist(casename_firstparty, "The", "Sir", "Non", "All") 
 
gen casename_firstpartywrong = 1 if regexm(casename_firstparty,"^[a-z]") 





* extract second party name from case name and delete party names that are too short, 
artifical or non-capitalized 
gen casename_secondparty = trim(regexs(4)) if regexm(citecontext2,"([a-zA-Z']+ v [a-
zA-Z]+.* )*([a-zA-Z']+) (v |v\.|v\. )([a-zA-Z]+)") 
 
gen casename_secondpartylen = length(casename_secondparty) 
replace casename_secondparty = "" if casename_secondpartylen < 3 
 
replace casename_secondparty = "" if inlist(casename_secondparty, "The", "Sir", "Non", 
"All") 
 
gen casename_secondpartywrong = 1 if regexm(casename_secondparty,"^[a-z]") 
replace casename_secondparty = "" if casename_secondpartywrong == 1 
 
* drop variables detecting extraction errors 




* drop shortened case context 
drop citecontext2 
 
* save citing information and added case cite information 




*** match nominative citations to case attributes in dataset 
** save case citations without explicit case parties 
preserve 
keep if casename_firstparty == "" 
save "$path/_temp/case_citations_caseciteready_nocaseparty.dta", replace 
restore 
 
** match case citations based on explicite case parties 
cd "$path/_temp/casecite matches" 
!rm * 
 
keep if casename_firstparty != "" 
gen nomcite_matching = . 
gen uid_temp = _n 
 
qui levelsof nomcite_vol, local(nomcite_vols) 
foreach n of local nomcite_vols { 




 * keep only case_attributes of reporter volume to be matched, remove duplicates 
 preserve 
 use "$path/case_attributes.dta", clear 
 keep if nomcite_vol ==  "`n'" 
 ren uid uid_partymatched 
 ren nomcite_page nomcite_pagematched 
 gsort nomcite_pagematched casename_firstparty casename_secondparty -
num_words 
 duplicates drop nomcite_pagematched casename_firstparty 
casename_secondparty, force 
 keep uid_partymatched nomcite_pagematched casename_firstparty 
casename_secondparty 
 save "$path/_temp/case_attributes_temp.dta", replace 
 restore 
 
 * keep only case cites of reporter volume to be matched, match case cites, remove 
duplicates 
 preserve 
 keep if nomcite_vol == "`n'" 
 reclink casename_firstparty casename_secondparty using 
"$path/_temp/case_attributes_temp.dta", gen(mscore) idm(uid_temp) 
idu(uid_partymatched) wmatch(1 1) wnomatch(1 1) minscore(0.6) minbigram(0.6)  
 duplicates drop uid_temp, force 
 gen nomcite_partymatched = nomcite_vol + " " + string(nomcite_pagematched) if 
_merge == 3 
 replace nomcite_matching = 1 if _merge == 3 
 drop uid_temp nomcite_pagematched Ucasename_firstparty 
Ucasename_secondparty mscore _merge 





set obs 1 
gen nomcite = "xxx" 
foreach n of local nomcite_vols { 
 append using "$path/_temp/casecite matches/`n'.dta" 
} 
drop if _n == 1 
 
* append case citations without explicite case parties 
append using "$path/_temp/case_citations_caseciteready_nocaseparty.dta" 






*** match case citations with exactly corresponding nominative citations (in case 
attributes) 
* prepare reduced case attributes 
preserve 
use "$path/case_attributes_combined.dta", clear 
ren uid uid_pagematched 
keep uid_pagematched nomcite 
save "$path/_temp/case_attributes_combinedtemp.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* exact nomcite merge with case attributes 
sort nomcite_vol nomcite_page 
merge m:1 nomcite using "$path/_temp/case_attributes_combinedtemp.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
gen nomcite_pagematched = nomcite if _merge == 3 
replace nomcite_matching = 2 if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 




*** match case citations to nominative citation with closest lower page number (in case 
attributes) 
* prepare reduced case attributes 
preserve 
use "$path/case_attributes_combined.dta", clear 
ren uid uid_lowerpagematched 
keep uid_lowerpagematched nomcite_vol nomcite_page 
save "$path/_temp/case_attributes_combinedtemp.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* lower page merge with case attributes 
nearmrg nomcite_vol using "$path/_temp/case_attributes_combinedtemp.dta", lower 
nearvar(nomcite_page) genmatch(nomcite_pagelowermatched) 
drop if _merge == 2 
gen nomcite_lowerpagematched = nomcite_vol + " " + 
string(nomcite_pagelowermatched) if _merge == 3 
replace nomcite_matching = 3 if _merge == 3 & nomcite_matching == . 
drop nomcite_pagelowermatched _merge 
 
* label nomcite matching method variable 
replace nomcite_matching = 4 if nomcite_matching == . 
label define nomcite_matching 1 "matched on fuzzy case parties (most reliable)" 2 
"matched on exact nominative citation (not on case parties)" 3 "matched only on lower 
page nominative citation" 4 "not matched" 
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label values nomcite_matching nomcite_matching 
 
* generate ultimate matched uid (party matching > exact page matching > nearest page 
matching) 
gen uidmatched = uid_partymatched if nomcite_matching == 1 
replace uidmatched = uid_pagematched if nomcite_matching == 2 
replace uidmatched = uid_lowerpagematched if nomcite_matching == 3 
 
* generate ultimate matched nomcite (party matching > exact page matching > nearest 
page matching) 
gen nomcite_matched = nomcite_partymatched if nomcite_matching == 1 
replace nomcite_matched = nomcite_pagematched if nomcite_matching == 2 
replace nomcite_matched = nomcite_lowerpagematched if nomcite_matching == 3 
gen nomcite_matchedvol = regexs(1) if regexm(nomcite_matched,"(.*) ([0-9]+)$") 
gen nomcite_matchedpage = regexs(2) if regexm(nomcite_matched,"(.*) ([0-9]+)$") 
destring nomcite_matchedpage, replace 
 
* save dataset after matching is complete 




*** combine case citations from case reports with identical nominative citations and case 
citations to case reports with identical nominative citations 
*** citing 
** merge combined case UID's for citing case 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/uid-UID.dta" 




** rename and order citing uids 
ren uid citing_uid 
ren UID citing_uidcombined 





** merge combined case UID's for cited case 
ren uidmatched uid 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/uid-UID.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
drop _merge 





** merge cited with volume attributes 
merge m:1 nomcite_vol using "$path/volume_attributes.dta" 




** rename cited variables 
ren uid cited_uid 
label var cited_uid "uid of single or combined case report (cited)" 
ren UID cited_uidcombined 
label var cited_uidcombined "uid of combined case report (cited)" 
ren nomcite_matched cited_nomcitematched 
label var cited_nomcitematched "nominative citation by best matching method (cited)" 
ren nomcite_matchedvol cited_nomcitematchedvol 
label var cited_nomcitematchedvol "nominative citation volume by best matching 
method (cited)" 
ren nomcite_matchedpage cited_nomcitematchedpage 
label var cited_nomcitematchedpage "nominative citation page by best matching method 
(cited)" 
ren court cited_court 
label var cited_court "court where reported case is presented (cited)" 
 
ren nomcite_matching cited_nomcitematching 
label var cited_nomcitematching "matching method used for nominative citation (cited)" 
 
ren citecontext cited_citecontext 
label var cited_citecontext "context of nominative citation (cited)" 
ren uid_partymatched cited_uidpartymatched 
label var cited_uidpartymatched "uid by party matching method (cited)" 
ren uid_pagematched cited_uidpagematched 
label var cited_uidpagematched "uid by page matching method (cited)" 
ren uid_lowerpagematched cited_uidlowerpagematched 
label var cited_uidlowerpagematched "uid by lower page matching method (cited)" 
ren nomcite_partymatched cited_nomcitepartymatched 
label var cited_nomcitepartymatched "nominative citation by party matching method 
(cited)" 
ren nomcite_pagematched cited_nomcite_pagematched 
label var cited_nomcite_pagematched "nominative citation by page matching method 
(cited)" 
ren nomcite_lowerpagematched cited_nomcite_lowerpagematched 
label var cited_nomcite_lowerpagematched "nominative citation by lower page matching 
method (cited)" 
ren nomcite cited_nomciteoriginal 
label var cited_nomciteoriginal "nominative citation unmatched (cited)" 
ren nomcite_vol cited_nomciteoriginalvol 
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label var cited_nomciteoriginalvol "nominative citation volume unmatched (cited)" 
ren nomcite_page cited_nomciteoriginalpage 
label var cited_nomciteoriginalpage "nominative citation page unmatched (cited)" 
 
 
ren nomcite_rep cited_nomciterep 
label var cited_nomciterep "reporter volume (cited)" 
ren nomcite_volyearstart cited_nomcitevolyearstart 
label var cited_nomcitevolyearstart "starting year of reporter volume (cited)" 
ren nomcite_volyearend cited_nomcitevolyearend 
label var cited_nomcitevolyearend "ending year of reporter volume (cited)" 
ren nomcite_pagestart cited_nomcitepagestart 
label var cited_nomcitepagestart "starting page of reporter volume (cited)" 
ren nomcite_pageend cited_nomcitepageend 
label var cited_nomcitepageend "ending year of reporter volume (cited)" 
ren nomcite_repvollawfrench cited_nomcitelawfrench 
label var cited_nomcitelawfrench "law french used (cited)" 
 
drop casename_firstparty casename_secondparty 
 
 
** merge cited with combined case attributes 
ren cited_uidcombined uid 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/case_attributes_combined.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
drop _merge 
ren uid cited_uidcombined 
 
ren date cited_date 
label var cited_date "date of combined case report (cited)" 
ren decade cited_decade 
label var cited_decade "decade of combined case report (cited)" 
ren numcasesyear cited_numcasesyear 
label var cited_numcasesyear "number of report cases during year of combined case 
report (cited)" 
ren numcasesdecade cited_numcasesdecade 
label var cited_numcasesdecade "number of reported cases during decade of combined 
case report (cited)" 
ren num_words cited_numwords 
label var cited_numwords "number of words in combined case report (cited)" 
ren ercite cited_ercite 
label var cited_ercite "ER citation of combined case report (cited)" 
ren ercite_vol cited_ercitevol 
label var cited_ercitevol "ER citation volume of combined case report (cited)" 
ren nomcite_num cited_nomcitenum 
label var cited_nomcitenum "number of case reports in combined case report (cited)" 
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ren casename cited_casename 
label var cited_casename "name of combined case report (cited)" 
ren casename_firstparty cited_casenamefirstparty 
label var cited_casenamefirstparty "first party, i.e. plaintiff, of combined case report 
(cited)" 
ren casename_secondparty cited_casenamesecondparty 
label var cited_casenamesecondparty "second party, i.e. defendant, of combined case 
report (cited)" 





** merge citing with combined case attributes 
ren citing_uidcombined uid 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/case_attributes_combined.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
drop _merge 
ren uid citing_uidcombined 
 
 
** merge citing with volume attributes 
merge m:1 nomcite_vol using "$path/volume_attributes.dta" 




** rename citing variables 
label var citing_uidcombined "unique id number of combined case report (citing)" 
label var citing_uid "unique id number of single case report (citing)" 
ren nomcite citing_nomcite 
label var citing_nomcite "nominative citation (citing)" 
ren nomcite_vol citing_nomcitevol 
label var citing_nomcitevol "nominative citation volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_page citing_nomcitepage 
label var citing_nomcitepage "nominative citation page (citing)" 
 
ren date citing_date 
label var citing_date "date of combined case report (citing)" 
ren decade citing_decade 
label var citing_decade "decade of combined case report (citing)" 
ren numcasesyear citing_numcasesyear 
label var citing_numcasesyear "number of report cases during year of combined case 
report (citing)" 
ren numcasesdecade citing_numcasesdecade 
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label var citing_numcasesdecade "number of reported cases during decade of combined 
case report (citing)" 
ren num_words citing_numwords 
label var citing_numwords "number of words in combined case report (citing)" 
ren nomcite_num citing_nomcitenum 
label var citing_nomcitenum "number of case reports in combined case report (citing)" 
ren ercite citing_ercite 
label var citing_ercite "ER citation of combined case report (citing)" 
ren ercite_vol citing_ercitevol 
label var citing_ercitevol "ER citation volume of combined case report (citing)" 
ren casename citing_casename 
label var citing_casename "name of combined case report (citing)" 
ren casename_firstparty citing_casenamefirstparty 
label var citing_casenamefirstparty "first party, i.e. plaintiff, of combined case report 
(citing)" 
ren casename_secondparty citing_casenamesecondparty 
label var citing_casenamesecondparty "second party, i.e. defendant, of combined case 
report (citing)" 
 
ren court citing_court 
label var citing_court "court where reported case is presented (citing)" 
ren nomcite_rep citing_nomciterep 
label var citing_nomciterep "reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_volyearstart citing_nomcitevolyearstart 
label var citing_nomcitevolyearstart "starting year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_volyearend citing_nomcitevolyearend 
label var citing_nomcitevolyearend "ending year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_pagestart citing_nomcitepagestart 
label var citing_nomcitepagestart "starting page of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_pageend citing_nomcitepageend 
label var citing_nomcitepageend "ending year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_repvollawfrench citing_nomcitelawfrench 




*** drop duplicates of combined case citations 
duplicates drop citing_uidcombined cited_uidcombined, force 
 
 
** calculate number of cited case reports (for a given combined case report) 
egen citing_numcites = count(citing_uidcombined), by(citing_uidcombined) 
label var citing_numcites "number of cited case reports in combined case report (citing)" 
 
 
** order and save dataset 
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order citing_uidcombined citing_uid citing_nomcite citing_nomcitevol 
citing_nomcitepage /// 
 citing_casename citing_casenamefirstparty citing_casenamesecondparty 
citing_ercite citing_ercitevol /// 
 citing_date citing_decade citing_court citing_nomcitenum citing_numcites 
citing_numcasesyear citing_numcasesdecade citing_numwords /// 
 citing_nomcitevolyearstart citing_nomcitevolyearend citing_nomcitepagestart 
citing_nomcitepageend citing_nomcitelawfrench citing_nomciterep 
 
order citing_* cited_uidcombined cited_uid cited_nomcitematched* 
cited_nomcitematching /// 
 cited_casename cited_casenamefirstparty cited_casenamesecondparty cited_ercite 
cited_ercitevol /// 
 cited_date cited_decade cited_court cited_nomcitenum cited_numcasesyear 
cited_numcasesdecade cited_numwords /// 
 cited_nomcitevolyearstart cited_nomcitevolyearend cited_nomcitepagestart 
cited_nomcitepageend cited_nomcitelawfrench cited_nomciterep /// 
 cited_citecontext cited_nomciteoriginal cited_nomciteoriginalvol 
cited_nomciteoriginalpage 
  
save "$path/case_citations_combined_final.dta", replace 
 
 
*** clean case citations 
gen cited_citecontext2 = substr(cited_citecontext,1,length(cited_citecontext)-50) 
 
* drop artificial self-cites 
drop if citing_nomcite == cited_nomcitematched 
 
* drop case citations if their page number is outside plausible range 
drop if cited_nomciteoriginalpage > cited_nomcitepageend & cited_nomcitematching != 
1 
drop if cited_nomciteoriginalpage < cited_nomcitepagestart & cited_nomcitematching != 
1      
 
* drop non-matched case citations 
drop if cited_nomcitematching == 4 
 
* remove ambiguities due to identical citations of queen's bench reports and queen's 
bench law reports 
gen queenexchequer = 1 if regexm(cited_citecontext2, "\[18[0-9][0-9]\]") & 
(cited_nomciterep == "queen's bench" | cited_nomciterep == "exchequer") 
replace queenexchequer = 1 if regexm(cited_citecontext2, " L\.?R\.? ?[0-9]") & 
(cited_nomciterep == "queen's bench" | cited_nomciterep == "exchequer") 





* remove misidentified coke on littleton citations 
gen cokelittleton = 1 if  cited_nomcitematchedvol == "littleton" & 
regexm(cited_citecontext2,"C[oO]?k?e?[,\.]? ?Lit") 
drop if cokelittleton == 1  
drop cokelittleton 
 
* remove incorrect cases temp hardwicke citations 
gen casestemphardwickeincorrect = 1 if cited_nomciterep == "cases temp hardwicke" & 
regexm(cited_citecontext2,"B\.? ?R\.? ?H\.? ?[0-9]") 
drop if casestemphardwickeincorrect == 1 
drop cited_citecontext2 
 
* remove observations outside 1550 - 1865 date range 
drop if !inrange(citing_date,1580,1865) 
drop if !inrange(cited_date,1580,1865) 
 
save "$path/case_citations_combined_final_cleaned.dta", replace 
 
3_merge statutes data 
clear 
set mem 200m 
set more off 




** import statute citations 
clear 
insheet using "$path/_db input/statute_citations.csv" 
 
 
*** combine statute citations from case reports with identical nominative citations  
** merge combined case UID's for citing case 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/uid-UID.dta" 




** rename and order citing uids 
ren uid citing_uid 
ren UID citing_uidcombined 





** correct william & mary regnal years and dates 
replace stat_cite_year = 1696 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "8 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "8. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "8 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_year = 1697 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "9 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "9. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "9 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_year = 1698 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "10 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "10. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "10 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_year = 1699 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "11 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "11. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "11 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_year = 1700 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "12 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "12. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "12 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_year = 1701 if  stat_cite_regnalyear == "13 will. & mary" 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = "13. will.3" if stat_cite_regnalyear == "13 will. & mary" 
 
 
** correct ambiguitites of wills act 
gen stat_cite_context2 = substr(stat_cite_context,round(length(stat_cite_context)/2,1)- 
10,20) 
gen willsact = 1 if regexm(stat_cite_context2, "(.*[Ww]ills [Aa]ct.*)") & 
stat_cite_regnalyear == "" 
drop if willsact == 1 
drop willsact stat_cite_context2 
 
** correct geo 1 misattributions 
gen stat_cite_context2 = substr(stat_cite_context,round(length(stat_cite_context)/2,1)- 
10,20) 
gen george1 = 1 if regexm(stat_cite_regnalyear, "[0-9]+ geo. 1") 
gen george1year = regexs(1) if regexm(stat_cite_regnalyear,"([0-9]+) geo. 1") 
gen george2 = 1 if  regexm(stat_cite_context2, "(Ge?o?\.? 11[\. ,]+)|(Ge?o?\.? Il[\. 
,]+)|(Ge?o?\.?,? 2[\. ,]+)") & george1 == 1 
gen george3 = 1 if  regexm(stat_cite_context2, "(Ge?o?\.?,? 111)|(Ge?o?\.?,? 
Ill)|(Ge?o?\.?,? 3)|(Ge?o?\.?,? 11 I)") & george1 == 1 
replace george2 = . if george3 == 1 & george2 == 1 
gen george = 1 if george2 == 1 | george3 == 1 
 
gen george2temp = " geo. 2" 
egen george2stat_cite_regnalyear = concat(george1year george2temp) if george2 == 1 
replace stat_cite_regnalyear = george2stat_cite_regnalyear if george2 == 1 
gen george3temp = " geo. 3" 
egen george3stat_cite_regnalyear = concat(george1year george3temp) if george3 == 1 







insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/1_Extraction/input/regnal 
years.csv" 
gen temp = " " 
egen stat_cite_regnalyear = concat(v1 temp v2) 
ren v3 stat_cite_year 
keep stat_cite_regnalyear stat_cite_year 





drop if george == 1 
drop george* 




keep if george == 1 
drop george* 
drop stat_cite_year 
merge m:1 stat_cite_regnalyear using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/_temp/regnalyears.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
drop _merge 
replace stat_cite_year = 0 if stat_cite_year == . 
append using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/_temp/nogeorgetemp.dta" 
!rm "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/2_Cleaning/_temp/nogeorgetemp.dta" 
 
** merge number of enacted stautes in the cited year 
preserve 
clear 
insheet using "$path/_statutes added/statute chapters.csv", comma 
keep stat_cite_year chapterstotal chapterspublic 
save "$path/_statutes added/statutenumbersadded.dta", replace 
restore 
 
merge m:1 stat_cite_year using "$path/_statutes added/statutenumbersadded.dta" 









insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/1_Extraction/input/stat names & 
years.csv", comma 
ren v1 stat_cite_name 
ren v3 stat_cite_regnalyear 
ren v4 stat_cite_chapter 
keep stat_cite_name stat_cite_regnalyear stat_cite_chapter 
save "$path/_statutes added/statutechaptersadded.dta", replace 
restore 
 
merge m:1 stat_cite_name using "$path/_statutes added/statutechaptersadded.dta", update 




** drop statute citations with duplicate years (prefer chapter over statute name over 
regnal year only) 
gsort citing_uidcombined stat_cite_year -stat_cite_name stat_cite_chapter 
duplicates drop citing_uidcombined stat_cite_year stat_cite_chapter, force 
duplicates tag citing_uidcombined stat_cite_year, gen(dup) 




** merge citing with combined case attributes 
ren citing_uidcombined uid 
merge m:1 uid using "$path/case_attributes_combined.dta" 
drop if _merge == 2 
drop _merge 
ren uid citing_uidcombined 
 
 
** merge citing with volume attributes 
merge m:1 nomcite_vol using "$path/volume_attributes.dta" 




** rename citing variables 
ren nomcite citing_nomcite 
label var citing_nomcite "nominative citation (citing)" 
ren nomcite_vol citing_nomcitevol 
label var citing_nomcitevol "nominative citation volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_page citing_nomcitepage 
label var citing_nomcitepage "nominative citation page (citing)" 
egen citing_statutenumcites = count(citing_uidcombined), by(citing_uidcombined) 




ren date citing_date 
label var citing_date "date of combined case report (citing)" 
ren date_juta citing_datejuta 
label var citing_datejuta "unamended date of combined case report originally (citing)" 
ren decade citing_decade 
label var citing_decade "decade of combined case report (citing)" 
ren numcasesyear citing_numcasesyear 
label var citing_numcasesyear "number of reported cases during year of combined case 
report (citing)" 
ren numcasesdecade citing_numcasesdecade 
label var citing_numcasesdecade "number of reported cases during decade of combined 
case report (citing)" 
ren num_words citing_numwords 
label var citing_numwords "number of words in combined case report (citing)" 
ren nomcite_num citing_nomcitenum 
label var citing_nomcitenum "number of case reports in combined case report (citing)" 
ren ercite citing_ercite 
label var citing_ercite "ER citation of combined case report (citing)" 
ren ercite_vol citing_ercitevol 
label var citing_ercitevol "ER citation volume of combined case report (citing)" 
ren casename citing_casename 
label var citing_casename "name of combined case report (citing)" 
ren casename_firstparty citing_casenamefirstparty 
label var citing_casenamefirstparty "first party, i.e. plaintiff, of combined case report 
(citing)" 
ren casename_secondparty citing_casenamesecondparty 
label var citing_casenamesecondparty "second party, i.e. defendant, of combined case 
report (citing)" 
 
ren court citing_court 
label var citing_court "court where reported case is presented (citing)" 
ren nomcite_rep citing_nomciterep 
label var citing_nomciterep "reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_volyearstart citing_nomcitevolyearstart 
label var citing_nomcitevolyearstart "starting year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_volyearend citing_nomcitevolyearend 
label var citing_nomcitevolyearend "ending year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_pagestart citing_nomcitepagestart 
label var citing_nomcitepagestart "starting page of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_pageend citing_nomcitepageend 
label var citing_nomcitepageend "ending year of reporter volume (citing)" 
ren nomcite_repvollawfrench citing_nomcitelawfrench 







** rename cited variables 
ren stat_cite_year cited_statutedate 
label var cited_statutedate "date of cited statute" 
ren stat_cite_context cited_statutecitecontext 
label var cited_statutecitecontext "context of statute citation" 
ren stat_cite_regnalyear cited_statuteregnalyear 
label var cited_statuteregnalyear "regnal year of cited statute (if available)" 
ren stat_cite_chapter cited_statutechapter 
label var cited_statutechapter "chapter reference of cited statute (if available)" 
ren stat_cite_name cited_statutename 
label var cited_statutename "name of cited statute (if available)" 
ren chapterstotal cited_statutechapterstotal 
label var cited_statutechapterstotal "number of total enacted statutes in year of cited 
statute (if available)" 
ren chapterspublic cited_statutechapterspublic 
label var cited_statutechapterspublic "number of public enacted statutes in year of cited 
statute (if available)" 
 
 
** order and save dataset 
order citing_uidcombined citing_uid citing_nomcite citing_nomcitevol 
citing_nomcitepage /// 
 citing_casename citing_casenamefirstparty citing_casenamesecondparty 
citing_ercite citing_ercitevol /// 
 citing_date citing_decade citing_court citing_nomcitenum citing_statutenumcites 
citing_numcasesyear citing_numcasesdecade citing_numwords /// 
 citing_nomcitevolyearstart citing_nomcitevolyearend citing_nomcitepagestart 
citing_nomcitepageend citing_nomcitelawfrench citing_nomciterep 
 
order citing_* /// 
 cited_statutedate cited_statuteregnalyear cited_statutechapter cited_statutename 
cited_statutecitecontext 
 




** clean data from incorrect statute citations, save dataset 
drop if cited_statutedate == 0 // drop if regnal year is invalid (mainly due to OCR error) 
drop if cited_statutechapter > cited_statutechapterstotal & cited_statutechapter != . // drop 
if chapter is bigger than number of statutes in a given year 
drop if cited_statutechapterstotal == . 
 





Appendix C: R code for the detection of network 
communities 
### import graphs and packages 
library(igraph) 
setwd("/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection") 
commonlaw <- read.graph("common law no isolates.gml", format = "gml") 
summary(commonlaw) 
commonlawrandom <- read.graph("common law no isolates random.gml", format = 
"gml") 
summary(commonlawrandom) 
uslaw <- read.graph("us no isolates.gml", format = "gml") 
summary(uslaw) 




### prepare for export 
id = get.vertex.attribute(commonlaw, "id") 
nomcite = get.vertex.attribute(commonlaw, "nomcite") 
date = get.vertex.attribute(commonlaw, "date") 
 
idrandom = get.vertex.attribute(commonlawrandom, "id") 
nomciterandom = get.vertex.attribute(commonlawrandom, "nomcite") 
daterandom = get.vertex.attribute(commonlawrandom, "date") 
 
idus = get.vertex.attribute(uslaw, "id") 
nomciteus = get.vertex.attribute(uslaw, "nomcite") 




### authority and hub scores 
authority = authority.score(commonlaw)$vector 
top100authority = sort(authority, decreasing=TRUE)[1:100] 
 
hub = hub.score(commonlaw)$vector 
top100hub = sort(hub, decreasing=TRUE)[1:100] 
 
# authorities and hubs 









### community detection 
## simulated annealing (modularity optimization) 
# spin glass - 2 spins 
commonlaw_community_sg2 = spinglass.community(commonlaw, spins=2) 
 
membership_sg2 = membership(commonlaw_community_sg2) 
class(membership_sg2) = "numeric" 
modularityscore_sg2 = modularity(commonlaw_community_sg2) 
 






# spin glass - 3 spins 
commonlaw_community_sg3 = spinglass.community(commonlaw, spins=3) 
 
membership_sg3 = membership(commonlaw_community_sg3) 
class(membership_sg3) = "numeric" 
modularityscore_sg3 = modularity(commonlaw_community_sg3) 
 






# spin glass - 4 spins 
commonlaw_community_sg4 = spinglass.community(commonlaw, spins=4) 
 
membership_sg4 = membership(commonlaw_community_sg4) 
class(membership_sg4) = "numeric" 
modularityscore_sg4 = modularity(commonlaw_community_sg4) 
 






# spin glass - 2 spins (random model) 
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commonlaw_community_random_sg2 = spinglass.community(commonlawrandom, 
spins=2) 
 
membership_random_sg2 = membership(commonlaw_community_random_sg2) 
class(membership_random_sg2) = "numeric" 









# spin glass - 2 spins (us) 
uslaw_community_sg2 = spinglass.community(uslaw, spins=2) 
 
usmembership_sg2 = membership(uslaw_community_sg2) 
class(usmembership_sg2) = "numeric" 
usmodularityscore_sg2 = modularity(uslaw_community_sg2) 
 






# spin glass - 3 spins (us) 
uslaw_community_sg3 = spinglass.community(uslaw, spins=3) 
 
usmembership_sg3 = membership(uslaw_community_sg3) 
class(usmembership_sg3) = "numeric" 
usmodularityscore_sg3 = modularity(uslaw_community_sg3) 
 






# spin glass - 4 spins (us) 
uslaw_community_sg4 = spinglass.community(uslaw, spins=4) 
 
usmembership_sg4 = membership(uslaw_community_sg4) 
class(usmembership_sg4) = "numeric" 











## limit communities from hierarchical analysis to n members and export 
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Appendix D: Stata code for the preparation of tables and 
figures 
*** code to produce all the figures in the dissertation 
clear 
set more off 
global path "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/4_Presentation/Figures" 
global casescombinedinput "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/case_attributes_combined.dta" 
global volumesinput "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/volume_attributes.dta" 
global citesinput "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/case_citations_combined_final_cleaned.dta" 
global statutesinput "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/statute_citations_combined_final_cleaned.dta" 
global uscasesinput "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/US/case_attributes.dta" 











*** number of cases 




* drop reports outside desired range 
keep if inrange(date,1580,1865) 
 
* merge volume information and create common law dummy 
merge m:1 nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
gen common = 1 if inlist(court, "CP", "EX", "KB", "NP") 
replace common = 0 if inlist(court, "CH", "Rolls", "VC") 
drop if common == . 
 
label define common 0 "equity law er series" 1 "common law er series" 
label values common common 
 
* calculate annual number of case reports by common law dummy 
collapse (count) reports = uid [fweight= nomcite_num], by(date common) 
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label variable date "year" 
label variable common "common law" 
label variable reports "number of er case reports" 
 
* plot number of case reports by year 
twoway (line reports date) (lowess reports date, bwidth(0.3)), xlabel(1580 (40) 1860) 
by(common) /// 
 legend(label(1 "number of er case reports per year") label(2 "lowess smooothed") 
rows(2) region(col(white))) 
  
graph export "$path/case numbers per year.png", replace 
 
* common law courts separately 
clear 
set more off 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"CP","EX","KB") 
replace court = "king's bench er series" if court == "KB" 
replace court = "common pleas er series" if court == "CP" 
replace court = "exchequer er series" if court == "EX" 
 
collapse (count) cases = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(date court) 
label variable date "year" 
label variable cases "number of case reports" 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcourtscases.dta", replace 
 
twoway (line cases date) (lowess cases date, bwidth(0.3)), xlabel(1580(40)1860)  
ylabel(0(00)800) by(court, cols(1)) /// 
 legend(label(1 "number of er case reports per year") label(2 "lowess smooothed") 
rows(2) region(col(white))) 
  
graph export "$path/common law courts case numbers per year.png", replace 
 
 
* common law only 
clear 
set more off 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
preserve 
collapse (count) cases = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(date) 
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label variable date "year" 
label variable cases "number of case reports" 




collapse (count) cases = uid, by(date) 
label variable date "year" 
label variable cases "number of case reports" 












* remove unwanted date ranges 
drop if !inrange(citing_date, 1700, 1865) 
drop if !inrange(cited_date, 1550, 1865) 
 
* drop non-precendents (later analogies and reports of same case) 
drop if cited_date >= citing_date 
 
* remove case reports from unwanted courts 
drop if inlist(citing_court,"Crown", "Ecc_Adm_PD", "HL", "PC") 
drop if inlist(cited_court,"Crown", "Ecc_Adm_PD", "HL", "PC") 
 
* create binary variable that distinguishes common law and equity 
gen citing_common = 1 if inlist(citing_court, "CP", "EX", "KB", "NP") 
replace citing_common = 0 if inlist(citing_court, "CH", "Rolls", "VC") 
 
gen cited_common = 1 if inlist(cited_court, "CP", "EX", "KB", "NP") 
replace cited_common = 0 if inlist(cited_court, "CH", "Rolls", "VC") 
 
label define common 0 "equity law er series" 1 "common law er series" 
label values citing_common cited_common common 
 
* calculate citing equity court rates by decade 
preserve 
keep if citing_common == 0 
collapse (count) equitycites=citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_common) 
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reshape wide equitycites, i(citing_decade) j(cited_common) 
 
ren equitycites0 equityequitycites 
ren equitycites1 equitycommonlawcites 
gen equitycitestotal = equityequitycites + equitycommonlawcites 
 
gen equityequitycitespercent = equityequitycites/equitycitestotal 
gen equitycommonlawcitespercent = equitycommonlawcites/equitycitestotal 
 
ren citing_decade decade 
keep decade equityequitycitespercent equitycommonlawcitespercent 
 
save "$path/_temp/equitycites.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* calculate citing common law court rates by decade 
preserve 
keep if citing_common == 1 
collapse (count) commonlawcites=citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_common) 
reshape wide commonlawcites, i(citing_decade) j(cited_common) 
 
ren commonlawcites0 commonlawequitycites 
ren commonlawcites1 commonlawcommonlawcites 
gen commonlawcitestotal = commonlawequitycites + commonlawcommonlawcites 
 
gen commonlawequityitespercent = commonlawequitycites/commonlawcitestotal 
gen commonlawcommonlawcitespercent = 
commonlawcommonlawcites/commonlawcitestotal 
 
ren citing_decade decade 
keep decade commonlawequityitespercent commonlawcommonlawcitespercent 
 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcites.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* random citing model predictions 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
drop if inlist(court,"Crown", "Ecc_Adm_PD", "HL", "PC") 
gen common = 1 if inlist(court, "CP", "EX", "KB", "NP") 
replace common = 0 if inlist(court, "CH", "Rolls", "VC") 
 
collapse (count) cases = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(decade common) 




ren cases0 equitycases 
ren cases1 commonlawcases 
 
replace equitycases = 0 if equitycases == . 
replace commonlawcases = 0 if commonlawcases == . 
 
gen equitycasestotal = . 
 replace equitycasestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace equitycasestotal = equitycases[_n-1] + equitycasestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
gen commonlawcasestotal = . 
 replace commonlawcasestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace commonlawcasestotal = commonlawcases[_n-1] + 
commonlawcasestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
gen casestotal = equitycasestotal + commonlawcasestotal 
 
gen randomequitypercent = equitycasestotal/casestotal 
gen randomcommonpercent = commonlawcasestotal/casestotal 
 
keep if decade >= 1700 
keep decade randomequitypercent randomcommonpercent 
  
save "$path/_temp/equityandcommonlawrandomcites.dta", replace 
 
* merge equity, common law and random data 
merge 1:1 decade using "$path/_temp/equitycites.dta" 
drop _merge 
merge 1:1 decade using "$path/_temp/commonlawcites.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
* plot graphs 
twoway (line equityequitycitespercent decade, lcolor(gs10)) (line 
equitycommonlawcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs2)) /// 
  (line randomequitypercent decade, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(longdash)) (line 
randomcommonpercent decade, lcolor(gs2) lpattern(longdash)) /// 
  , legend(label(1 "citing equity law er series") label(2 "citing common law 
er series") /// 
  label(3 "citing equity law predicted from model") label(4 "citing common 
predicted from model") rows(4) region(col(white))) /// 
  yscale(range(0 1)) title(equity law er series)  name(equity) 
   
twoway (line commonlawequityitespercent decade, lcolor(gs10)) (line 
commonlawcommonlawcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs2)) /// 
  (line randomequitypercent decade, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(longdash)) (line 
randomcommonpercent decade, lcolor(gs2) lpattern(longdash)) /// 
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  , legend(label(1 "citing equity law er series") label(2 "citing common law 
er series") /// 
  label(3 "citing equity law predicted from model") label(4 "citing common 
predicted from model") rows(4) region(col(white))) /// 
  yscale(range(0 1)) title(common law er series)  name(common) 
 
grc1leg equity common 












* remove unwanted date ranges 
drop if !inrange(citing_date, 1700, 1865) 
drop if !inrange(cited_date, 1550, 1865) 
 
* drop non-precendents (later analogies and reports of same case) 
drop if cited_date >= citing_date 
 
* remove case reports from unwanted courts 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"KB", "CP", "EX") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"KB", "CP", "EX") 
  
* create binary variable that distinguishes common law and equity 
gen citing = 1 if citing_court == "KB" 
replace citing = 2 if citing_court == "CP" 
replace citing = 3 if citing_court == "EX" 
 
gen cited = 1 if cited_court == "KB" 
replace cited = 2 if cited_court == "CP" 
replace cited = 3 if cited_court == "EX" 
 
label define common 1 "king's bench er series" 2 "common pleas er series" 3 "exchequer 
er series" 
label values citing cited common 
 
* calculate citing king's bench court rates by decade 
preserve 
keep if citing == 1 
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collapse (count) kbcites=citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited) 
reshape wide kbcites, i(citing_decade) j(cited) 
 
ren kbcites1 kbkbcites 
ren kbcites2 kbcpcites 
ren kbcites3 kbexcites 
 
replace kbkbcites = 0 if kbkbcites == . 
replace kbcpcites = 0 if kbcpcites == . 
replace kbexcites = 0 if kbexcites == . 
 
gen kbcitestotal = kbkbcites + kbcpcites + kbexcites 
 
gen kbkbcitespercent = kbkbcites/kbcitestotal 
gen kbcpcitespercent = kbcpcites/kbcitestotal 
gen kbexcitespercent = kbexcites/kbcitestotal 
 
ren citing_decade decade 
keep decade kbkbcitespercent kbcpcitespercent kbexcitespercent 
 
save "$path/_temp/kbcites.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* calculate citing common pleas court rates by decade 
preserve 
keep if citing == 2 
collapse (count) cpcites=citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited) 
reshape wide cpcites, i(citing_decade) j(cited) 
 
ren cpcites1 cpkbcites 
ren cpcites2 cpcpcites 
ren cpcites3 cpexcites 
 
replace cpkbcites = 0 if cpkbcites == . 
replace cpcpcites = 0 if cpcpcites == . 
replace cpexcites = 0 if cpexcites == . 
 
gen cpcitestotal = cpkbcites + cpcpcites + cpexcites 
 
gen cpkbcitespercent = cpkbcites/cpcitestotal 
gen cpcpcitespercent = cpcpcites/cpcitestotal 
gen cpexcitespercent = cpexcites/cpcitestotal 
 
ren citing_decade decade 




save "$path/_temp/cpcites.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* calculate citing exchequer court rates by decade 
preserve 
keep if citing == 3 
collapse (count) excites=citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited) 
reshape wide excites, i(citing_decade) j(cited) 
 
ren excites1 exkbcites 
ren excites2 excpcites 
ren excites3 exexcites 
 
replace exkbcites = 0 if exkbcites == . 
replace excpcites = 0 if excpcites == . 
replace exexcites = 0 if exexcites == . 
 
gen excitestotal = exkbcites + excpcites + exexcites 
 
gen exkbcitespercent = exkbcites/excitestotal 
gen excpcitespercent = excpcites/excitestotal 
gen exexcitespercent = exexcites/excitestotal 
 
ren citing_decade decade 
keep decade exkbcitespercent excpcitespercent exexcitespercent 
 
save "$path/_temp/excites.dta", replace 
restore 
 
* random citing model predictions 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"KB", "CP", "EX") 
 
gen common = 1 if court == "KB" 
replace common = 2 if court == "CP" 
replace common = 3 if court == "EX" 
 
collapse (count) cases = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(decade common) 
reshape wide cases, i(decade) j(common) 
 
ren cases1 kbcases 
ren cases2 cpcases 




replace kbcases = 0 if kbcases == . 
replace cpcases = 0 if cpcases == . 
replace excases = 0 if excases == . 
 
gen kbcasestotal = . 
 replace kbcasestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace kbcasestotal = kbcases[_n-1] + kbcasestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
gen cpcasestotal = . 
 replace cpcasestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace cpcasestotal = cpcases[_n-1] + cpcasestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
gen excasestotal = . 
 replace excasestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace excasestotal = excases[_n-1] + excasestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
 
gen casestotal = kbcasestotal + cpcasestotal + excasestotal 
  
gen randomkbpercent = kbcasestotal/casestotal 
gen randomcppercent = cpcasestotal/casestotal 
gen randomexpercent = excasestotal/casestotal 
 
keep if decade >= 1700 
keep decade randomkbpercent randomcppercent randomexpercent 
  
save "$path/_temp/kbcpexrandomcites.dta", replace 
 
* merge kb, cp, ex and random data 
merge 1:1 decade using "$path/_temp/kbcites.dta" 
drop _merge 
merge 1:1 decade using "$path/_temp/cpcites.dta" 
drop _merge 
merge 1:1 decade using "$path/_temp/excites.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
* plot graphs 
twoway (line kbkbcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs2)) (line kbcpcitespercent decade, 
lcolor(gs9)) (line kbexcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs14)) /// 
  (line randomkbpercent decade, lcolor(gs2) lpattern(longdash)) (line 
randomcppercent decade, lcolor(gs9) lpattern(longdash)) (line randomexpercent decade, 
lcolor(gs14) lpattern(longdash)) /// 
  , legend(label(1 "citing kb er series") label(2 "citing cp er series") label(3 
"citing ex er series") /// 
  label(4 "citing kb predicted from model") label(5 "citing cp predicted from 
model") label(6 "citing ex predicted from model") rows(6) region(col(white))) /// 
  yscale(range(0 1)) title(king's bench er series) name(kb) 
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twoway (line cpkbcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs2)) (line cpcpcitespercent decade, 
lcolor(gs9)) (line cpexcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs14)) /// 
  (line randomkbpercent decade, lcolor(gs2) lpattern(longdash)) (line 
randomcppercent decade, lcolor(gs9) lpattern(longdash)) (line randomexpercent decade, 
lcolor(gs14) lpattern(longdash)) /// 
  , legend(label(1 "citing kb er series") label(2 "citing cp er series") label(3 
"citing ex er series") /// 
  label(4 "citing kb predicted from model") label(5 "citing cp predicted from 
model") label(6 "citing ex predicted from model") rows(6) region(col(white))) /// 
  yscale(range(0 1)) title(common pleas er series) name(cp) 
   
twoway (line exkbcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs2)) (line excpcitespercent decade, 
lcolor(gs9)) (line exexcitespercent decade, lcolor(gs14)) /// 
  (line randomkbpercent decade, lcolor(gs2) lpattern(longdash)) (line 
randomcppercent decade, lcolor(gs9) lpattern(longdash)) (line randomexpercent decade, 
lcolor(gs14) lpattern(longdash)) /// 
  , legend(label(1 "citing kb er series") label(2 "citing cp er series") label(3 
"citing ex er series") /// 
  label(4 "citing kb predicted from model") label(5 "citing cp predicted from 
model") label(6 "citing ex predicted from model") rows(6) region(col(white))) /// 
  yscale(range(0 1)) title(exchequer er series) name(ex) 
 
grc1leg kb cp ex, rows(1) 







*** common law's most cited cases 




* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date > 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* create citations counts 
preserve 
collapse (count) cites = cited_uidcombined, by(cited_nomcitematched cited_date) 




* calculate top 10 and top 1 percentiles 
egen top10 = pctile(cites), p(90) 
egen top1 = pctile(cites), p(99) 
 
* list most cited case reports 
list cited_nomcitematched cited_date cites if cites > top1, table noobs 
 
* create date histograms of most cited cases (top 10% and top 1%) 
twoway (hist cited_date if cites > top10, width(5) start(1550) frequency fcolor(gs10) 
lcolor(gs6)) /// 
 (hist cited_date if cites > top1, width(5) start(1550) frequency fcolor(gs5) 
lcolor(gs6)), /// 
 legend(label(1 "top decile") label(2 "top percentile") region(col(white))) 
name(top) 
 
* save graph 
graph export "$path/most cited histogram.png", replace 
 
 
* create dindiviudal date histograms of 5 most cited cases 
restore 
keep if inlist(cited_nomcitematched, "1 wms saunders 319", "1 coke report 93", "1 
burrow 38", "6 adolphus and ellis 469", "8 coke report 66") 
 
global i = 1 
graph drop _all 
foreach c in  "1 wms saunders 319" "1 coke report 93" "1 burrow 38" "6 adolphus and 
ellis 469" "8 coke report 66" { 
 preserve 
 keep if cited_nomcitematched == "`c'" 
 de, sh 
 local area = 5 *`r(N)' 
 twoway (hist citing_date, freq width(5) start(1700) title("`c'") yscale(range(0 25)) 
ylabel(0(5)25)) /// 
  (kdensity citing_date, area(`area')), legend(off) name(hist_$i) 




graph combine hist_1 hist_2 hist_3 hist_4 hist_5, rows(2) 











* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date > 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* calculate time difference distribution (all years) 
preserve 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_date 
label variable timediff "years between citing and cited case" 
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(timediff) 
label variable cites "number of cites" 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcitestimedifferences.dta", replace 
 
* fit exponential decay model 
gen logcites = ln(cites) 
reg logcites timediff 
esttab using "$path/timedepreciationfit.rtf", se r2(%9.2f) replace 
 
predict logciteshat 
twoway (line logcites timediff) (line logciteshat timediff), /// 
 legend(label(1 "actual log cites") label(2 "predicted log cites based on exponential 
model fit") rows(2) region(col(white))) xtitle(years between citing and cited case) 
graph export "$path/timedepreciationfit.png", replace 
restore 
 
* calculate number of new cites per year 
collapse (count) newcites = citing_uid, by(citing_date) 
ren citing_date date 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawnewcites.dta", replace 
 
 
** calculate expected random cites 
* merge with new cites and citations 
clear 
use "$path/_temp/commonlawcases.dta" 
merge 1:1 date using "$path/_temp/commonlawnewcites.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
* calculate expected cites 
forvalues y = 1701/1865 { 
 gen timediff_`y' = `y' - date if date < `y' 
 su newcites if date == `y' 
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 gen new_`y' = `r(mean)' if date < `y' 
 egen total_`y' = sum(cases) if date < `y' 
 gen p_`y' =  cases / total_`y' if date < `y' 
 gen Enew_`y' = p_`y' * new_`y'  if date < `y' 
} 
save "$path/_temp/randommodel.dta", replace 
 
* calculate expected time difference distribution (all years) 
keep date timediff_* Enew_* 
reshape long timediff Enew , i(date) j(year, string) 
gen Enewrounded = round(Enew,-1) 
drop year 
collapse (sum) Enewrounded, by(timediff) 
 
* graph time difference distribution 
merge 1:1 timediff using "$path/_temp/commonlawcitestimedifferences.dta" 
drop _merge 
twoway (hist timediff [fweight=cites], freq width(1)) (line Enewrounded timediff), /// 
 legend(label(1 "actual distribution of time differences") label(2 "expected 
distribution of time differences under random model") rows(2) region(col(white))) 
xtitle(years between citing and cited case) 





*** degree distribution 




* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* calculate in-degree distribution 
preserve 
collapse (count) indegree = citing_uid, by(cited_uidcombined) 
collapse (count) count = cited_uidcombined, by(indegree) 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesindegrees.dta", replace 
restore 
 
** attachment rates 
* calculate attachment rates for different decades 
 304 
 
forvalues y = 1710 (10) 1860 { 
 
 * case indegrees for previous periods 
 preserve 
 keep if citing_date < `y' 
 collapse (count) citesold = citing_uid, by(cited_uidcombined) 
 save "$path/_temp/commonlawcasescitesold_`y'.dta", replace 
 restore 
 
 * case indegrees for current period 
 preserve 
 keep if citing_decade == `y' 
 keep if cited_date < `y' 
 collapse (count) citesnew = citing_uid, by(cited_uidcombined) 
 merge 1:1 cited_uidcombined using 
"$path/_temp/commonlawcasescitesold_`y'.dta" 
 replace citesnew = 0  if citesnew == . 
 replace citesold = 0  if citesold == . 
 
 * calculate attachment average vs case indegree of previous periods 
 egen citesoldaggregated = cut(citesold), at(1(1)17,20,23,30,100) 
 drop citesold 
 ren citesoldaggregated citesold 
 collapse (mean) citesnew (sum) sumcitesnew=citesnew, by(citesold) 
  
  




* combine and average decade attachment rates 
clear 
use "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesattachments_1710.dta" 
forvalues y = 1720 (10) 1860 { 
 append using "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesattachments_`y'.dta" 
} 
* calculate 
collapse (mean) citesnew [fweight=sumcitesnew], by(citesold) 
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesattachmentrates.dta", replace 
 
 
*** random model distribution 
set seed 1234567 





** degree distribution 
forvalues n = 1/`nsimulation' { 
 
 * prepare output files 
 clear 
 set obs 1 
 gen temp = . 
 save "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta", replace 
 save "$path/_temp/randommodelcites.dta", replace 
 
 * provide annual case numbers and new citations 
 clear 
 use "$path/_temp/commonlawcasescombined.dta" 
 merge 1:1 date using "$path/_temp/commonlawnewcites.dta" 
 drop _merge 
 sort date 
 
 gen casestotal = . 
 replace casestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace casestotal = cases[_n-1] + casestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
 
 * generate case and cite files 
 levelsof date 
 foreach y of numlist `r(levels)' { 
  
  * extract year-specific parameters 
  preserve 
  keep if date == `y' 
  local newcites = newcites[1] 
  local cases = cases[1] 
  local casestotal = casestotal[1] 
 
  * generate random cases 
  clear 
  set obs `cases' 
  gen date = `y' 
  append using "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta" 
  save "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta", replace 
   
  * generate random cites 
  if `y' > 1700 { 
   clear 
   set obs `newcites' 
   gen citing_rnd = runiform() 
   gen cited_rnd = runiform() 
   gen citing_uid = ceil(citing_rnd * `cases') + `casestotal' 
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   gen cited_uid = ceil(cited_rnd * `casestotal') 
   append using "$path/_temp/randommodelcites.dta" 
   save "$path/_temp/randommodelcites.dta", replace 
  } 
  restore 
 } 
 
 * clean up case attributes, generate case id 
 clear 
 use "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta" 
 dropmiss, force 
 dropmiss, obs force 
 sort date 
 gen uid = _n 
 save "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta", replace 
 
 * clean up case cites, merge dates 
 clear 
 use "$path/_temp/randommodelcites.dta 
 dropmiss, force 
 dropmiss, obs force 
 drop citing_rnd cited_rnd 
 
 ren citing_uid uid 
 merge m:1 uid using "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta" 
 keep if _merge == 3 
 drop _merge 
 ren uid citing_uid 
 ren date citing_date 
 
 ren cited_uid uid 
 merge m:1 uid using "$path/_temp/randommodelcases.dta" 
 keep if _merge == 3 
 drop _merge 
 ren uid cited_uid 
 ren date cited_date 
 order citing_uid citing_date cited_uid cited_date 
 save "$path/_temp/randommodel case citations_`n'.dta.", replace 
 
 * calculate indegree distribution of random model 
 collapse (count) indegree = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
 collapse (count) randomcount= cited_uid, by(indegree) 
 






forvalues n = 2/`nsimulation' { 
 append using "$path/_temp/randommodelindegree_`n'.dta" 
} 
 
collapse (mean) randomcount, by(indegree) 
replace randomcount = round(randomcount,1) 
 
* merge with actual indegree distribution and plot 
merge 1:1 indegree using  "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesindegrees.dta" 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = count], freq width(1)) (line randomcount indegree), /// 
  legend(label(1 "actual distribution of received citations") label(2 "expected 
number received citations under random model") rows(2) region(col(white))) 
xtitle(received citations) name(indegree1) 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = count] if indegree <= 20, freq width(1)) (line 
randomcount indegree if indegree <= 20), /// 
 legend(off) xtitle(received citations) name(indegree2) 
grc1leg indegree1 indegree2, ycommon  
graph export "$path/degreedistributions.png", replace  
 
 
** attachment rates 
local nsimulation = 100 
forvalues n = 1/`nsimulation' { 
 
 clear 
 use "$path/_temp/randommodel case citations_`n'.dta" 
 egen citing_decade = cut(citing_date), at(1710(10)1870) 
 
 keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 keep if citing_date >= 1700 
 
 * calculate attachment rates for different decades 
 
 forvalues y = 1710 (10) 1860 { 
 
  * case indegrees for previous periods 
  preserve 
  keep if citing_date < `y' 
  collapse (count) randomcitesold = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
  save "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomcitesold_`y'.dta", replace 
  restore 
 
  * case indegrees for current period 
  preserve 
  keep if citing_decade == `y' 
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  keep if cited_date < `y' 
  collapse (count) randomcitesnew = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
  merge 1:1 cited_uid using 
"$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomcitesold_`y'.dta" 
  replace randomcitesnew = 0  if randomcitesnew == . 
  replace randomcitesold = 0  if randomcitesold == . 
 
  * calculate attachment average vs case indegree of previous periods 
  egen randomcitesoldaggregated = cut(randomcitesold), at(1(1)10) 
  drop randomcitesold 
  ren randomcitesoldaggregated randomcitesold 
  collapse (mean) randomcitesnew (sum) 
randomsumcitesnew=randomcitesnew, by(randomcitesold) 
   
  save  "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_`y'.dta", replace 




 * combine and average decade attachment rates 
 clear 
 use "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_1710.dta" 
 forvalues y = 1720 (10) 1860 { 
  append using "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_`y'.dta" 
 } 
  
save "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_`n'.dta", replace 
} 
 
* combine different simulations 
clear 
use "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_1.dta" 
forvalues n = 2/`nsimulation' { 
 append using "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesrandomattachments_`n'.dta" 
} 
 
* calculate attachment averages, merge, plot 
collapse (mean) randomcitesnew [fweight=randomsumcitesnew], by(randomcitesold) 
ren randomcitesold citesold 
merge 1:1 citesold using  "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesattachmentrates.dta" 
 
twoway (line citesnew citesold) (line randomcitesnew citesold), /// 




 legend(label(1 "actual distribution of attachment rates") label(2 "expected 
distribution of attachment rates under random model") rows(2) region(col(white))) 
xtitle(number of previously received citations) 
  







*** long-term persistence 
** actual data 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$citesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* determine most recent citing year 
collapse (max) citing_date, by(cited_uidcombined cited_date) 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_date 
gen cited_decade = 10*floor(cited_date/10) 
 
* time difference histograms for specific cited decades 
gen uid = _n 
collapse (count) citesperyear = uid, by(cited_decade timediff) 
save "$path/_temp/survical cases all decades.dta", replace 
 
* generate graphs 
sort cited_decade timediff 
tabstat citesperyear if cited_decade == 1580, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line citesperyear timediff) if cited_decade == 1580, /// 
 name(g1580) xtitle("") ytitle(number of cites) title(1580's) subtitle(`numobs' 
cases) legend(off) 
tabstat cites if cited_decade == 1700, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line citesperyear timediff) if cited_decade == 1700, /// 
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 name(g1700) xtitle(years since reported) ytitle(number of cites) title(1700's) 
subtitle(`numobs' cases) legend(off) 
 
* complete overview 
keep if inrange(cited_decade,1580,1700) 
twoway line citesperyear timediff, by(cited_decade,  rows(5) legend(off)) xtitle(years 
since reported) ytitle(number of cites) 
graph export "$path/survival cases all decades.png", replace 
 
  
** random model 
forvalues y = 1/100 { 
 clear 
 use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_`y'.dta" 
 
 * drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
 keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 keep if citing_date >= 1700 
 
 * determine most recent citing year 
 collapse (max) citing_date, by(cited_uid cited_date) 
 gen timediff = citing_date - cited_date 
 gen cited_decade = 10*floor(cited_date/10) 
 
 * time difference histograms for specific cited decades 
 gen uid = _n 
 collapse (count) citesperyear = uid, by(cited_decade timediff) 
 
 * save to temporary folder 
 save "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_survival_`y'.dta", 
replace 
} 
* combine random simulation 
clear 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_survival_1.dta" 
forvalues y = 2/100 { 
append using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_survival_`y'.dta" 
} 
collapse (mean) citesperyear, by(cited_decade timediff) 
 
* generate graphs 
sort cited_decade timediff 
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tabstat cites if cited_decade == 1580, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = round(tabs[1,1],1) 
twoway (line citesperyear timediff) if cited_decade == 1580, /// 
 name(rg1580) xtitle("") ytitle("") title("1580's (random model)") 
subtitle(`numobs' cases) legend(off) 
tabstat cites if cited_decade == 1700, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = round(tabs[1,1],1) 
twoway (line citesperyear timediff) if cited_decade == 1700, /// 
 name(rg1700) xtitle(years since reported) ytitle("") title("1700's (random model)") 
subtitle(`numobs' cases) legend(off) 
 
  
** combine actual and random graphs 
graph combine g1580 rg1580 g1700 rg1700, xcommon ycommon rows(2) 







*** actual top authorities over whole time period 
* open case citations file 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$citesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* define matrix to collect results 
matrix define year = [.] 
matrix colnames year = year 
mat define meanage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames meanage_topcited = meantop10 meantop50 meantop100 meantop500 
mat define medianage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames medianage_topcited = medianp99 medianp95 medianp90 medianp80 
mat define sdage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames sdage_topcited = sdtop10 sdtop50 sdtop100 sdtop500 
mat define madage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 





forvalues y = 1700/1865 { 
 preserve 
 di "year: `y' **************************************" 
 keep if citing_date <= `y' 
 
 collapse (count) cites = cited_uid, by(cited_uidcombined cited_nomcitematched 
cited_date) 
 gsort - cites + cited_uidcombined 
 
 egen p99 = pctile(cites), p(99) 
 egen p95 = pctile(cites), p(95) 
 egen p90 = pctile(cites), p(90) 
 egen p80 = pctile(cites), p(80) 
  
 gen timediff = `y' - cited_date 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 10 
 scalar meantop10 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop10 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p99, detail 
 scalar medianp99 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp99 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p99 
 su madp99 
 scalar madp99 = `r(mean)' 
 
 su timediff if _n <= 50, detail 
 scalar meantop50 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop50 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p95, detail 
 scalar medianp95 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp95 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p95 
 su madp95 
 scalar madp95 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 100, detail 
 scalar meantop100 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop100 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p90, detail 
 scalar medianp90 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp90 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p90 
 su madp90 
 scalar madp90 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 500, detail 
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 scalar meantop500 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop500 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p80, detail 
 scalar medianp80 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp80 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p80 
 su madp80 
 scalar madp80 = `r(mean)' 
  
 hist timediff if _n <= 100, percent width(5) xscale(reverse) name(h`y'top100) 
nodraw /// 
  title(`y', size(large) color(black) position(12) orientation(horizontal) 
ring(0) margin(vlarge)) 
  
 keep if _n <= 500 
 save "$path/_temp/meanagemedianage_topcited`y'.dta", replace 
  
 matrix define year = [year \ `y'] 
 matrix define meanage_topcited = [meanage_topcited \ 
meantop10,meantop50,meantop100,meantop500] 
 matrix define medianage_topcited = [medianage_topcited \ 
medianp99,medianp95,medianp90,medianp80] 
 matrix define sdage_topcited = [sdage_topcited \ sdtop10, sdtop50, sdtop100, 
sdtop500] 






matrix define meanagemediansdmad = 
[year,meanage_topcited,medianage_topcited,sdage_topcited,madage_topcited] 
svmat meanagemediansdmad, names(col) 
drop if year == . 
save "$path/_temp/meanagemedianage_topcited_all.dta", replace 
 
twoway (line meantop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line meantop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
meantop100 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line meantop500 year, lcolor(black)), name(mean) 
xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(mean) legend(region(col(white))) 
twoway (line sdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line sdtop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line sdtop100 
year, lcolor(gs4)) (line sdtop500 year, lcolor(black)), name(sd) xlabel(1700(40)1865) 
title(sd) legend(region(col(white))) 
twoway (line medianp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line medianp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
medianp90 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line medianp80 year, lcolor(black)), name(median) 
xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(median) legend(region(col(white))) 
 314 
 
twoway (line madp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line madp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line madp90 
year, lcolor(gs4)) (line madp80 year, lcolor(black)), name(mad) xlabel(1700(40)1865) 
title(mad) legend(region(col(white))) 
 
graph combine mean sd 
graph export "$path/meanage_sdage_topcited.png", replace 
 
graph combine median mad 
graph export "$path/medianage_madage_toppercentiles.png", replace 
 
graph combine h1740top100 h1790top100 h1810top100 h1860top100, xcommon 
ycommon 






*** top authorities over whole time period (random model) 
* open case citations file 
clear 
graph drop _all 
 
forvalues n = 1/100 { 
 use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_`n'.dta" 
 * drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
 keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 keep if citing_date >= 1700 
 
 
 * define matrix to collect results 
 matrix define year = [.] 
 matrix colnames year = year 
 mat define meanage_topcited_random = [.,.,.,.] 
 matrix colnames meanage_topcited_random = meantop10 meantop50 
meantop100 meantop500 
 mat define medianage_topcited_random = [.,.,.,.] 
 matrix colnames medianage_topcited_random = medianp99 medianp95 
medianp90 medianp80 
 mat define sdage_topcited_random = [.,.,.,.] 
 matrix colnames sdage_topcited_random = sdtop10 sdtop50 sdtop100 sdtop500 
 mat define madage_topcited_random = [.,.,.,.] 





 forvalues y = 1701/1865 { 
  preserve 
  di "year: `y' **************************************" 
  keep if citing_date <= `y' 
 
  collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(cited_uid cited_date) 
  gsort - cites + cited_uid 
 
  egen p99 = pctile(cites), p(99) 
  egen p95 = pctile(cites), p(95) 
  egen p90 = pctile(cites), p(90) 
  egen p80 = pctile(cites), p(80) 
   
  gen timediff = `y' - cited_date 
   
  su timediff if _n <= 10 
  scalar meantop10 = `r(mean)' 
  scalar sdtop10 = `r(sd)' 
  su timediff if cites >= p99, detail 
  scalar medianp99 = `r(p50)' 
  egen madp99 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p99 
  su madp99 
  scalar madp99 = `r(mean)' 
 
  su timediff if _n <= 50, detail 
  scalar meantop50 = `r(mean)' 
  scalar sdtop50 = `r(sd)' 
  su timediff if cites >= p95, detail 
  scalar medianp95 = `r(p50)' 
  egen madp95 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p95 
  su madp95 
  scalar madp95 = `r(mean)' 
   
  su timediff if _n <= 100, detail 
  scalar meantop100 = `r(mean)' 
  scalar sdtop100 = `r(sd)' 
  su timediff if cites >= p90, detail 
  scalar medianp90 = `r(p50)' 
  egen madp90 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p90 
  su madp90 
  scalar madp90 = `r(mean)' 
   
  su timediff if _n <= 500, detail 
  scalar meantop500 = `r(mean)' 
  scalar sdtop500 = `r(sd)' 
  su timediff if cites >= p80, detail 
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  scalar medianp80 = `r(p50)' 
  egen madp80 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p80 
  su madp80 
  scalar madp80 = `r(mean)' 
   
  matrix define year = [year \ `y'] 
  matrix define meanage_topcited_random = [meanage_topcited_random \ 
meantop10,meantop50,meantop100,meantop500] 
  matrix define medianage_topcited_random = 
[medianage_topcited_random \ medianp99,medianp95,medianp90,medianp80] 
  matrix define sdage_topcited_random = [sdage_topcited_random \ 
sdtop10, sdtop50, sdtop100, sdtop500] 
  matrix define madage_topcited_random = [madage_topcited_random \ 
madp99, madp95, madp90, madp80] 




 matrix define meanagemediansdmad_random = 
[year,meanage_topcited_random,medianage_topcited_random,sdage_topcited_random,m
adage_topcited_random] 
 svmat meanagemediansdmad_random, names(col) 
 drop if year == . 
 save "$path/_temp/meanagemediansdmad_random_`n'.dta", replace 
} 
 
* calculate expected value of mc simmulations 
clear 
use "$path/_temp/meanagemediansdmad_random_1.dta" 
forvalues n = 2/100 { 
 append using "$path/_temp/meanagemediansdmad_random_`n'.dta" 
 } 
  
collapse (mean) meantop10 meantop50 meantop100 meantop500 medianp99 medianp95 
medianp90 medianp80 sdtop10 sdtop50 sdtop100 sdtop500 madp99 madp95 madp90 
madp80, by(year) 
 
* remove labels 
ds3 
foreach v in `r(varlist)' { 




twoway (line meantop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line meantop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
meantop100 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line meantop500 year, lcolor(black)), name(mean) 
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xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(mean) legend(region(col(white) label(1 "top 1%") label(2 "top 
5%") label(3 "top 10%") label(4 "top 20%"))) 
twoway (line sdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line sdtop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line sdtop100 
year, lcolor(gs4)) (line sdtop500 year, lcolor(black)), name(sd) xlabel(1700(40)1865) 
title(sd) legend(region(col(white))) 
twoway (line medianp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line medianp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
medianp90 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line medianp80 year, lcolor(black)), name(median) 
xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(median) legend(region(col(white))) 
twoway (line madp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line madp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line madp90 
year, lcolor(gs4)) (line madp80 year, lcolor(black)), name(mad) xlabel(1700(40)1865) 
title(mad) legend(region(col(white))) 
 
grc1leg combine mean sd, name(meansd) xcommon ycommon 
grc1leg combine median mad, name(meansd) xcommon ycommon 
 
graph combine meansd medianmad, rows(2) 





*** top 100 authorities in specific time periods 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$citesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
forvalues y = 1740(30)1830 { 
 preserve 
 local yend = `y' + 30 
 keep if inrange(citing_date, `y',`yend') 
 collapse (count) cites = cited_uid, by(cited_uidcombined cited_nomcitematched 
cited_date) 
 gsort - cites + cited_uidcombined 
 keep if _n <= 100 
 hist cited_date, freq width(5) name(h`y'_`yend') nodraw /// 
  xtitle(year of cited case) title(`y' - `yend', size(large) color(black) 






graph combine h1740_1770 h1770_1800 h1800_1830 h1830_1860, xcommon ycommon 








*** generate example time profile for year 1780 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$citesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
  
* calculate relative cites for example year 
keep if citing_date == 1780 
collapse (count) cites = cited_uidcombined, by(cited_date) 
egen cites_total = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/cites_total 
 
* aggregate over semidecades 
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(cited_date/5)  
bysort cited_semidecade: egen citesrel_semidecade = total(citesrel) 
bysort cited_semidecade: replace citesrel_semidecade = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot graph and save 
line citesrel cited_date, xtitle(year) ytitle(fraction of citations per year) lcolor(gs2) 
name(year) 
line citesrel_semidecade cited_semidecade, xtitle(year) ytitle(fraction of citations per 
semidecade) lcolor(gs6) name(semidecade) 
graph combine year semidecade, rows(2) 




*** generate comparison between model prediction and actual observations for year 1790 
clear 
graph drop _all 
set more off 
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use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model estimation/ready to 
estimate delta new.dta" 
 
keep if year == 1780 
drop if dT == 1 
 
 
** actual data 
preserve 
keep if target == 1 
collapse (count) cites=uid, by(target_possible) 
egen cites_total = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/cites_total 
line citesrel target_possible, title(actual data) xtitle("") ytitle("") name(actual) 
 
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(target_possible/5)  
bysort cited_semidecade: egen citesrel_semidecade = total(citesrel) 
bysort cited_semidecade: replace citesrel_semidecade = . if _n != 1 






** representative courtroom model 
asclogit target knew_ln dT, case(uid) alternatives(target_possible) noconstant 
predict predicted 
 
collapse (mean) predicted, by(target_possible) 
line predicted target_possible, title(representative courtroom model) xtitle(year) ytitle("") 
cmissing(n) name(courtroom) 
 
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(target_possible/5)  
bysort cited_semidecade: egen citesrel_semidecade = total(predicted) 
bysort cited_semidecade: replace citesrel_semidecade = . if _n != 1 
line citesrel_semidecade cited_semidecade, title(representative courtroom model) 
xtitle("") ytitle("") name(courtroomsemidecade) 
 
** random citing model 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"KB", "CP", "EX", "NP") 
 
collapse (count) cases = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(date) 
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keep if date < 1780 
egen casestotal1800 = total(cases) 
gen citesrel = cases/casestotal1800 
 
line citesrel date, title(random citing model) xtitle("") ytitle(fraction of citations per year) 
name(random) 
 
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(date/5)  
bysort cited_semidecade: egen citesrel_semidecade = total(citesrel) 
bysort cited_semidecade: replace citesrel_semidecade = . if _n != 1 




** combine graphs 
graph combine actual random courtroom , ycommon imargin(b=1 t=1) rows(3) name(g1) 
graph combine actualsemidecade randomsemidecade courtroomsemidecade, ycommon 
imargin(b=1 t=1) rows(3) name(g2) 
graph combine g1 g2 







*** time profiles 
** random citing model 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"KB", "CP", "EX", "NP") 
 
* generate semidecades variable 
gen semidecade = 5 * floor(date/5)  
 
* calculate number of cases per year and number of total cases preceding year 
collapse (count) casessemidecade = uid [fweight=nomcite_num], by(semidecade decade) 
 
gen casestotal = . 
 replace casestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace casestotal = casessemidecade[_n-1] + casestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
 




** citing_decade to cited_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
preserve 
forvalues y = 1700(10)1860 { 
 su casestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 gen citing_casestotal = `r(mean)' 
 gen citing_randompercent`y' = casessemidecade/citing_casestotal if semidecade < 
`y' 
 drop citing_casestotal 
} 
 
* clean, reshape and save to file 
drop decade casessemidecade casestotal casesdecade 
ren semidecade cited_semidecade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_semidecade) j(citing_decade) 
order citing_decade cited_semidecade 




** cited_decade to citing_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
forvalues y = 1700(5)1865 { 
 su casestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 gen citing_casestotal = `r(mean)' 
 gen citing_randompercenttemp`y' = casessemidecade/citing_casestotal if 
semidecade < `y' 
 bysort decade: egen citing_randompercent`y' = 
total(citing_randompercenttemp`y'), missing 
 drop citing_casestotal citing_randompercenttemp`y' 
} 
 
* clean, reshape and save to file 
keep if semidecade/10 == int(semidecade/10) 
drop semidecade casessemidecade casestotal casesdecade 
ren decade cited_decade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_decade) j(citing_semidecade) 
order citing_semidecade cited_decade 
save "$path/_temp/timeprofilerandomcites citingsemidecade to citeddecade.dta", replace 
 
 
** actual observations 






* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* generate semidecades variable 
gen citing_semidecade = 5 * floor(citing_date/5)  
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(cited_date/5)  
 
* generate citation counts per cited semidecade by citing decade  
preserve 
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_semidecade) 
by citing_decade: egen citing_decadetotal = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/citing_decadetotal 
 
merge 1:1 citing_decade cited_semidecade using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/timeprofilerandomcites citingdecade to 
citedsemidecade.dta" 
drop if _merge == 1 
dropmiss citesrel citing_randompercent, obs force 
sort citing_decade cited_semidecade 
 
twoway (line citesrel cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1650(100)1850, grid) 
ytitle(fraction of citations) yscale(range(0 0.18)) ylabel(0(0.05)0.18) lcolor(gs6)) /// 
 (line citing_randompercent cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1650(100)1850) 
yscale(range(0 0.18)) ylabel(0(0.05)0.18) lcolor(gs10) lpattern(shortdash)), /// 
 by(citing_decade, note("") legend(off) rows(3) compact) 
graph export "$path/time profiles cited semidecade by citing decade.png", replace 
restore 
 
* generate citation counts per citing semidecade by cited decade 
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(citing_semidecade cited_decade) 
by citing_semidecade: egen citing_semidecadetotal = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/citing_semidecadetotal 
 
merge 1:1 cited_decade citing_semidecade using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/timeprofilerandomcites citingsemidecade to 
citeddecade.dta" 
drop if _merge == 1 
dropmiss citesrel citing_randompercent, obs force 




twoway (line citesrel citing_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1750(50)1850, grid) 
ytitle(fraction of citations) color(gs10)) /// 
 (line citing_randompercent citing_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1750(50)1850) 
lcolor(gs10) lpattern(shortdash)), by(cited_decade, note("") legend(off) rows(3) compact) 








* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* generate semidecade variable 
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(cited_date/5)  
 
* generate citation counts per cited semidecade by citing decade  
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_semidecade) 
by citing_decade: egen citing_decadetotal = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/citing_decadetotal 
 
* reshape 
drop cites citing_decadetotal 
reshape wide citesrel, i(cited_semidecade) j(citing_decade) 
forvalues y = 1700(10)1860 { 




* matrix graph and correlation matrix for selected decades 
graph matrix citesrel1700 citesrel1720 citesrel1740 citesrel1760 citesrel1780 citesrel1800 
citesrel1820 citesrel1840 citesrel1860, /// 
 half msymbol(p) maxes(ylab(0.05 0.10) xlab(0.05 0.10) xscale(range(0 0.15)) 
yscale(range(0 0.15))) 
graph export "$path/matrixgraphs_citingsemidecade.png", replace 
cd "$path" 
mkcorr citesrel1700 citesrel1720 citesrel1740 citesrel1760 citesrel1770 citesrel1780 







*** time plot of parameter estimates from conditional logit model 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model 
estimation/results_constrained 120 years indegreeadded.dta" 
replace delta = -1*delta 
serrbar delta deltase year, scale(1.96) xlabel(1700(20)1870) legend(off) addplot(lowess 
delta year, bwidth(0.2) lcolor(red) xlabel(1700(20)1870)) 
graph export "$path/citation model estimates constrained 120 years.png", replace 
 
clear 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model 
estimation/results_unconstrained 120 years indegreeadded.dta" 
graph drop _all 
replace delta = -1*delta 
serrbar delta deltase year, scale(1.96) xlabel(1700(20)1870) legend(off) addplot(lowess 
delta year, bwidth(0.2) lcolor(red) xlabel(1700(20)1870)) name(delta) 
serrbar alpha alphase year, scale(1.96)  xlabel(1700(20)1870) legend(off) addplot(lowess 
alpha year, bwidth(0.2) lcolor(red) xlabel(1700(20)1870)) name(alpha) 
graph combine delta alpha, rows(2) 
graph export "$path/citation model estimates unconstrained 120 years.png", replace 
 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model estimation/results lrtest 
120 years indegreeadded.dta" 
twoway (line chi2 year) , xlabel(1700(20)1870) legend(off) 







*** temporal composition of communities 
*** prepare gephi & r input 
* actual nodes 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"KB", "CP", "EX", "NP") 
ren uid id 




outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes.csv", comma replace 
 
* actual cites 
clear 
use "$citesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
ren citing_uidcombined source 
ren cited_uidcombined target 
gen type = "directed" 
keep source target type 
sort source 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi cites.csv", comma replace 
 
* eliminate isolated actual nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/common law communityanalysis start.csv" 
bysort modularityclass: egen modularityclassize = count(id) 
drop if modularityclassize < 10 
keep id nomcite date 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates.csv", comma replace 
save "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 
nodes no isolates.dta", replace 
 
* eliminate cites to/from isolated actual nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi cites.csv" 
ren source id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates.dta" 
ren id source 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
ren target id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates.dta" 
ren id target 




keep source target type 
rm "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 
nodes no isolates.dta" 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi cites no isolates.csv", comma replace 
 
* random nodes 
clear 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_100.dta" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep citing_uid citing_date 
ren citing_uid id 
ren citing_date date 
save "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 




paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_100.dta" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep cited_uid cited_date 
ren cited_uid id 
ren cited_date date 
append using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes random temp.dta" 
rm "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 
nodes random temp.dta" 
duplicates drop id, force 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes random.csv", comma replace 
 
* random cites 
clear 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/randommodel case citations_100.dta" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
ren citing_uid source 
ren cited_uid target 
gen type = "directed" 




outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi cites random.csv", comma replace 
 
* eliminate isolated random nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/common law communityanalysis start random.csv" 
bysort modularityclass: egen modularityclassize = count(id) 
drop if modularityclassize < 10 
keep id date 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates random.csv", comma replace 
save "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 
nodes no isolates random.dta", replace 
 
* eliminate cites to/from isolated random nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi cites random.csv" 
ren source id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates random.dta" 
ren id source 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
ren target id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/gephi nodes no isolates random.dta" 
ren id target 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
keep source target type 
rm "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/gephi 
nodes no isolates random.dta" 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 




*** characterize detected communities 
** spinglass2 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_sg2.csv" 
 
* label communities 
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ren membership spinglass2 
recode spinglass2 (1=2) (2=1) 
label define spinglass2 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 
label values spinglass2 spinglass2 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_spinglass2.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date spinglass2) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date spinglass2: egen datespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datespinglass2percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade spinglass2: egen semidecadespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadespinglass2percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade spinglass2: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, 





insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_sg3.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren membership spinglass3 
label define spinglass3 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2"  3 "community 3" 
label values spinglass3 spinglass3 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_spinglass3.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 




bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date spinglass3: egen datespinglass3percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datespinglass3percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade spinglass3: egen semidecadespinglass3percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadespinglass3percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade spinglass3: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 3, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass3 == 3, 





insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_sg4.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren membership spinglass4 
label define spinglass4 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2"  3 "community 3" 4 
"community 4" 
label values spinglass4 spinglass4 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_spinglass4.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date spinglass4) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date spinglass4: egen datespinglass4percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datespinglass4percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade spinglass4: egen semidecadespinglass4percent = total(percent) 
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gen semidecadefraction = semidecadespinglass4percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade spinglass4: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs10)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 3, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs6)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 3, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 4, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass4 == 4, 






* import data 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_louvain2.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren modularityclass louvain2 
replace louvain2 = louvain2 + 1 
label define louvain2 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 
label values louvain2 louvain2 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_louvain2.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date louvain2) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date louvain2: egen datelouvain2percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datelouvain2percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade louvain2: egen semidecadelouvain2percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadelouvain2percent/semidecadepercent 
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bysort semidecade louvain2: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 2, 




* import data 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_louvain3.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren modularityclass louvain3 
replace louvain3 = louvain3 + 1 
label define louvain3 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 3 "community 3" 
label values louvain3 louvain3 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_louvain3.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date louvain3) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date louvain3: egen datelouvain3percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datelouvain3percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade louvain3: egen semidecadelouvain3percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadelouvain3percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade louvain3: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs12)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
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 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 3, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain3 == 3, 




* import data 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_louvain4.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren modularityclass louvain4 
replace louvain4 = louvain4 + 1 
label define louvain4 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 3 "community 3"  4 
"community 4" 
label values louvain4 louvain4 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/communitydetection_louvain4.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date louvain4) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date louvain4: egen datelouvain4percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datelouvain4percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade louvain4: egen semidecadelouvain4percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadelouvain4percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade louvain4: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs16)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs12)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 3, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 3, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
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 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 4, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain4 == 4, 








keep nomcite date spinglass2 
 
























hist date, freq width(5) by(spinglass2, title(spinglass communities) note("")) 
name(histsg2) 
hist date, freq width(5) by(louvain2, title(louvain communities) note("")) 
name(histlouvain2) 
graph combine histsg2 histlouvain2, rows(2) ycommon 




graph combine sg2 louvain2, rows(1) ycommon 
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hist date, freq width(5) by(spinglass3) 
hist date, freq width(5) by(louvain3) 
 
hist date, freq width(5) by(spinglass4) 
hist date, freq width(5) by(louvain4) 
 
graph combine sg2 sg3 sg4 louvain2 louvain3 louvain4, rows(2) ycommon 




*** random citing model 
** spinglass2 (random) 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_random_sg2.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren idrandom id 
ren daterandom date 
ren membership spinglass2 
label define spinglass2 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 
label values spinglass2 spinglass2 
 
* histogram 
hist date, freq width(5) by(spinglass2, title(spinglass communities) note("")) 
name(histsg2random) 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date spinglass2) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date spinglass2: egen datespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datespinglass2percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade spinglass2: egen semidecadespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadespinglass2percent/semidecadepercent 





twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)), legend(off) title("2 spinglass communities") name(sg2random) 
 
  
** louvain2 (random) 
* import data 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/communityanalysis_louvain2 random.csv" 
 
* label communities 
ren modularityclass louvain2 
replace louvain2 = louvain2 + 1 
recode louvain2 (1=2) (2=1) 
label define louvain2 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 
label values louvain2 louvain2 
 
* histogram 
hist date, freq width(5) by(louvain2, title(louvain communities) note("")) 
name(histlouvain2random) 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date louvain2) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date louvain2: egen datelouvain2percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datelouvain2percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade louvain2: egen semidecadelouvain2percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadelouvain2percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade louvain2: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if louvain2 == 2, 







graph combine histsg2random histlouvain2random, rows(2) ycommon 




graph combine sg2random louvain2random, rows(1) ycommon 







*** quality of case reports 
** quality and authority 
clear 
use "$citesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
keep if inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
collapse (count) cites = citing_uidcombined, by(cited_uidcombined cited_numwords) 
keep if cites <= 40 
keep if cited_numwords <= 15000 
twoway (scatter cites cited_numwords, msize(vtiny) jitter(1.5)) (lowess cites 
cited_numwords, lcolor(red) lwidth(medium)), xtitle(number of words in case report) 
ytitle(number of citations) legend(off) 
graph export "$path/casereportqualitycites.png", replace 
 
* quality over time 
clear 
use "$casescombinedinput" 
merge m:m nomcite_vol using "$volumesinput" 
keep if inrange(date, 1580,1865) 
keep if inlist(court,"KB", "CP", "EX", "NP") 
 
bysort date: egen num_wordsave = mean(num_words) 
 
keep if num_words <= 15000 
 
twoway (scatter num_words date, msize(vtiny)) /// 
 (line num_wordsave date, lcolor(red) lwidth(medium) cmissing(n)) /// 
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 , xtitle(date) ytitle(number of words in case report) legend(off) 













*** prepare us law data 
** case attributes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/0_Data/US/judicial.csv" 
rename caseid uid 
rename year date 
gen decade = 10*floor(date/10) 
rename usid uscite 
order uid uscite date decade parties 
keep if date >= 1780 




** case citations 
clear 




ren v1 uid 
merge m:1 uid using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/US/case_attributes.dta", keepusing(date decade uscite parties) 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
ren uid citing_uid 
ren uscite citing_uscite 
ren date citing_date 
ren decade citing_decade 





ren v2 uid 
merge m:1 uid using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/US/case_attributes.dta", keepusing(date decade uscite parties) 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
ren uid cited_uid 
ren uscite cited_uscite 
ren date cited_date 
ren decade cited_decade 
ren parties cited_parties 
 
order citing* cited* 
keep if citing_date >= 1780 
keep if cited_date >= 1780 









collapse (count) uscases = uid, by(date) 
label variable date "year" 
label variable uscases "number of case reports" 
merge 1:1 date using "$path/_temp/commonlawcases.dta" 
 
sort date 
twoway (line uscases date) (line cases date, lpattern(dash)), legend(label(1 "us judicial 
opinions") label(2 "er common law case reports") rows(2) region(col(white))) 




*** time depreciation 
clear 
use "$uscitesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
* calculate cites per time difference 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_date 
label variable timediff "years between citing and cited case" 
collapse (count) uscites = citing_uid, by(timediff) 
label variable uscites "number of cites" 
save "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcitestimedifferences.dta", replace 
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merge 1:1 timediff using "$path/_temp/commonlawcitestimedifferences.dta" 
 
* fit exponential decay model 
gen logcites = ln(cites) 
reg logcites timediff 
predict logciteshat 
 
gen uslogcites = ln(uscites) 
reg uslogcites timediff 
predict uslogciteshat 
esttab using "$path/ustimedepreciationfit.rtf", se r2(%9.2f) replace 
 
* plot and export graph 
twoway (line uslogcites timediff, lcolor(edkblue)) (line uslogciteshat timediff, 
lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line logcites timediff, lcolor(edkblue) lpattern(dash)) (line logciteshat timediff, 
lcolor(red) lpattern(dash)), /// 
 legend(label(1 "actual us log cites") label(2 "us log cites exponential model 
prediction") /// 
 label(3 "actual er log cites") label(4 "er log cites exponential model prediction") 
/// 
 rows(2) region(col(white))) xtitle(years between citing and cited case) 




*** degree distribution and attachment rates 
clear 
use "$uscitesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
** in-degree distribution 
* calculate 
collapse (count) indegree = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
collapse (count) uscount = cited_uid, by(indegree) 
save "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcasesindegrees.dta", replace 
merge 1:1 indegree using  "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesindegrees.dta" 
 
* plot 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = uscount], freq width(1)) (line count indegree [fweight = 
count]), /// 
  legend(label(1 "us distribution of received citations") label(2 "er common law 
distribution of received citations") rows(2) region(col(white))) xtitle(received citations) 
name(indegree1) 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = uscount] if indegree <= 20, freq width(1)) (line count 
indegree [fweight = count] if indegree <= 20), /// 
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 legend(off) xtitle(received citations) name(indegree2) 
grc1leg indegree1 indegree2, ycommon  
graph export "$path/usdegreedistributions.png", replace  
 
 
** attachment rates 
clear 
use "$uscitesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
* calculate attachment rates for different decades 
forvalues y = 1820 (10) 2000 { 
 
 * case indegrees for previous periods 
 preserve 
 keep if citing_date < `y' 
 collapse (count) citesold = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
 save "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcasescitesold_`y'.dta", replace 
 restore 
 
 * case indegrees for current period 
 preserve 
 keep if citing_decade == `y' 
 keep if cited_date < `y' 
 collapse (count) citesnew = citing_uid, by(cited_uid) 
 merge 1:1 cited_uid using "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcasescitesold_`y'.dta" 
 replace citesnew = 0  if citesnew == . 
 replace citesold = 0  if citesold == . 
 
 * calculate attachment average vs case indegree of previous periods 
 egen citesoldaggregated = cut(citesold), at(1(1)17,20,23,30,100) 
 drop citesold 
 ren citesoldaggregated citesold 
 collapse (mean) citesnew (sum) sumcitesnew=citesnew, by(citesold) 
  
  




* combine and average decade attachment rates 
clear 
use "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcasesattachments_1790.dta" 
forvalues y = 1790 (10) 2000 { 





collapse (mean) uscitesnew = citesnew [fweight=sumcitesnew], by(citesold) 
save "$path/_temp/uscommonlawcasesattachmentrates.dta", replace 
merge 1:1 citesold using "$path/_temp/commonlawcasesattachmentrates.dta" 
 
* plot 
twoway (line uscitesnew citesold) (line citesnew citesold), /// 
 xtitle(citations received before citing decade) ytitle(average number of new 
citations) /// 
 legend(label(1 "us distribution of attachment rates") label(2 "er common law 
distribution of attachment rates") rows(2) region(col(white))) xtitle(years between citing 
and cited case) 







keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
* determine most recent citing year 
collapse (max) citing_date, by(cited_uid cited_date) 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_date 
gen cited_decade = 10*floor(cited_date/10) 
 
* time difference histograms for specific cited decades 
gen uid = _n 
collapse (count) uscitesperyear = uid, by(cited_decade timediff) 
merge 1:1 timediff cited_decade using "$path/_temp/survical cases all decades.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
* generate graphs 
sort cited_decade timediff 
tabstat uscitesperyear if cited_decade == 1800, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line uscitesperyear timediff if cited_decade == 1800), /// 
  name(usg1800) xtitle("years since reported") ytitle(number of cites) title(1800's) 
subtitle(`numobs' cases) legend(off) 
tabstat uscitesperyear if cited_decade == 1840, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line uscitesperyear timediff if cited_decade == 1840), /// 
  name(usg1840) xtitle("years since reported") ytitle(number of cites) title(1840's) 
subtitle(`numobs' cases) legend(off) 
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graph combine usg1800 usg1840, cols(2) xcommon ycommon 
graph export "$path/ussurvival cases 2 decades.png", replace 
 
* complete overview 
keep if inrange(cited_decade,1800,1900) 
twoway line uscitesperyear timediff, by(cited_decade,  rows(4) legend(off)) xtitle(years 
since reported) ytitle(number of cites) 




*** actual top authorities over whole time period 
* open case citations file 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$uscitesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
* define matrix to collect results 
matrix define year = [.] 
matrix colnames year = year 
mat define meanage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames meanage_topcited = meantop10 meantop50 meantop100 meantop500 
mat define medianage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames medianage_topcited = medianp99 medianp95 medianp90 medianp80 
mat define sdage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames sdage_topcited = sdtop10 sdtop50 sdtop100 sdtop500 
mat define madage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames madage_topcited = madp99 madp95 madp90 madp80 
 
 
forvalues y = 1820/2000 { 
 preserve 
 di "year: `y' **************************************" 
 keep if citing_date <= `y' 
 
 collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(cited_uid cited_parties cited_date) 
 gsort - cites + cited_uid 
 
 egen p99 = pctile(cites), p(99) 
 egen p95 = pctile(cites), p(95) 
 egen p90 = pctile(cites), p(90) 




 gen timediff = `y' - cited_date 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 10 
 scalar meantop10 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop10 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p99, detail 
 scalar medianp99 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp99 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p99 
 su madp99 
 scalar madp99 = `r(mean)' 
 
 su timediff if _n <= 50, detail 
 scalar meantop50 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop50 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p95, detail 
 scalar medianp95 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp95 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p95 
 su madp95 
 scalar madp95 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 100, detail 
 scalar meantop100 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop100 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p90, detail 
 scalar medianp90 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp90 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p90 
 su madp90 
 scalar madp90 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 500, detail 
 scalar meantop500 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop500 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p80, detail 
 scalar medianp80 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp80 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p80 
 su madp80 
 scalar madp80 = `r(mean)' 
  
 hist timediff if _n <= 100, percent width(5) xscale(reverse) name(ush`y'top100) 
nodraw /// 
  title(`y', size(large) color(black) position(12) orientation(horizontal) 
ring(0) margin(vlarge)) 
  
 keep if _n <= 500 




 matrix define year = [year \ `y'] 
 matrix define meanage_topcited = [meanage_topcited \ 
meantop10,meantop50,meantop100,meantop500] 
 matrix define medianage_topcited = [medianage_topcited \ 
medianp99,medianp95,medianp90,medianp80] 
 matrix define sdage_topcited = [sdage_topcited \ sdtop10, sdtop50, sdtop100, 
sdtop500] 






matrix define meanagemediansdmad = 
[year,meanage_topcited,medianage_topcited,sdage_topcited,madage_topcited] 
svmat meanagemediansdmad, names(col) 
drop if year == . 
ren * us* 
ren usyear year 
save "$path/_temp/usmeanagemedianage_topcited_all.dta", replace 





twoway (line meantop10 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line meantop50 year, 
lcolor(gs7) lpattern(dash)) (line meantop100 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) (line 
meantop500 year, lcolor(black) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line usmeantop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line usmeantop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) 
(line usmeantop100 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line usmeantop500 year, lcolor(black)) /// 
  , name(usmean) xlabel(1700(40)2000) ytitle(years) title(mean) 
legend(region(col(white)) rows(2) /// 
  label(1 "england top 10") label(2 "england top 50") label(3 "england top 
100") label(4 "england top 500") label(5 "us top 10") label(6 "us top 50") label(7 "us top 
100") label(8 " us top 500")) 
twoway (line sdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line sdtop50 year, lcolor(gs7) 
lpattern(dash)) (line sdtop100 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) (line sdtop500 year, 
lcolor(black) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line ussdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line ussdtop50 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
ussdtop100 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line ussdtop500 year, lcolor(black)) /// 
  , name(ussd) xlabel(1700(40)2000) title(sd) legend(off) 
twoway (line medianp99 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line medianp95 year, 
lcolor(gs7) lpattern(dash)) (line medianp90 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) (line 
medianp80 year, lcolor(black) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line usmedianp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line usmedianp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) 
(line usmedianp90 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line usmedianp80 year, lcolor(black)) /// 
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  , name(usmedian) xlabel(1700(40)2000) ytitle(years) title(median) 
legend(region(col(white)) rows(2) /// 
  label(1 "england top 1%") label(2 "england top 5%") label(3 "england top 
10%") label(4 "england top 20%") label(5 "us top 1%") label(6 "us top 5%") label(7 "us 
top 10%") label(8 " us top 20%")) 
twoway (line madp99 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line madp95 year, lcolor(gs7) 
lpattern(dash)) (line madp90 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) (line madp80 year, 
lcolor(black) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line usmadp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line usmadp95 year, lcolor(gs7)) (line 
usmadp90 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line usmadp80 year, lcolor(black)) /// 
  , name(usmad) xlabel(1700(40)2000) title(mad) legend(off) 
 
grc1leg  usmean ussd 
graph export "$path/usmeanage_sdage_topcited.png", replace 
 
grc1leg usmedian usmad 
graph export "$path/usmedianage_madage_toppercentiles.png", replace 
 
graph combine ush1880top100 ush1920top100 ush1960top100 ush1990top100, 
xcommon ycommon 




*** top 100 authorities in specific time periods 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$uscitesinput" 
 
* drop non-precedents and non-common law citations 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
forvalues y = 1830(40)1950 { 
 preserve 
 local yend = `y' + 30 
 di "`y'`yend'" 
 keep if inrange(citing_date, `y',`yend') 
 collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(cited_uid cited_parties cited_date) 
 gsort - cites + cited_uid 
 keep if _n <= 100 
 hist cited_date, freq width(5) name(ush`y'_`yend') nodraw /// 
  xtitle(year of cited case) title(`y' - `yend', size(large) color(black) 






graph combine ush1830_1860 ush1870_1900 ush1910_1940 ush1950_1980, xcommon 
ycommon 







*** time profiles 




* generate semidecades variable 
gen semidecade = 5 * floor(date/5)  
 
* calculate number of cases per year and number of total cases preceding year 
collapse (count) casessemidecade = uid, by(semidecade decade) 
 
gen casestotal = . 
 replace casestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace casestotal = casessemidecade[_n-1] + casestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
 
bysort decade: egen casesdecade = total(casessemidecade) 
 
** citing_decade to cited_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
preserve 
forvalues y = 1780(10)1995 { 
 su casestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 gen citing_casestotal = `r(mean)' 
 gen citing_randompercent`y' = casessemidecade/citing_casestotal if semidecade < 
`y' 
 drop citing_casestotal 
} 
 
* clean, reshape and save to file 
drop decade casessemidecade casestotal casesdecade 
ren semidecade cited_semidecade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_semidecade) j(citing_decade) 
order citing_decade cited_semidecade 







** cited_decade to citing_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
forvalues y = 1780(5)1995 { 
 su casestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 gen citing_casestotal = `r(mean)' 
 gen citing_randompercenttemp`y' = casessemidecade/citing_casestotal if 
semidecade < `y' 
 bysort decade: egen citing_randompercent`y' = 
total(citing_randompercenttemp`y'), missing 
 drop citing_casestotal citing_randompercenttemp`y' 
} 
 
* clean, reshape and save to file 
keep if semidecade/10 == int(semidecade/10) 
drop semidecade casessemidecade casestotal casesdecade 
ren decade cited_decade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_decade) j(citing_semidecade) 
order citing_semidecade cited_decade 




** actual observations 
* open case citations file 
clear 
use "$uscitesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
 
* generate semidecades variable 
gen citing_semidecade = 5 * floor(citing_date/5)  
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(cited_date/5)  
 
* generate citation counts per cited semidecade by citing decade  
preserve 
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_semidecade) 
by citing_decade: egen citing_decadetotal = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/citing_decadetotal 
 
merge 1:1 citing_decade cited_semidecade using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/ustimeprofilerandomcites citingdecade to 
citedsemidecade.dta" 
drop if _merge == 1 
dropmiss citesrel citing_randompercent, obs force 
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sort citing_decade cited_semidecade 
 
drop if citing_decade == 1790 | citing_decade == 1800 
 
twoway (line citesrel cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1850(50)1950, grid) 
ytitle(fraction of citations) lcolor(gs6)) ///  
 (line citing_randompercent cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1850(50)1950) 
lcolor(gs10) lpattern(shortdash)) /// 
 , by(citing_decade, note("") legend(off) rows(3) compact) 





*** time plot of parameter estimates from conditional logit model 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model estimation/additional 
estimations/US/results_constrained 120 years indegree added.dta" 
replace delta = -1*delta 
serrbar delta deltase year, scale(1.96) xlabel(1840(20)2000) legend(off) addplot(lowess 
delta year, bwidth(0.2) lcolor(red) xlabel(1840(20)2000)) 







*** temporal composition of communities 
*** prepare gephi & r input 
* actual nodes 
clear 
use "$uscasesinput" 
ren uid id 
keep id date 
gen nomcite = id 
tostring nomcite, replace 
sort id 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi nodes.csv", comma replace 
 
* actual cites 
clear 
use "$uscitesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_date 
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ren citing_uid source 
ren cited_uid target 
gen type = "directed" 
keep source target type 
sort source 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi cites.csv", comma replace 
 
* eliminate isolated actual nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/us communityanalysis start.csv" 
bysort modularityclass: egen modularityclassize = count(id) 
drop if modularityclassize < 10 
keep id nomcite date 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi nodes no isolates.csv", comma replace 
save "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi nodes no isolates.dta", replace 
 
* eliminate cites to/from isolated actual nodes 
clear 
insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi cites.csv" 
ren source id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi nodes no isolates.dta" 
ren id source 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
ren target id 
merge m:1 id using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/gephi nodes no isolates.dta" 
ren id target 
keep if _merge == 3 
drop _merge 
keep source target type 
rm "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community detection/US/gephi 
nodes no isolates.dta" 
outsheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 









insheet using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/community 
detection/US/uscommunityanalysis_sg2.csv" 
ren dateus date 
 
* label communities 
ren usmembership spinglass2 
recode spinglass2 (1=2) (2=1) 
label define spinglass2 1 "community 1"  2 "community 2" 
label values spinglass2 spinglass2 
 
* plot temporal compositions 
hist date, freq width(5) by(spinglass2, title(spinglass communities) note("")) 
name(ushistsg2) 
graph export "$path/us communitydetectionhistogram.png", replace 
 
* save to file 
save "$path/_temp/uscommunitydetection_spinglass2.dta", replace 
 
* calculate fractions 
collapse (percent) percent = id, by(date spinglass2) 
 
bysort date: egen datepercent = total(percent) 
bysort date spinglass2: egen datespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen datefraction = datespinglass2percent/datepercent 
 
gen semidecade = 5*floor(date/5) 
bysort semidecade: egen semidecadepercent = total(percent) 
bysort semidecade spinglass2: egen semidecadespinglass2percent = total(percent) 
gen semidecadefraction = semidecadespinglass2percent/semidecadepercent 
bysort semidecade spinglass2: replace semidecadefraction = . if _n != 1 
 
* plot fractions 
twoway (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs8)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 1, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)) /// 
 (line semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, ytitle(fraction) 
ylabel(0(0.2)1) lcolor(gs4)) (lowess semidecadefraction semidecade if spinglass2 == 2, 
bwidth(0.3) lcolor(red)), legend(off) title("2 spinglass communities") name(ussg2) 















*** number of statutes 
clear 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
collapse (mean) statutes = cited_statutechapterstotal, by(cited_statutedate) 
label variable cited_statutedate "year" 
label variable statutes "number of statutes" 




set obs 631 
gen temp1 = 1235 
gen temp2 = _n - 1 
gen cited_statutedate = temp1 + temp2 
keep cited_statutedate 
merge 1:1 cited_statutedate using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/2_Cleaning/_statutes added/statutenumbers.dta", 
drop _merge 
replace statutes = 0 if statutes == . 




twoway (line statutes cited_statutedate,  xlabel(1300(100)1800)) (lowess statutes 
cited_statutedate, bwidth(0.1)), legend(off) 




*** time depreciation 
clear 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 




* calculate cites per time difference 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_statutedate 
label variable timediff "years between citing case and cited statute" 
collapse (count) statutecites = citing_uid, by(timediff) 
label variable statutecites "number of cites" 
save "$path/_temp/statutecitestimedifferences.dta", replace 
 
* fit exponential decay model 
gen statutelogcites = ln(statutecites) 
reg statutelogcites timediff 
predict statutelogciteshat 
esttab using "$path/statutetimedepreciationfit.rtf", se r2(%9.2f) replace 
 
* plot and export graph 
twoway (line statutelogcites timediff, lcolor(edkblue)) (line statutelogciteshat timediff, 
lcolor(red)), /// 
 legend(label(1 "actual statute cites") label(2 "predicted statute cites") /// 
 rows(2) region(col(white))) xtitle(years between citing case and cited statute) 




*** degree distribution 
clear 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* calculate 
collapse (count) indegree = citing_uid, by(cited_statuteregnalyear cited_statutechapter ) 
drop if cited_statutechapter == . 
collapse (count) statutecount = cited_statutechapter, by(indegree) 
save "$path/_temp/statuteindegrees.dta", replace 
 
* plot 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = statutecount], freq width(1)), xtitle(received citations) 
name(indegree1) 
twoway (hist indegree [fweight = statutecount] if indegree <= 50, freq width(1)) , 
xtitle(received citations) name(indegree2) 
graph combine indegree1 indegree2, ycommon  












keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* determine most recent citing year 
collapse (max) citing_date, by(cited_statutedate cited_statutechapter) 
gen timediff = citing_date - cited_statutedate 
gen cited_statutedecade = 10*floor(cited_statutedate/10) 
 
* time difference histograms for specific cited decades 
gen uid = _n 
collapse (count) statutecitesperyear = uid, by(cited_statutedecade timediff) 
 
* generate graphs 
sort cited_statutedecade timediff 
tabstat statutecitesperyear if cited_statutedecade == 1580, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line statutecitesperyear timediff if cited_statutedecade == 1580), /// 
  name(statuteg1580) xtitle("years since enacted") ytitle(number of cites) 
title(1580's) subtitle(`numobs' statutes) legend(off) 
tabstat statutecitesperyear if cited_statutedecade == 1700, st(sum) save 
matrix tabs = r(StatTotal) 
local numobs = tabs[1,1] 
twoway (line statutecitesperyear timediff if cited_statutedecade == 1700), /// 
  name(statuteg1700) xtitle("years since enacted") ytitle(number of statutes) 
title(1700's) subtitle(`numobs' statutes) legend(off) 
graph combine statuteg1580 statuteg1700, cols(2) xcommon ycommon 







*** actual top authorities over whole time period 
* open case citations file 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
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keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* define matrix to collect results 
matrix define year = [.] 
matrix colnames year = year 
mat define meanage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames meanage_topcited = meantop10 meantop50 meantop100 meantop500 
mat define medianage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames medianage_topcited = medianp99 medianp95 medianp90 medianp80 
mat define sdage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames sdage_topcited = sdtop10 sdtop50 sdtop100 sdtop500 
mat define madage_topcited = [.,.,.,.] 
matrix colnames madage_topcited = madp99 madp95 madp90 madp80 
 
 
forvalues y = 1701/1865 { 
 preserve 
 di "year: `y' **************************************" 
 keep if citing_date <= `y' 
 
 collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(cited_statutedate cited_statutechapter) 
 gsort - cites + cited_statutechapter 
 drop if cited_statutechapter == . 
 
 egen p99 = pctile(cites), p(99) 
 egen p95 = pctile(cites), p(95) 
 egen p90 = pctile(cites), p(90) 
 egen p80 = pctile(cites), p(80) 
  
 gen timediff = `y' - cited_statutedate 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 10 
 scalar meantop10 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop10 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p99, detail 
 scalar medianp99 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp99 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p99 
 su madp99 
 scalar madp99 = `r(mean)' 
 
 su timediff if _n <= 50, detail 
 scalar meantop50 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop50 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p95, detail 
 scalar medianp95 = `r(p50)' 
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 egen madp95 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p95 
 su madp95 
 scalar madp95 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 100, detail 
 scalar meantop100 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop100 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p90, detail 
 scalar medianp90 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp90 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p90 
 su madp90 
 scalar madp90 = `r(mean)' 
  
 su timediff if _n <= 500, detail 
 scalar meantop500 = `r(mean)' 
 scalar sdtop500 = `r(sd)' 
 su timediff if cites >= p80, detail 
 scalar medianp80 = `r(p50)' 
 egen madp80 = mad(timediff) if cites >= p80 
 su madp80 
 scalar madp80 = `r(mean)' 
  
 hist timediff if _n <= 100, percent width(10) xscale(reverse) 
name(statuteh`y'top100) nodraw /// 
  title(`y', size(large) color(black) position(12) orientation(horizontal) 
ring(0) margin(vlarge)) 
  
 keep if _n <= 500 
 save "$path/_temp/statutemeanagemedianage_topcited`y'.dta", replace 
  
 matrix define year = [year \ `y'] 
 matrix define meanage_topcited = [meanage_topcited \ 
meantop10,meantop50,meantop100,meantop500] 
 matrix define medianage_topcited = [medianage_topcited \ 
medianp99,medianp95,medianp90,medianp80] 
 matrix define sdage_topcited = [sdage_topcited \ sdtop10, sdtop50, sdtop100, 
sdtop500] 






matrix define meanagemediansdmad = 
[year,meanage_topcited,medianage_topcited,sdage_topcited,madage_topcited] 
svmat meanagemediansdmad, names(col) 
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drop if year == . 
ren * statute* 
ren statuteyear year 
save "$path/_temp/statutemeanagemedianage_topcited_all.dta", replace 





twoway (line meantop10 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line meantop50 year, 
lcolor(gs7) lpattern(dash)) (line meantop100 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line statutemeantop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line statutemeantop50 year, 
lcolor(gs7)) (line statutemeantop100 year, lcolor(gs4))  /// 
  , name(statutemean) xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(mean) 
legend(region(col(white)) rows(2) /// 
  label(1 "case top 10") label(2 "case top 50") label(3 "case top 100")  
label(4 "statute top 10") label(5 "statute top 50") label(6 "statute top 100")) 
twoway (line sdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line sdtop50 year, lcolor(gs7) 
lpattern(dash)) (line sdtop100 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line statutesdtop10 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line statutesdtop50 year, 
lcolor(gs7)) (line statutesdtop100 year, lcolor(gs4))  /// 
  , name(statutesd) xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(sd) legend(off) 
twoway (line medianp99 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line medianp95 year, 
lcolor(gs7) lpattern(dash)) (line medianp90 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash))  /// 
  (line statutemedianp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line statutemedianp95 year, 
lcolor(gs7)) (line statutemedianp90 year, lcolor(gs4))  /// 
  , name(statutemedian) xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(median) 
legend(region(col(white)) rows(2) /// 
  label(1 "case top 1%") label(2 "case 5%") label(3 "case 10%") label(4 
"statute top 1%") label(5 "statute top 5%") label(6 "statute top 10%")) 
twoway (line madp99 year, lcolor(gs10) lpattern(dash)) (line madp95 year, lcolor(gs7) 
lpattern(dash)) (line madp90 year, lcolor(gs4) lpattern(dash)) (line madp80 year, 
lcolor(black) lpattern(dash)) /// 
  (line statutemadp99 year, lcolor(gs10)) (line statutemadp95 year, 
lcolor(gs7)) (line statutemadp90 year, lcolor(gs4)) (line statutemadp80 year, 
lcolor(black)) /// 
  , name(statutemad) xlabel(1700(40)1865) title(mad) legend(off) 
 
grc1leg  statutemean statutesd 
graph export "$path/statutemeanage_sdage_topcited.png", replace 
 
grc1leg statutemedian statutemad 
graph export "$path/statutemedianage_madage_toppercentiles.png", replace 
 
graph combine statuteh1740top100 statuteh1790top100 statuteh1810top100 
statuteh1860top100, xcommon ycommon 
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*** top 100 authorities in specific time periods 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
forvalues y = 1740(30)1830 { 
 preserve 
 local yend = `y' + 30 
 di "`y'`yend'" 
 keep if inrange(citing_date, `y',`yend') 
 collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(cited_statutedate cited_statutechapter) 
 gsort - cites + cited_statutechapter 
 drop if cited_statutechapter == . 
 keep if _n <= 100 
 hist cited_statutedate, freq width(10) name(statuteh`y'_`yend') 
xlabel(1200(200)1865) nodraw /// 
  xtitle(year of cited statute) title(`y' - `yend', size(large) color(black) 




graph combine statuteh1740_1770 statuteh1770_1800 statuteh1800_1830 
statuteh1830_1860, ycommon 







*** time profiles 
** random citing model 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/2_Cleaning/_statutes 
added/statutenumbers.dta" 
keep if inrange(cited_statutedate,1580,1865) 




* generate semidecades variable 
gen semidecade = 5 * floor(date/5)  
gen decade = 10 * floor(date/10) 
* calculate number of statutes per year and number of total statutes preceding year 
bysort semidecade: egen statutessemidecade = sum(statutes) 
duplicates drop statutessemidecade, force 
drop date statutes 
 
gen statutestotal = . 
 replace statutestotal = 0 if _n == 1 
 replace statutestotal = statutessemidecade[_n-1] + statutestotal[_n-1] if _n > 1 
 
bysort decade: egen statutesdecade = total(statutessemidecade) 
 
** citing_decade to cited_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
preserve 
forvalues y = 1700(10)1865 { 
 su statutestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 if `r(N)' != 0 { 
  gen citing_statutestotal = `r(mean)' 
  gen citing_randompercent`y' = statutessemidecade/citing_statutestotal if 
semidecade < `y' 
  drop citing_statutestotal 
 } 
 else { 




* clean, reshape and save to file 
drop decade statutessemidecade statutestotal statutesdecade 
ren semidecade cited_semidecade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_semidecade) j(citing_decade) 
order citing_decade cited_semidecade 





** cited_decade to citing_semidecade 
* calculate probabilities in random citing model 
forvalues y = 1580(5)1865 { 
 su statutestotal if semidecade == `y' 
 if `r(N)' != 0 {  
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  gen citing_statutestotal = `r(mean)' 
  gen citing_randompercenttemp`y' = 
statutessemidecade/citing_statutestotal if semidecade < `y' 
  bysort decade: egen citing_randompercent`y' = 
total(citing_randompercenttemp`y'), missing 
  drop citing_statutestotal citing_randompercenttemp`y' 
 } 
 else { 




* clean, reshape and save to file 
keep if semidecade/10 == int(semidecade/10) 
drop semidecade statutessemidecade statutestotal statutesdecade 
ren decade cited_decade 
dropmiss citing*, obs force 
reshape long citing_randompercent, i(cited_decade) j(citing_semidecade) 
order citing_semidecade cited_decade 




** actual observations 
* open case citations file 
clear 
use "$statutesinput" 
keep if citing_date > cited_statutedate 
keep if citing_date >= 1700 
keep if inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
 
* generate semidecades variable 
gen citing_semidecade = 5 * floor(citing_date/5)  
gen cited_semidecade = 5 * floor(cited_statutedate/5)  
 
* generate citation counts per cited semidecade by citing decade  
collapse (count) cites = citing_uid, by(citing_decade cited_semidecade) 
by citing_decade: egen citing_decadetotal = total(cites) 
gen citesrel = cites/citing_decadetotal 
 
merge 1:1 citing_decade cited_semidecade using "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER 
paper/4_Presentation/Figures/_temp/statutetimeprofilerandomcites citingdecade to 
citedsemidecade.dta" 
drop if _merge == 1 
dropmiss citesrel citing_randompercent, obs force 




twoway (line citesrel cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1650(100)1850, grid) 
ytitle(fraction of citations) lcolor(gs6)) ///  
 (line citing_randompercent cited_semidecade, xtitle("") xlabel(1650(100)1850) 
lcolor(gs10) lpattern(shortdash)) /// 
 , by(citing_decade, note("") legend(off) rows(3) compact) 




*** time plot of parameter estimates from conditional logit model 
clear 
graph drop _all 
use "/Users/M/Documents/Research/ER paper/3_Analysis/model estimation/additional 
estimations/statutes/results_constrained.dta" 
replace delta = -1*delta 
serrbar delta deltase year, scale(1.96) xlabel(1700(20)1870) legend(off) addplot(lowess 
delta year, bwidth(0.2) lcolor(red) xlabel(1700(20)1870)) 







*** case-statute use 
* prepare data 
clear 
use "$citesinput" 
append using "$statutesinput" 
drop if citing_date <= cited_date & cited_date != . 
drop if citing_date <= cited_statutedate & cited_statutedate != . 
drop if citing_date < 1700 
drop if citing_date > 1865 
drop if cited_statutedate < 1580 
drop if cited_statutedate > 1865 & cited_statutedate != . 
drop if !inlist(citing_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP") 
drop if !inlist(cited_court,"CP","EX","KB","NP","") 
 
* calculate case and statute citations per case 
bysort citing_uidcombined: egen casecites = count(cited_uid) 
bysort citing_uidcombined: egen statutecites = count(cited_statutedate) 
gen totalcites = casecites + statutecites 
gen casescites_rel = casecites / totalcites 
gen statutecites_rel = statutecites / totalcites 




* calculate annual mean 
bysort citing_date: egen statutecitesmean = mean(statutecites_rel) 
 
* plot graphs 
hist statutecites_rel, percent width(0.2) xlabel(0(0.2)1, grid) xtitle(fraction of statute 
citations in citing case) note("") by(citing_decade,  note("")) 
graph export "$path/statute fraction case citations.png", replace 
 
duplicates drop citing_date, force 
twoway (line statutecitesmean citing_date) (lowess statutecitesmean citing_date), 
xlabel(1700(20)1870) ylabel(0(0.2)1) legend(off) 
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